Gleaves v. Checker Cab, 97-00183

Citation15 S.W.3d 799
Decision Date22 February 2000
Docket Number97-00183
PartiesMICHAEL C. GLEAVES, Appellant, v. CHECKER CAB TRANSIT CORPORATION, INC., Appellee. NO. M1997-00183-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE FILED:
CourtSupreme Court of Tennessee
DAVIDSON COUNTY

HON. HAMILTON V. GAYDEN, JR.,JUDGE

For Appellant:

WILLIAM D. LEADER, JR., JULIE C. MURPHY, Nashville, TN

For Appellee:

STEVEN D. PARMAN, MATTHEW A. BOYD, Nashville, TN

FOR PUBLICATION

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS REVERSED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT REINSTATED.

BIRCH, J.

OPINION
I

We granted this appeal in order to determine whether 6.72.210 of the Code of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County1B. These agreements shall place the vehicles operated under their franchise in the taxicab company's complete possession and control, and the taxicab company shall assume complete liability for each and every vehicle for which it enters into this agreement. (Metro. Code) and the required Taxicab Liability Insurance Agreement23. That the above-named taxicab company, partnership or sole proprietorship shall assume complete liability for each vehicle being operated under its name, color, emblem, design and insignia and shall be liable for any personal injuries or property damage to third parties as the result of the negligent use of these vehicles. (Agreement) impose liability upon Checker Cab Transit Corporation, Inc. (Checker) for injuries to a third party caused by the negligence of one of Checker's contract drivers who was "off-duty" at the time of the incident. Because we find that the ordinance and the Agreement impose liability on the taxicab company regardless of the status (on-duty/off-duty) of the driver, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the judgment entered by the trial court is reinstated.

II

On the day in question, the record shows that Robert J. Mosley (a driver for Checker) began work at about 5:30 a.m. and reported "off-duty" by radio at approximately 9:20 p.m. Shortly after reporting "off-duty," and while en route home, Mosley's high speed attracted the attention of City of Lakewood police officers. A high speed chase ensued. The chase ended at about 10:05 p.m. when Mosley collided with a vehicle operated by Michael C. Gleaves. Gleaves sustained serious injuries.

Gleaves filed a lawsuit against Checker, Mosley, the City of Lakewood, and a City of Lakewood police officer. He sought damages under the theories of negligent hiring and supervision, respondeat superior, 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and under 6.72.210 of the Metro. Code. Checker moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Checker on the common law claims but denied summary judgment to Checker on the issue of liability under the ordinance. Instead, the court granted, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of Gleaves, ruling that 6.72.210 imposed liability on Checker for Mosley's negligence. The question of Mosley's negligence was submitted to a jury, and it determined that Mosley was 70 percent at fault and the City of Lakewood was 30 percent at fault. Applying 6.72.210, the trial court held Checker liable in accordance with the jury's apportionment of fault.

Checker appealed the trial court's ruling on the issue of liability under 6.72.210, and Gleaves appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on his common law claims. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment against Checker and dismissed Gleaves's complaint but affirmed the trial court's judgment in all other aspects. The sole issue on appeal is whether 6.72.210 imposes liability upon Checker for Mosley's negligence while "off-duty."3

The Metropolitan Council of Nashville and Davidson County (Metropolitan Council) closely regulates the taxicab business. In order to operate a taxicab service within Davidson County, a taxicab company must first obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the taxicab licensing board. Metro. Gov't. of Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, 6.72.020.4 Mosley was operating his taxicab under the authority of a certificate of public convenience and necessity issued to Checker Cab Transportation Corporation, Inc.

The taxicab company must also "file a liability insurance agreement with the taxicab and wrecker licensing board for each taxicab operated under [its] franchise." Metro. Gov't. of Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, 6.72.210(A). The liability insurance agreement places "the vehicles operated under [the company's] franchise in the taxicab company's complete possession and control" and the company must "assume complete liability for each and every vehicle for which it enters" the agreement. Id. at ch. 6.72, 6.72.210(B). A liability insurance agreement between Checker and its operators makes Checker "complete[ly] liable for each vehicle being operated under its name, color, emblem, design and insignia," and Checker is liable "for any personal injuries or property damage to third parties as the result of the negligent use of these vehicles." Agreement, supra n.2. Mosley and Checker had entered into the above-described agreement, and it had been filed.

For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to describe the relationship between Checker and its drivers. Checker is essentially a dispatch service. Typically, a customer telephones Checker, requests a taxicab, and a dispatcher contacts a driver by radio and directs him or her to the customer. Checker owns none of the taxicabs which it dispatches. Instead, the owner of the vehicle is personally responsible for the vehicle's maintenance, not Checker. Moreover, Checker does not share directly in any of the fare income. The only financial obligation an owner has to Checker is payment of a weekly fee for the use of a meter, a radio, a top light, Checker's dispatch service, Checker's distinctive paint scheme, Checker's emblem, Checker's insignia, and the right to drive under Checker's certificate of public convenience and necessity.

III

The construction of the pertinent ordinances controls the resolution of this case. Gleaves essentially insists that 6.72.210 imposes complete liability on Checker for the negligence of the driver of any vehicle for which Checker has filed a liability insurance agreement. This result is dictated, contends Gleaves, by the clear and unambiguous language of the ordinance. Checker, on the other hand, contends that a taxicab operates under a company's franchise only when it is actively seeking or transporting passengers and that the ordinance imposes liability only when a taxicab is operated under the taxicab company's franchise. Thus, according to Checker, no liability should be imposed upon Checker for a driver's negligence while "off-duty." As the Court of Appeals aptly noted, "[a] cursory review of the selected provisions [of the ordinances] could lead to either conclusion."

IV

"Construction of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo, with no presumption of correctness." Myint v. Allstate Ins. Co., 970 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tenn. 1998). The rules of statutory interpretation are used when interpreting an ordinance. See Tennessee Mfg. Housing Ass'n. v. Metro. Gov't. of Nashville, 798 S.W.2d 254, 260 (Tenn. App. 1990); see also Carroll Blake Constr. Co. v. Boyle, 140 Tenn. 166, 181, 203 S.W. 945, 948 (1918).

A "basic rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention and purpose of the legislature." Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc. v. State Dep't. of Revenue, 865 S.W.2d 1,2 (Tenn. 1993). In determining legislative intent and purpose, a court must not "unduly restrict[] or expand[] a statute's coverage beyond its intended scope." Worely v. Weigels, Inc., 919 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tenn. 1996)(quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995)). Rather, a court ascertains a statute's purpose from the plain and ordinary meaning of its language, see Westland West Community Ass'n. v. Knox County, 948 S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tenn. 1997), "without forced or subtle construction that would limit or extend the meaning of the language." Carson Creek Vacation Resorts, Inc., 865 S.W.2d at 2.

When, however, a statute is without contradiction or ambiguity, there is no need to force its interpretation or construction, and courts are not at liberty to depart from the words of the statute. Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960 S.W.2d 10, 16 (Tenn. 1997). Moreover, if "the language contained within the four corners of a statute is plain, clear, and unambiguous, the duty of the courts is simple and obvious, 'to say sic lex scripta, and obey it.'" Id. (quoting Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 320, 321-22 (1841)). Therefore, "[i]f the words of a statute plainly mean one thing they cannot be given another meaning by judicial construction." Henry v. White, 194 Tenn. 192, 198, 250 S.W.2d 70,72 (1952).

Finally, it is not for the courts to alter or amend a statute. See Town of Mount Carmel v. City of Kingsport, 217 Tenn. 298, 306, 397 S.W.2d 379, 382 (1965); see also Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 453 (Tenn. 1995); Manahan v. State, 188 Tenn. 394, 397, 219 S.W.2d 900,901 (1949). Moreover, a court must not question the "reasonableness of [a] statute or substitut[e] [its] own policy judgments for those of the legislature." BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. Greer, 972 S.W.2d 663, 673 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Instead, courts must "presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there." Id. Accordingly, courts must construe a statute as it is written. See Jackson v. Jackson, 186 Tenn. 337, 342, 210 S.W.2d 332, 334 (1948).

V

The language of the ordinance is plain, clear, and unambiguous. It requires that all certified taxicab companies "assume complete liability" for each vehicle for which it enters into a liability insurance agreement. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Co., Tenn. Code ch. 6.72, 6.72.210(B) (1991) (...

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