Glenn v. Metech Recycling Inc.
| Decision Date | 01 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-1066 |
| Parties | GURLEY E. GLENN, Plaintiff, v. METECH RECYCLING INC.; REX CHANG, President, and ROBERT LAUGHLIN, Vice-President, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
Plaintiff Gurley E. Glenn brings this action against his former employer and two of its executives ("Defendants") alleging a host of violations, mainly sounding in employment discrimination. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) Before the Court are Defendants' Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (ECF No. 19), and Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Prosecution, (ECF No. 23). For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's motion to stay will be denied, and Defendants' motion to dismiss will be granted.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed his complaint on October 17, 2019 and, on the same day, filed a separate document that he calls a petition to "amend and supplement" his complaint. (ECF Nos. 2, 3.) As these documents were filed on the same day, as Plaintiff is pro se, and as Defendants have not objected to consideration of Plaintiff's "amendment and supplement," the Court will construe the complaint and the amendment and supplement as a single, unified complaint.
According to Plaintiff, he is a former employee of Metech Recycling Inc. ("Metech"), a "post consumer electronics recycling business." (ECF No. 2 at 1-2.) Metech is headquartered in California and operates a warehouse in Granville County, North Carolina.1 (See id. at 1.) Plaintiff was employed by Metech from July 13, 2011 through February 21, 2014.2 (See ECF No. 14 at 3.)
Though Plaintiff sets forth a number of claims in his complaint, the most developed allegation appears to be that he was subjected to a campaign of peer-on-peer harassment by his co-workers, Rufino Calderon and Chinedau Nnani, and by a company foreman, Carlos Valasques. (See ECF No. 3 at 2.) According to Plaintiff, this harassment began after Plaintiff rebuked Valasques for kicking Spanish-speaking employees who could not easily report this abuse due to his limited English proficiency. (See id.) Following this incident, Valasques "isolated" Plaintiff by assigning him the "repetitive" task of "packaging and labeling computer hard drives." (See id.) Calderon, Nnani, and Valasques also harassed Plaintiff for standing up to Valasques by calling him a "rat" or "ratton." (See id.) In addition, the complaint alleges that the men sexually harassed Plaintiff by making lewd and disparaging remarks about him. (ECF Nos. 2 at 3; 3 at 2.)
Plaintiff has also alleged that Andrew McManus, Metech's chief operator in North Carolina, was "out to get" him due to McManus's belief that Plaintiff was a messy worker and a possible thief. (See ECF No. 2 at 2.) As a result, Plaintiff was often "'pulled off' from doing one task to perform another." (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that no other employee was forced to multi-task in this manner and that this disparate treatment "may have been done in hope of inducing Plaintiff to quit." (Id.)
Further, Plaintiff alleges that he was (1) "subjected to antagonistic interactions of animosity for attempting to offer options for remedy[ing] substandard heat" during the winter of 2014; (2) "retaliated against for not accepting a proposed non-matching investment portfolio or 40l-k retirement plan"; (3) denied overtime pay for "two and one quarter years"; and (4) denied seventeen weeks of Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") benefits. (See ECF No. 3 at 1-2.) Plaintiff appears to also allege that Defendants played a role in his involuntary admission to Duke University Hospital, though this allegation is particularly unclear. (See id. at 2.)
Finally, under the heading "Allegation For Jurisdiction," Plaintiff's complaint lists the following constitutional provisions and statutes, though he does not clearly link the factual allegations in his complaint to these referenced provisions: Section Two of Article Four of the United States Constitution; the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the FMLA; the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA"); North Carolina's Wage and Hour Act("NCWHA"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.3 (ECF No. 2 at 1-2.)
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) on February 3, 2020 and Plaintiff filed his motion to stay prosecution of this action on March 24, 2020. (ECF Nos. 19; 23.)
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint." Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). To survive dismissal, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In assessing a claim's plausibility, a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 539 (4th Cir. 2013). However, "mere conclusory and speculative allegations" are insufficient, Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013), and a court "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments," Vitol, 708 F.3d at 548 ). Further, "[w]hile a pro se litigant's pleadings are liberally construed, a pro se complaint must still contain sufficient facts to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Adams v. Sw. Va. Reg'l Jail Auth., 524 F. App'x 899, 900 (4th Cir.2013) (citation and quotations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion." United States v. Kivanc, 714 F.3d 782, 789 (4th Cir. 2013).
The Court will now consider the parties' respective motions and will first consider Plaintiff's motion to stay the prosecution of this action.
This Court "has the inherent power to stay proceedings to achieve equity and to ensure the efficient management of its docket." John and Jane Doe 2 v. Ortho-Clinical Diagnostics, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 614, 633 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (citing Williford v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F.2d 124, 127 (4th Cir. 1983)). Though such motions are subject to the Court's discretion, this power is not unbounded. Williford, 715 F.2d at 127. Proper use of this authority requires the court to exercise its judgment "to balance the various factors relevant to the expeditious and comprehensive disposition of the causes of action on the court's docket." Maryland v. Universal Elections, Inc., 729 F.3d 370, 375 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 562 F.2d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 1977)). Courts have identified these various factors as: (1) "the interests of judicial economy," (2) the "hardship and equity to the moving party" in the absence of a stay, and (3) the "potential prejudice to the non-moving party" in the event of a stay. See, e.g., White v. Ally Fin. Inc., 969 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 (S.D.W. Va. 2013). The burden rests on the party seeking the stay to "justify it by clear and convincing circumstances outweighing potential harm" to the opposing party. Williford, 715 F.2d at 127.
In this case, after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss on February 3, 2020, (ECF No. 19), the Clerk of Court sent Plaintiff a Roseboro Letter informing him that a failure to filea timely response to Defendants' motion would likely result in his case being dismissed or in summary judgment for the Defendants, (ECF No. 21). After Plaintiff failed to file a timely response, the Clerk of Court sent Plaintiff a second letter, this one dated March 4, 2020. (ECF No. 22.) This letter informed Plaintiff that Defendants' motion would be referred to the Court as an unopposed motion on March 20, unless Plaintiff first filed a proposed response and explained why his neglect was excusable. (Id.) This deadline came and went with no response from Plaintiff. Further, as the Clerk's letter warned Plaintiff, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was submitted to the Court on March 20, 2020 as an unopposed motion. Then, on March 24, Plaintiff filed his Motion to Stay Prosecution, asking the Court "to stay prosecution of [this] action for [ninety] days from the 16th day of March 2020." (ECF No. 23 at 1.) As the basis for his motion, Plaintiff offers his desire to "curtail any greater fraud and abuse of discretion upon this Honorable Court by returning for provident judicial review of actions by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, being in response to the [Defendants'] 'Motion to Dismiss' dated the 3rd day of February 2020, wherein time to respond incurred acts of God." (Id.) Plaintiff also stated that he had "incurred [a] retaliatory untimely eviction from his residence that resulted in interference" with his ability to exercise due diligence in the prosecution of this action.4 (Id. at 2.)
To better understand Plaintiff's reference to "actions by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina," the Court provides the following procedural history leading to the instant litigation. On August 4, 2016, Plaintiff brought a related lawsuitin the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ("the E.D.N.C. suit").5 (See E.D.N.C. ECF No. 3.) Plaintiff's claims in the E.D.N.C. suit were substantially the same as the ones he now brings in this lawsuit, though he brought them against different executives than the ones he now seeks to sue. (See id.) On February 27, 2017, the...
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