Glenville, In re

Decision Date30 November 1990
Docket NumberNo. M,M
Citation152 Ill.Dec. 90,139 Ill.2d 242,565 N.E.2d 623
Parties, 152 Ill.Dec. 90 In re Michael Creighton GLENVILLE, Petitioner. R. 6564.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Edward J. Bradley, Sr., of Bradley & Bradley, Chicago, for the Committee on Character and Fitness.

Raymond P. Carroll, Chicago, for petitioner.

Chief Justice THOMAS J. MORAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Michael Creighton Glenville, was graduated from IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law in June 1985 and passed the Illinois bar examination in July 1985. Following an investigation, the Committee on Character and Fitness (Committee) refused to certify to the State Board of Law Examiners that petitioner possessed the good moral character and general fitness necessary for the practice of law. Petitioner requested a hearing on that decision and, on October 17, 1988, and November 15, 1988, the hearing panel of the Committee received evidence concerning his character and fitness to practice law. The panel initially voted 4 to 3 to recommend certification, but one member of the panel changed his vote. As a result, the full Committee directed the panel to reconvene and, on January 22, 1990, the panel voted 5 to 2 to deny certification. Petitioner filed exceptions to the report and recommendation of the hearing panel (107 Ill.2d R. 708(d)).

The following issues are raised on review: (1) whether the hearing panel arbitrarily disregarded petitioner's evidence that he suffered an alcohol-related blackout on March 28, 1984; and (2) whether the hearing panel's recommendation to deny certification was arbitrary.

The following evidence was adduced at petitioner's hearing. He was born in 1944 and has resided in Chicago and its surrounding communities his entire life. Petitioner testified that he began drinking alcohol at the age of 14. He stated that while he had used marijuana and cocaine sometimes in the past, he preferred alcohol.

Petitioner had engaged in a series of criminal acts, beginning in December 1958, when he was arrested with four high school classmates for riding in a stolen motor vehicle. He pleaded guilty in juvenile court and was sentenced to one year of supervision. In May 1964, petitioner was arrested as a result of a barroom altercation. He pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct, was fined $250 and served two days in jail. In March 1974, he pleaded guilty to the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. He was fined $500 and his driver's license was revoked for one year. In November 1977, petitioner refused to take a breathalyzer test and his driver's license was revoked for 90 days because of his refusal to take the test.

In 1978, petitioner began working as a hearing officer with the Cook County assessor's office. In his employment application, petitioner included one prior position which he never held and failed to include any of his prior arrests. In 1981, petitioner entered the evening program at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. In his application for admission, petitioner included one prior position which he never held and failed to include his job as a bouncer in a bar.

In 1982, petitioner entered the Chicago police academy and was graduated first in his class. As a policeman, petitioner received five honorable mentions. Five or six complaints were made against petitioner but none of them were sustained.

The following incident took place on March 27, 1984, and March 28, 1984, while petitioner was on furlough from the Chicago police department. At approximately 11:30 p.m. on March 27, 1984, petitioner went to the Snuggery Lounge in Chicago. In the course of three to four hours, petitioner drank five or six Southern Comfort Manhattans which, according to the record, contained two to three ounces of alcohol per drink. Throughout the evening, petitioner was accompanied by Mr. Hall and Mr. Terry Finnegan. Petitioner knew Hall from the Rush Street area but he had never met Finnegan before.

At approximately 1:30 a.m., a prostitute, Brenda Yearby, solicited petitioner for an act of sex and informed him that he could meet her at the Paxton Hotel in Chicago. He told her that he was a policeman and suggested that she leave the bar. Yearby, however, remained there with her companion, Rufus Terry. Petitioner left to use the washroom; when he returned he noticed that his drink tasted bitter. He testified that he experienced a complete blackout which lasted 14 to 16 hours. There is no medical evidence in the record which indicates that petitioner's blackout was drug-induced. He maintains that the blackout was caused by his addiction to alcohol and his overconsumption of alcohol that evening.

The record reveals that Yearby and Terry carried an attache case containing 1,000 $1 bills and an additional $140. At some point during the evening Terry opened the case in the lounge. Petitioner did not see the attache case in the lounge. According to him, Finnegan saw the case and he told petitioner that the case contained little bags of white powder.

At approximately 4:30 a.m., petitioner and his two companions left the lounge and went to the Paxton Hotel. The hotel clerk, Charles Carner, testified that petitioner "staggered through the door" and appeared drunk. Petitioner showed Carner his badge and told him that he was on a "drug investigation." He demanded Yearby's room key, but Carner refused to give it to him. Carner testified that petitioner became extremely abusive, used profane language and threatened him with his pistol. Carner relented and brought petitioner to Yearby's room. On the way to the room petitioner kicked and beat Carner and threatened him further with his pistol. Carner gave petitioner the room key, but petitioner was not able to unlock the door. Petitioner then fired one shot into the ceiling, one into the door, and he used his body to open the door and found Yearby in the room. He placed his pistol against Yearby's head and asked her where Terry was. He found Terry naked in the closet and ordered him to lie on the bed. After a search of the room, petitioner found the attache case under some clothing. The case was opened; it contained the money but not the drugs. Petitioner then attempted to telephone the police, but he was unable to get through because no one was tending the hotel switchboard. Petitioner confiscated the attache case and left the hotel.

Yearby and Terry called the 911 emergency number. Chicago police officer Michael Williamson responded quickly to the call and conducted a brief investigation at the hotel. Officer Williamson then proceeded immediately to petitioner's apartment. Officer Williamson confronted petitioner outside his apartment and asked petitioner what he had been doing. Petitioner stated he was out having a good time and that he was on his way to Cicero. Petitioner was placed under arrest and 255 one dollar bills were found in the dresser drawer of petitioner's apartment.

After he made bond, petitioner was voluntarily committed to Ingalls Memorial Hospital for detoxification. He was then transferred to Northwestern Memorial Hospital, where he remained for two weeks. Petitioner testified that he was suicidal for several days following the incident.

Petitioner was charged with home invasion, armed robbery, residential burglary, armed violence and theft. After a bench trial, petitioner was found guilty of the misdemeanor offense of theft in an amount less than $300, and was sentenced to one year of conditional discharge. Petitioner was acquitted of the remaining charges. The court found that petitioner did not possess the mental state element of those offenses because he thought he was acting in the line of duty. In support of that finding, the court noted that petitioner's intellectual ability was substantially reduced as a result of his overconsumption of alcohol. The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 144 Ill.App.3d 1175, 110 Ill.Dec. 300, 510 N.E.2d 1331 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

After an administrative hearing, petitioner was discharged from the Chicago police department. That decision was upheld by the circuit court and appellate court. (177 Ill.App.3d 583, 126 Ill.Dec. 805, 532 N.E.2d 490.) Petitioner maintains that he did not receive a fair hearing because the police board did not consider whether the incident was causally related to his addiction to alcohol.

Petitioner testified that his criminal or violent behavior always occurred when he was under the influence of alcohol, and he was never in any kind of trouble when he was not under the influence of alcohol. He stated that he had suffered blackouts in the past as a result of his overconsumption of alcohol, but never of the magnitude of March 28, 1984.

Petitioner testified that he began attending Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings once he was released from the hospital. He stated that he attends AA meetings three times per week, has chaired meetings has served as a secretary, and has sponsored two persons. He further stated that all of his friends are AA members and he regularly attends AA social functions.

Petitioner testified that he has not consumed any alcohol or taken any mood-altering drugs since March 28, 1984. He admits that he is an alcoholic and is "powerless over all of the mind and mood altering drugs." He testified that he is confident that he will not drink alcohol or take drugs again. Finally, petitioner apologized for what he had done.

Petitioner's sister, Carol Ryan, testified on petitioner's behalf. She stated that their mother passed away in August 1983, and at that point petitioner began drinking more heavily. She further stated that petitioner became violent when he was under the influence of alcohol, but was a "kind, considerate" person when sober.

Ryan testified that she, like petitioner, is a recovering alcoholic. She stated that, based on her relationship with her brother and her experience as a member of AA, she is confident...

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26 cases
  • People v. Urdiales
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • February 16, 2007
    ...evidence and to decide the issue * * * in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the case * * *." In re Glenville, 139 Ill.2d 242, 251, 152 Ill.Dec. 90, 565 N.E.2d 623 (1990). In this case, the trial court found that defendant had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence,......
  • Wolinsky v. Kadison, Docket Nos. 1–11–1186
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • March 29, 2013
    ...the province of the trier of fact to weigh the credibility of the expert evidence and to decide the issue. In re Glenville, 139 Ill.2d 242, 251, 152 Ill.Dec. 90, 565 N.E.2d 623 (1990). The fact that Judge Hogan found the plaintiff's valuation evidence insufficient to carry her burden of pro......
  • People v. Tuduj
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 23, 2014
    ...province of the trier of fact to weigh the credibility of the expert evidence and to decide the issue.” In re Glenville, 139 Ill.2d 242, 251, 152 Ill.Dec. 90, 565 N.E.2d 623 (1990). ¶ 81 In this case, the record shows that all of the points defendant raises on appeal were raised at trial an......
  • Avery v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • September 26, 2005
    ...in which reviewing courts are especially loathe to second-guess the findings made by the trier of fact. See In re Glenville, 139 Ill.2d 242, 152 Ill.Dec. 90, 565 N.E.2d 623 (1990). The court avoids discussing the evidence presented by plaintiffs by holding that State Farm never promised any......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Illinois Objections
    • May 1, 2013
    ...NE2d 86 (1993), §§5:40, 12:30 In re General Order of March 15, 1993 , 258 Ill App 3d 13, 629 NE2d 673 (1994), §19:10 In re Glenville , 139 Ill 2d 242, 565 NE2d 623 (1990), §11:40 In re Grand Jury, January 246 , 272 Ill App 3d 991, 651 NE2d 696 (1995), §7:240 In re Grand Jury Proceedings , 2......
  • Science, Opinion & Experts
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Illinois Objections
    • May 1, 2013
    ...be rejected arbitrarily. Disbelieving expert testimony does not mean that the testimony was arbitrarily rejected. In re Glenville , 139 Ill 2d 242, 565 NE2d 623 (1990). Although uncontroverted and unimpeached testimony of an expert cannot be rejected arbitrarily, subjective and unclear test......

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