Glenn v. Point Park College
| Decision Date | 25 January 1971 |
| Parties | Frank A. GLENN and Thomas S. Christo, Appellants, v. POINT PARK COLLEGE. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Tice F. Ryan, Jr., Ryan & Bowser, Jerome DeRiso Pittsburgh, for appellants.
Charles F. C. Arensberg, William J. Staley, Tucker, Burke, Campbell & Arensberg, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Before BELL, C.J., and JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS and POMEROY, JJ.
This appeal presents the question of the sufficiency of a complaint in a suit in trespass wherein real estate brokers seek damages from a vendee of real estate by reason of negotiating a direct purchase from the vendor, thus interfering with a prospective economic gain by the brokers in the form of their anticipated commissions from the vendor. More precisely, the issue is whether the brokers have stated a cause of action against the vendee for tortious interference with a prospective contractual relationship between the brokers and the vendor. The lower court held not and dismissed the complaint. [1] This appeal followed.
Interference with a prospective contractual relation is a tort long recognized at common law. [2] It is formulated thusly in the Restatement of Torts, § 766:
'* * * one who, without a privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to * * * (b) enter into or continue a business relation with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby.' [3]
The courts of this Commonwealth have accepted and applied § 766 in a variety of situations, but apparently not heretofore in the area of prospective as distinguished from presently existing contractual or business relations. [4] In Glazer v. Chandler, 414 Pa. 304, 307, 308, 200 A.2d 416 (1964), however, this Court indicated that recovery in tort would be allowed for interference with prospective contracts or business relations of third parties with a plaintiff. We see no reason whatever why an intentional inference with a prospective business relationship which results in economic loss is not as actionable as where the relation is presently existing, although we recognize that there well may be more difficult problems of proof in the latter situation. [5] Indeed, the disagreement between the parties here is not as to the existence of the tort, but whether appellants have sufficiently pleaded it. We therefore turn to the allegations of the complaint.
Appellants aver in their amended complaint ('complaint') that they are duly licensed real estate brokers; that early in 1962 they advised appellee that a property in Pittsburgh known as the Sherwyn Hotel ('the Hotel') was to be sold; that the owner of the Hotel was Allegheny Sheraton Corporation (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Sheraton Corporation of America) ('Sheraton'); that appellants showed the property to appellees in 1962, telling them that Sheraton, while it would not have anyone as exclusive broker, would entertain offers through brokers, and would pay the customary commission; that in 1966 appellants quoted to appellee a possible sale price for property, including furnishings, of $790,000; that appellees then expressed continued interest in the purchase and proposed a meeting with the officers of appellee to discuss it; that such meeting was held on October 10, 1966, following which appellant submitted a tracing of the lot involved and an historical record of the property with a letter suggesting an approach to Sheraton; that additional data was submitted by appellants on October 17, 1966, following which appellee's financial vice president expressed the continued interest of appellee in acquiring the Hotel 'by virtue of the efforts of the plaintiffs'; that thereafter on November 29, 1966, additional information was furnished at appellee's request, including a schedule of leases then in effect in the Hotel building, and a memorandum containing suggested terms of sale, one of which was that the brokerage commission would be paid by the seller; that appellee utilized the information furnished by appellant to negotiate a direct purchase of the Hotel property, which was consummated September 26, 1967 for a consideration of $700,000 (which may or may not have included the furnishings), the appellee representing to Sheraton that no brokers were involved in the transaction; that in so doing the appellee intentionally and maliciously prevented appellants from entering into a brokerage relationship with Sheraton, 'thus depriving plaintiffs (appellants) of their commission'; that appellants have suffered injury for which they are entitled to compensatory damages measured by the customary brokerage fee on the transaction, plus punitive damages.
In discussing the elements of the tort of inducing a breach of contract or refusal to deal, as formulated in § 766 of the Torts Restatement, our Court has stated that 'the actor must act (1) for the purpose of causing this specific type of harm to the plaintiff, (2) such act must be unprivileged, and (3) the harm must actually result.' Birl v. Phila. Electric Co., 402 Pa. 297, 301, 167 A.2d 472, 474 (1960). Underlying these requisites, of course, is the existence of a contract or of a prospective contractual relation between the third person and the plaintiff. Thus in this case the questions are whether the complaint discloses (1) a prospective contractual relation between Sheraton and plaintiffs, (2) the purpose or intent to harm plaintiff by preventing the relationship from occurring, (3) the absence of privilege or justification on the part of the actor (appellee), and (4) the occurrence of actual harm or damage to plaintiff as a result of the actor's conduct. Cf. Locker, etc. v. Hudson Coal Co., 87 Pa.Dist. & Co. R. 264, 267 (C.P. Lackawanna Co., 1953) (written by Judge, now Mr. Justice, Eagen of this Court).
Scrutinizing the complaint before us, we think it sufficiently avers that there was a reasonable probability that plaintiffs would have become the recognized broker in the transaction between Sheraton and appellee if they had been permitted to submit an offer. Paragraphs Seventh and Eighth assert that Sheraton would entertain offers through brokers, and that if an offer were accepted would recognize the broker and pay the usual commission. The possible sale price of $790,000, including furnishings, mentioned by appellants to appellees was not so far beyond the actual consideration of $700,000 (possibly without furnishings) as to make plaintiffs' prospective position as the efficient cause of a sale unrealistic and merely wishful thinking. It is true that there could be no guarantee of Sheraton's reaction to any offer that might be submitted, and it of course was under no compulsion to deal with either appellants or appellee. But anything that is prospective in nature is necessarily uncertain. We are not here dealing with certainties, but with reasonable likelihood or probability. This must be something more than a mere hope or the innate optimism of the salesman. As the Superior Court of New Jersey has put it, '* * * the rule to be applied * * * is that the broker may recover when the jury is satisfied that but for the wrongful acts of the defendant it is Reasonably probable that the plaintiff would have effected the sale of the property and received a commission.' Myers v. Arcadio, Inc., 73 N.J.Super. 493, 180 A.2d 329, 331 (1962). (Emphasis ours.) This is an objective standard which of course must be supplied by adequate proof. [6]
We then come to the second question, whether there is a sufficient allegation of specific intent. It must be emphasized that the tort we are considering is an intentional one: the actor is acting as he does For the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff. As proposed comment D to the Tentative Draft of § 766A of the Restatement (Second) Torts emphasizes, 'The defendant must not only have intended the interference, but must have acted in part at least for the purpose of accomplishing it.' In the words of a leading text, 'The wrong ordinarily requires conduct intended to interrupt negotiations or prevent the consummation of a contract.' [7] The lower court stated in its opinion that 'There is no allegation that the defendant acted for specific purpose of causing harm to the plaintiffs.' We agree. Paragraph Twenty-First alleges that 'By negotiating directly with (Sheraton), the defendant intentionally, wrongfully, maliciously, fraudulently, deceitfully and without justification interfered with and precluded and prevented plaintiffs from entering into the relationship of brokers in the transaction with (Sheraton), thus depriving plaintiffs of their commission.' While this comes close to charging an intent to cause harm to plaintiffs, it stops short of doing so. It thus does not meet the test of Birl, supra, or the Restatement.
The absence of privilege or justification in the tort under discussion is closely related to the element of intent. As stated by Harper & James, The Law of Torts, § 6.11, at 513: ...
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