Gleason v. Metropolitan Council Transit Operations

Decision Date20 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. C2-96-2475,C2-96-2475
Parties10 NDLR P 41 Melissa GLEASON, Respondent, v. The METROPOLITAN COUNCIL TRANSIT OPERATIONS, et al., Appellants.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Syllabus by the Court

1. Official immunity does not bar discrimination claims based on allegations of a bus driver's harassing and belittling comments to a disabled passenger because such comments do not constitute discretionary conduct.

2. Even when an official's conduct is discretionary, official immunity will not bar suit if the official acted without legal reasonableness in violating a known right. For purposes of official immunity, if an official acts with legal justification or with subjective good faith, his or her conduct is "legally reasonable."

3. The official asserting immunity from suit must demonstrate that no genuine issues of material fact exist on whether immunity applies.

4. An appeal from an immunity decision ordinarily involves a question of law. Fact-based challenges to the merits of the underlying action will not be considered on appeal.

5. Statutory immunity is not a defense to disability discrimination claims brought under the Minnesota Human Rights Act.

Robert M. Smith, Roger C. Alderson, Minneapolis, for Respondent.

Timothy R. Thornton, Eric J. Rucker, Briggs and Morgan, Minneapolis, for Appellants.

Considered and decided by LANSING, P.J., and SHORT and KLAPHAKE, JJ.

OPINION

LANSING, Presiding Judge.

In a case involving alleged disability discrimination, the Metropolitan Council Transit Operations appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment based on official and statutory immunity. We affirm the denial of official immunity and affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of statutory immunity.

FACTS

Melissa Gleason is disabled and confined to a wheel chair. She uses a three-wheeled, motorized wheelchair instead of the conventional four-wheeled wheelchair with two large wheels in the rear and two small wheels in the front. Before the incidents alleged in her complaint, she was a routine passenger on Metropolitan Council Transit Operations (MCTO) buses.

On December 2, 1995, Gleason boarded a wheelchair-accessible MCTO bus driven by Merrill Denenny. Gleason's complaint alleges that she recognized Denenny as a driver who had neglected to assist her in the past and who had publicly belittled her for using a "tricycle" as a wheelchair.

After Gleason boarded the bus using the lift, she backed her wheelchair into the designated space. According to Gleason, Denenny made no attempt to secure her wheelchair with safety belts as required by MCTO policy. Rather, he stood up and told the other bus passengers that there was a problem, that, because of Gleason, there would be a significant delay, and that they should disembark and board a separate bus. The other passengers all exited leaving Gleason alone on the bus with Denenny. Denenny then allegedly radioed for a supervisor stating that he had a "young one on a tricycle" whom he refused to transport. When Gleason asked Denenny to be removed from the bus, he first ignored her and then told her she would have to wait for a supervisor.

Some time later Sandra Hoeft, a MCTO supervisor, arrived. Gleason alleges that Hoeft ignored her attempts to explain what had happened. Gleason began to experience a physical tremor, a response to stress associated with her disability. Hoeft escorted Gleason off the bus and onto the next bus. The other passengers also boarded this second bus. The driver of the second bus secured Gleason's chair with the appropriate restraints and fastened the lap belt at Gleason's request.

Gleason filed suit against the MCTO, Denenny, and Hoeft. Her complaint alleges: (1) disability discrimination and aiding and abetting disability discrimination in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 363.01, 363.03, by all three respondents; (2) false imprisonment by Denenny; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress by all respondents; (4) negligent supervision, retention, training and hiring by the MCTO; and (5) respondeat superior as applied to the MCTO for the statutory violations and negligent acts of Denenny and Hoeft.

The MCTO, Denenny and Hoeft moved for dismissal arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because Gleason's complaint challenged a policy of the MCTO and such policies could only be reviewed by writ of certiorari. Alternatively, they moved for summary judgment on the basis of statutory and official immunity. The district court denied the motions, and this appeal followed.

ISSUES

I. Are Gleason's claims barred by official immunity?

II. Are Gleason's claims barred by statutory immunity?

III. Did the district court lack jurisdiction because review of Gleason's claims may only be obtained by writ of certiorari?

ANALYSIS

Whether an immunity defense applies is a question of law subject to independent review. Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 45 (Minn.1996). An order denying an immunity defense is appealable as of right because immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn.1986). The burden is on the party asserting an immunity defense to demonstrate that it is entitled to immunity. Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn.1997).

I. Official immunity

Official immunity is a common law doctrine intended "to protect public officials 'from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action.' " Janklow v. Minnesota Bd. of Exam'rs, 552 N.W.2d 711, 715 (Minn.1996) (quoting Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn.1988)). When a public official is charged by law to perform duties that require the exercise of discretion or judgment he or she may be immune from personal liability for injuries resulting from performance of those duties. See Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976). Official immunity protects all decisions made by a public official when those decisions call for the exercise of discretion. Watson by Hanson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 414 (Minn.1996). Stated differently, official immunity covers all but the "ministerial duties" of a public official, that is, duties that are "absolute, certain and imperative." Id.

But there are limits to the operation of official immunity. When an official willfully exercises his or her discretion in a manner that violates a known right, the protection of official immunity evaporates. See Rico v. State, 472 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Minn.1991). This limitation, often referred to as the "malice" exception, is defined by an "objective inquiry into the legal reasonableness of an official's actions." State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn.1994).

The starting point for analysis of an immunity question is the identification of "the precise governmental conduct at issue." Watson, 553 N.W.2d at 415. Gleason's complaint and her memorandum in opposition to the MCTO's motion for summary judgment allege three specific offending acts: (1) Denenny's harassing/belittling comments made in an attempt to embarrass Gleason and discourage her from using the MCTO; (2) Denenny's failure to secure the wheelchair; and (3) Denenny's refusal to let Gleason off the bus. 1

We stress the importance of identifying the precise alleged conduct giving rise to the plaintiff's claims at the outset of an immunities analysis. What governmental conduct the plaintiff is challenging is determinative of whether an immunity applies. The dissent, for example, characterizes the challenged conduct as allegations that "the driver failed to secure [Gleason's] wheelchair, refused to transport passengers until a proper tie-down had been accomplished, and called his supervisor for assistance." But those are not the allegations upon which Gleason's discrimination claims are based. Rather, her complaint alleges that Denenny "loudly pronounced that Ms. Gleason should not ride MCTO buses on her three-wheeled wheelchair," and "stated that he had a 'young one on a tricycle' whom he refused to take anywhere." The complaint further alleges that Denenny's intent was "to discourage Ms. Gleason from using MCTO public transportation." In addition, Gleason alleged that Denenny "made no attempts to secure [her] wheelchair." (Emphasis in original.) It is undisputed that Gleason's wheelchair had been successfully secured on previous MCTO bus rides and that it was successfully secured on the evening of the alleged occurrence by a different MCTO driver.

Official immunity analysis applies a two-step inquiry to the identified conduct: first, we determine whether the conduct required the exercise of judgment and discretion and is therefore the type of conduct protected by official immunity; and second, we determine whether the alleged acts, even though discretionary, were stripped of the immunity's protection because the official acted without legal reasonableness in violating a known right. See Davis v. Hennepin County, 559 N.W.2d 117, 122 (Minn.App.1997) (applying two-step process), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1997).

The supreme court has defined a ministerial duty as " 'absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely the execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts.' " Johnson, 553 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting Cook v. Trovatten, 200 Minn. 221, 224, 274 N.W. 165, 167 (1937)). A discretionary act, unlike a ministerial act, is one in which an official must exercise " 'judgment or discretion.' " Id. (quoting Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 677).

Gleason first alleges that Denenny made harassing and belittling comments about her in an effort to embarrass her and discourage her from riding the bus. The option of harassing and belittling a person with a disability is never left to the discretion of a public official. Indeed, the MCTO drivers' Pocket Guide instructs bus...

To continue reading

Request your trial
42 cases
  • Ap ex rel. Peterson v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. No. 11, No. 06-CV-2342 (PJS/RLE).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • March 17, 2008
    ...to act "willfully" is to "violate[] a known right," and the inquiry is objective, not subjective. Gleason v. Met. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 315 (Minn.Ct.App.1997), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 582 N.W.2d 216 (Minn.1998). The applicable standard "contemplates less of a sub......
  • W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A. B.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • October 31, 2014
    ...N.W.2d 728, 729 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (school board immune for negligent hiring and supervision); Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (claims for negligent supervision, hiring, training and retention are immune as discretionary acts); Doe ......
  • W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • November 18, 2014
    ...Mich.App. 692, 314 N.W.2d 728, 729 (1981) (school board immune for negligent hiring and supervision); Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 320 (Minn.Ct.App.1997) (claims for negligent supervision, hiring, training and retention are immune as discretionary acts); Doe......
  • W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 13-0037
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 27, 2014
    ...314 N.W.2d 728, 729 (Mich. App. 1981) (school board immune for negligent hiring and supervision); Gleason v. Metro. Council Transit Operations, 563 N.W.2d 309, 320 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (claims for negligent supervision, hiring, training and retention are immune as discretionary acts); Doe ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT