Glenn v. Mataloni
| Decision Date | 30 November 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:20-cv-00069,1:20-cv-00069 |
| Parties | TYRONE K. GLENN, Plaintiff, v. JOSEPH MATALONI, et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
(Judge Kane)
Presently before the Court are several motions to dismiss and for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 33, 36, 38, 42, 60) filed by Defendants Joseph Mataloni ("Mataloni"), Renato Diaz ("Diaz"), Anthony Chiavacci ("Chiavacci"), Myron Stanishefski ("Stanishefski"), Stanley Stanish ("Stanish"), Prison Health Services, Inc. ("PHS"), Wexford Health Services, Inc. ("Wexford"), and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition. The Court will also screen Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Larisa Yarczower ("Yarczower") pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").1
Pro se Plaintiff Tyrone Glenn ("Plaintiff') is currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Somerset, Pennsylvania ("SCI Somerset"). In 2005, Plaintiff initiated a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Mataloni, Diaz, and Yarczower, alleging that they had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate medical treatment for what Plaintiff described as a "parasitic worm-like creature squirming around inside [his] anal cavity that had mandibles." See Glenn v. Mataloni, No. 1:05-cv-1934, 2005 WL 3159195, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 28, 2005). In a Memorandum and Order dated November 28,2005, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See id. In doing so, the Court concluded that Plaintiff had failed to set forth an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Mataloni, Diaz, and Yarczower because it was "clearly a case where . . . Plaintiff has been given significant medical attention and is simply dissatisfied with the results." See id. at *3. On July 13, 2006, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the Court's November 28, 2005 Memorandum and Order. See Glenn v. Mataloni, No. 1:05-cv-1934, 2006 WL 1983167, at *1 (M.D. Pa. July 13, 2006). On November 2, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed Plaintiff's appeal for failure to prosecute. See Glenn v. Mataloni, No. 1:05-cv-1934 (M.D. Pa.) (Doc. No. 13). On December 19, 2019, Plaintiff filed a request for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. (Doc. No. 14.) In an Order dated January 21, 2020, the Court denied Plaintiff's request. See id. (Doc. No. 18).
Plaintiff initiated the above-captioned action on January 15, 2020 by filing a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants. In an Order dated January 22, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and directed service of his complaint upon Defendants. (Doc. No. 9.) On February 21, 2020, Defendants Mataloni, Stanishefski, and the DOC filed a motion to revoke Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status, asserting that Plaintiff had previously accrued three "strikes" pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). (Doc. No. 19.) In an Order dated April 2, 2020, the Court denied the motion to revoke Plaintiff's in forma pauperis status and directed Defendants to answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within thirty (30) days. (Doc. No. 28.) In an Order dated April 22, 2020, the Court directed Plaintiff to show cause why Defendants Yarczower and PHS should not be dismissed from theabove-captioned action pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 30.) Plaintiff filed his response to the Court's April 22, 2020 Order on April 29, 2020. (Doc. No. 31.)
On May 1, 2020, Defendants Chiavacci, Diaz, Stanish, and Wexford filed a motion to dismiss and brief in support thereof. (Doc. Nos. 33, 34.) That same day, observing that Defendants Chiavacci, Diaz, Stanish, and Wexford raised the issue of whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his claims in accordance with the PLRA, the Court issued a Paladino Order informing the parties that it would consider the exhaustion issue in the context of summary judgment and, by doing so, would consider matters outside the pleadings in its role as factfinder.2 (Doc. No. 35.) The Court directed Defendants to amend and supplement their brief to address the issue of administrative exhaustion and provide a statement of material facts in accordance with Local Rule 56.1. (Id.) On May 4, 2020, Defendants Mataloni, Stanishefski, and the DOC filed a motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 36) and a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. No. 38). On May 8, 2020, the Court issued another Paladino Order directing Plaintiff to respond to the motion for summary judgment within twenty-one (21) days. (Doc. No. 41.) On May 21, 2020, Defendants Chiavacci, Diaz, Stanish, and Wexford filed their motion for summary judgment and supporting materials regarding the issue of exhaustion. (Doc. Nos. 42, 43, 44.) Plaintiff subsequently filed his responses to the motions for summary judgment (Doc. Nos. 45, 46, 48), and Defendants filed their reply briefs (Doc. Nos. 47, 53).
In an Order dated June 15, 2020, the Court directed service of Plaintiff's complaint upon PHS at the address provided by Plaintiff in his response to the Court's April 22, 2020 show cause Order. (Doc. No. 51.) The Court also directed Defendant DOC to provide under seal any information it may have concerning Defendant Yarczower's current whereabouts for service purposes. (Id.) Defendant DOC did so on July 20, 2020. (Doc. No. 54.) In an Order dated July 21, 2020, the Court directed the Clerk of Court to issue summonses so that the United States Marshal could serve the complaint upon Defendants PHS and Yarczower. (Doc. No. 55.) Defendant PHS subsequently waived service (Doc. No. 58), and the summons issued to Defendant Yarczower was returned as executed on August 10, 2020 (Doc. No. 59). Defendant Yarczower, however, has not entered an appearance in the above-captioned case. Defendant PHS filed its motion to dismiss and brief in support on August 14, 2020 (Doc. Nos. 60, 61), and Plaintiff filed his response on September 24, 2020 (Doc. No. 68).
Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must present facts that, accepted as true, demonstrate a plausible right to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," a complaint may nevertheless be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for its "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that their claims are facially plausible. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct: "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged - but it has not 'show[n]' - 'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Accordingly, the Third Circuit has identified the following steps that a district court must take when reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion: (1) identify the elements that a plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) identify any conclusory allegations contained in the complaint that are "not entitled" to the assumption of truth; and (3) determine whether any "well-pleaded factual allegations" contained in the complaint "plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." See Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Third Circuit has specified that in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a court must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the complainant's claims are based upon these documents." See Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In the context of pro se prisoner litigation, the court must be mindful that a document filed pro se is "to be liberally construed." See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A pro se complaint, "however inartfully pleaded," must be held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" and can be dismissed for failure to state a claim only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, federal district courts must "review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)...
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