Glenn v. Farmland Foods, Inc.

• Decision Date: 15 February 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-451,83-451
• Citation: 344 N.W.2d 240
• Parties: Aaron M. GLENN, Appellant, v. FARMLAND FOODS, INC., A Corporation, and Steve Tierney, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 240

344 N.W.2d 240

Aaron M. GLENN, Appellant, v.FARMLAND FOODS, INC., A Corporation, and Steve Tierney, Appellees.

No. 83-451.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 15, 1984.

MacDonald Smith and LeRoy J. Sturgeon of Smith & Smith, Sioux City, for appellant.

F. David Eastman of Law Offices of Walter C. Schroeder, Mason City, for appelleeFarmland Foods, Inc.

Philip S. Deats and Thomas C. Whitesell of Whitesell Law Firm, Iowa Falls, for appelleeSteve Tierney.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C.J., and UHLENHOPP, HARRIS, McCORMICK, and WOLLE, JJ.

REYNOLDSON, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff, Aaron M. Glenn, brought this tort action against his employer and a co-employee, alleging their "gross negligence amounting to wanton neglect" caused a work-related injury.Trial court, dismissing count I of plaintiff's petition, against his employer, found it had no subject matter jurisdiction.The court dismissed count II of plaintiff's petition, against the co-employee, pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1.We affirm.

August 11, 1980, plaintiff Glenn filed a petition in district court seeking damages from his employer, Farmland Foods, Inc., and from a supervisory co-employee, Steve Tierney.The petition alleged defendant Tierney knowingly ordered plaintiff to do work that aggravated an already existing back injury.Plaintiff sought both actual and punitive damages from each defendant.

The employer filed a responsive pleading denominated "ANSWER OF FARMLAND FOODS, INC."Although it began "COMES NOW, Farmland Foods, Inc., ... and for separate answer to the Petition filed by the Plaintiff states," it was signed "WALTER C. SCHROEDER, ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANTS."(Emphasis added.)As noted in division II, below, plaintiff's attorney incorrectly assumed from this signature that defendant Tierney had been served and was appearing in the case.

In its answer, Farmland pleaded the exclusive jurisdiction of the industrial commissioner over employees' actions seeking redress for work-related injuries.The district court agreed and dismissed Farmland from the case on July 6, 1981.That dismissal forms the first ground for plaintiff's appeal.

I.Iowa Code section 85.20 makes the injured employee's right to workers' compensation his exclusive remedy against his employer.It states in pertinent part as follows:

85.20.Rights of employee exclusive.The rights and remedies provided in this chapter, ... for an employee on account of injury, ... for which benefits under this chapter ... are recoverable, shall be the exclusive and only rights and remedies of such employee, the employee's personal or legal representatives, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, ... against:

1. his or her employer; or

2. any other employee of such employer, provided that such injury, ... arises out of and in the course of such employment and is not caused by the other employee's gross negligence amounting to such lack of care as to amount to wanton neglect for the safety of another.

(Emphasis added.)

This remedy limitation is buttressed by Code section 85.3, which requires "every employer, ... [to] provide, secure, and pay compensation" and in return relieves each employer "from other liability for recovery of damages or other compensation."

We consistently have interpreted these sections as prohibiting an employee from suing his or her employer for damages.SeeSteffens v. Proehl, 171 N.W.2d 297, 300(Iowa1969);Jansen v. Harmon, 164 N.W.2d 323, 326(Iowa1969);Fabricius v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 254 Iowa 1319, 1321, 121 N.W.2d 361, 362(1963);Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 387, 101 N.W.2d 167, 174(1960).

Plaintiff, however, contends these cases were nullified by a 1974amendment to the workers' compensation law.We disagree.The 1974amendment acted primarily to define the status of co-employees, making them statutorily immune from suit except in cases of "gross negligence."See1974 Iowa Actsch. 1111.The statutory immunity remained unchanged for employers; the amendment created no new cause of action against the employer flowing from an allegation of co-employee gross negligence.Our interpretation is supported both by the language of the present statute and by its legislative history.When introduced, the legislation was designated "AN ACT to provide that the right to workmen's compensation shall be the exclusive remedy to an employee against his employer or fellow employee."Id.The floor amendment allowing suit against a grossly negligent co-employee said nothing about lifting the employer's immunity in such situations.In Larimer v. Raque Manufacturing Co., 498 F.Supp. 37, 38(S.D.Iowa1980), a federal case arising well after the 1974amendments, the court described Iowa's law thusly:

By statute and case law, jurisdiction of the subject matter of cases between employers and employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment is exclusively in the Industrial Commission, and the District Court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of such cases....Thus, coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act provides a special defense to the employer in suits by the employee.

See alsoHarned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331 N.W.2d 98, 99-100(Iowa1983).

Plaintiff's argument based on Code section 85.22 is similarly without merit.That section allows an action in tort against a legally liable third party and provides for indemnification of the employer or his insurer from the proceeds of the suit:

85.22.Liability of others--subrogation.When an employee receives an injury ... for which compensation is payable under this chapter, ... and which injury ... is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability against some person, other than his or her employer or any employee of such employer as provided in section 85.20 to pay damages, the employee, or the employee's dependent or the trustee of such dependent, may take proceedings against the employer for compensation, and the employee or, in case of death, the employee's legal representative may also maintain an action against such third party for damages.When an injured employee or the employee's legal representative brings an action against such third party, a copy of the original notice shall be served upon the employer by the plaintiff, not less than ten days before the trial of the case, but a failure to give such notice shall not prejudice the rights of the employer, ....

Plaintiff argues this section supports his theory that section 85.20 permits suit against the employer as well as against the third party, here the alleged grossly negligent co-employee.Section 85.22, however, clearly negates such interpretation.While the employee is empowered to "maintain an action against such third party for damages,"he"may take proceedings against the employer [only] for compensation."(Emphasis added.)Additionally, the statute requires a plaintiff-employee to serve his or her employer with notice of the tort suit at least ten days before trial.Such a provision would be redundant if the employer could be made a codefendant in the suit, requiring notice at its outset.

"Where ... the language of the statute is clear and plain there is no room for construction, and the sole function of this court is to apply the statute according to its terms,"Hinders v. City of Ames, 329 N.W.2d 654, 655(Iowa1983)(citations omitted).The workers' compensation statute clearly and plainly bars plaintiff's tort suit against his employer.We thus affirm trial court's dismissal of defendant Farmland.

II.Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1 requires all cases on file for more than one year by July 15 to be tried by January 1 of the next year.August 13, 1982, the clerk of court sent plaintiff's attorney the try-or-dismiss notice required by the rule.The latter then contacted attorney Schroeder, whom he incorrectly believed to be acting for the defendant co-employee, Tierney.He then learned for the first time this defendant had never been served.Service on Tierney finally was effected on December 1, 1982.The latter responded by filing a motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's receipt of the try-or-dismiss notice.Plaintiff then sought a continuance of his action against Tierney, or alternatively, its reinstatement following the inevitable January 1, 1983, dismissal.He asserted he had taken immediate steps to rectify the lack of service on Tierney and explained his district court inactivity resulted from his simultaneous pursuit of his workers' compensation remedy.

Trial court correctly denied Tierney's motion to dismiss, seeBaty v. City of West Des Moines, 259 Iowa 1017, 1026, 147 N.W.2d 204, 210(1966)("Rule 215.1 was intended to be a shield, not a sword.").The court's denial of plaintiff's motion for continuance or reinstatement forms the second ground for plaintiff's appeal.

"[T]he matter of a continuance is addressed to the sound legal discretion of the [trial] court,"Crouch v. Randolph, 213 N.W.2d 673, 678(Iowa1973), and absent a showing "that such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly...