Gleason v. Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co.

• Decision Date: 28 October 1948
• Docket Number: No. 2818.,2818.
• Citation: 214 S.W.2d 640
• Parties: GLEASON v. SOUTHWESTERN SUGAR & MOLASSES CO.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

214 S.W.2d 640

GLEASON v. SOUTHWESTERN SUGAR & MOLASSES CO.

No. 2818.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Waco.

October 28, 1948.

Appeal from District Court, Jim Wells County; L. Broeter, Judge.

Action by L. O. Gleason, Jr., doing business as Alice Pipe and Supply Company, against Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co., for breach of contract involving the purchase and sale of a pump. From judgment sustaining defendant's plea of privilege, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and judgment rendered over-ruling defendant's plea of privilege.

Lon D. Herbert, of Alice, for appellant.

Jack W. Knight, of Houston, for appellee.

HALE, Justice.

Appellant sued appellee, a private corporation, in the District Court of Jim Wells County for damages on account of the alleged breach of a contract involving the purchase, and sale of a pump. Appellee answered with a plea of privilege, asserting the right to be sued in Harris County. Appellant duly controverted the plea upon the grounds set forth in Subdvs. 5 and 23 of Art. 1995, Vernon's Tex.Civ. Stats. A hearing upon the issues thus joined by the pleadings was had before the court below without a jury and resulted in judgment sustaining the plea of privilege.

By appropriate points in his brief appellant says the court below erred in transferring the cause to Harris County because, among other reasons, his controverting affidavit and the undisputed evidence adduced upon the hearing show conclusively that his cause of action, or a part thereof, arose in Jim Wells County. We sustain this contention.

Subdv. 23 of Art. 1995, Vernon's Tex.Civ.Stats., provides in effect that suits against a private corporation may be brought in any county in which the cause of action, or a part thereof, arose. The making of a valid contract and its breach, with resulting damage, gives rise to a cause of action on behalf of the aggrieved party. Consequently, within the meaning of the foregoing venue statute, such a cause of action arises in part within the county where the contract is made or where it is breached. Silvers Box Corp. v. J. E. Stone & Co., Tex.Civ.App., 248 S.W. 1104; United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco, Tex.Civ.App., 100 S.W.2d 1099; National Life Co. v. Wolverton, Tex.Civ. App., 163 S.W.2d 654; Panther Oil & Grease Mfg. Co. v. Schumaker, Tex.Civ. App., 166 S.W.2d 205.

Furthermore, it is generally held that a contract is made at the place where the offer of one of the contracting parties is accepted by the other party. Texas Supply Co. v. Clarke, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 573; Early-Foster Co. v. A. P. Moore's Sons, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W. 787; Cowdin Grocery Co. v. Early-Foster Co., Tex. Civ.App., 237 S.W. 578.

Upon the hearing in this proceeding appellant introduced in evidence 14 written exhibits, various stipulations and admissions, and the verbal testimony of three witnesses, all as shown in the statement of facts. The evidence so introduced is clear and free of conflicts. Appellee offered no evidence.

Under the 1st, 2nd and 3rd points in his brief, appellant says his controverting affidavit and the undisputed evidence developed at the hearing show (1) that the contract here sued upon was made in Jim Wells County because such contract was shown to consist of an offer of appellee which was accepted by appellant in the latter county; (2) that the contract was breached by appellee in Jim Wells County; and (3) that appellant's damages resulting from the breach of the contract were sustained in that county. A statement of the facts and evidence pertinent to each point, with references to the pages in the record where the same may be found, is set forth in the brief in accordance with the requirements of Rule 418, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The statements so made by appe...