Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, Inc.

Citation651 F. Supp. 1271
Decision Date20 January 1987
Docket NumberCiv. No. Y-86-1568.
PartiesSophia GLEZOS v. AMALFI RISTORANTE ITALIANO, INC. and Moshen Abrishamkar.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Harvey A. Epstein, Towson, Md., for plaintiff.

Ernest C. Tucker, Chevy Chase, Md., for defendant Amalfa Ristorante Italiano, Inc.

Harry C. Tsitouris, Chevy Chase, Md., for defendant Moshen Abrishamkar.

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH H. YOUNG, District Judge.

Sophia Glezos filed suit against her former employers alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Maryland common law. Her request for a jury trial is opposed by defendants. Defendants argue that Title VII provides for equitable relief only and therefore does not afford plaintiff the right to a jury trial. While this may be true, one of plaintiff's pendent state law claims gives rise to monetary relief, and she is entitled to a trial by jury on that issue.

I. Factual Background

In August 1984, defendant Moshen Abrishamkar hired plaintiff to work as a waitress at Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, Inc. ("Amalfi's") in Montgomery County, Maryland. As manager of Amalfi's, Abrishamkar was plaintiff's supervisor and boss. On numerous occasions, he allegedly asked plaintiff to have sexual relations with him and made other remarks of a sexual nature. Plaintiff refused defendant's requests and attempted to ignore his advances. Defendant is alleged to have persisted in soliciting sexual favors and making sexual advances. In addition, plaintiff alleges she was assigned to the least favorable tables and was the victim of a scheme of further harassment conducted by other Amalfi employees.

In May 1985, Abrishamkar purportedly told plaintiff that if she did not perform oral sex for him once a week, she would be removed from the Saturday night schedule. Saturday was the most lucrative shift. Plaintiff refused defendant's demand, and within one week, Abrishamkar removed plaintiff from the Saturday night shift. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff felt compelled to resign due to sexual discrimination and harassment. She filed a complaint with the Montgomery County Human Relations Commission in July 1985, and the Commission issued its determination the following September. Upon review of this determination, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued plaintiff a "Notice of Right to Sue" in February 1986.

Plaintiff filed suit on May 19, 1986. Counts I, II and V of her complaint set forth claims of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. Count I alleges sexual harassment in the form of a hostile and offensive working environment. Count II alleges sexual harassment in the conditioning of employment benefits on sexual favors. And Count V sets forth a claim for constructive discharge. Counts III and IV allege intentional infliction of emotional distress and constructive discharge in violation of Maryland common law.

II. Right to a Jury Trial

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer to "discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex...." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Upon finding a violation of this provision, a court may order injunctive relief and "such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay ..., or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.

Compensatory or punitive damage awards are not available under Title VII. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.1982); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 366 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1667, 48 L.Ed.2d 176 (1976). Because the Act authorizes only equitable remedies, courts have consistently held that neither party has a right to a jury trial. Lincoln v. Board of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 97, 78 L.Ed.2d 102 (1983); Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir.1975).

When a case contains both legal and equitable claims, however, the right to trial by jury must be preserved. Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473, 82 S.Ct. 894, 897, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F.Supp. 804, 810 (D.Md.1978) (Title VII claims combined with § 1985 and Equal Pay Act claims). Plaintiff Glezos asserts two state law claims which give rise to monetary relief. If it is appropriate for this Court to exercise pendent jurisdiction over those claims, then plaintiff's request for a jury trial will be granted.

A. Authority to Hear the State Law Claims

The test for pendent jurisdiction, as set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), requires the court to determine first, whether it has authority over the state law claims, and second, whether the court in its discretion should entertain them. Authority exists if the federal claim has "substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court," and the state and federal claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" so that the plaintiff "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding." 383 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138.

Plaintiff's Title VII claims clearly are of sufficient substance to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Her state and federal claims arise from the same acts of sexual harassment allegedly perpetrated by Abrishamkar, thus they derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. Accordingly, under Gibbs, this Court has authority to hear plaintiff's pendent claims.

Several circuits have concluded, however, that Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978), added another level of analysis to the question of whether a federal court has authority to entertain state law claims. See Jones v. Intermountain Power Project, 794 F.2d 546, 551-52 (10th Cir.1986); Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 989-91 (3d Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Hoover v. Franzen, 669 F.2d 433, 440 (7th Cir.1982); and Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 71 n. 9 (1st Cir.1979) (dictum).

The Supreme Court in Owen ruled:

... a finding that federal and nonfederal claims arise from a "common nucleus of operative fact," the test of Gibbs, does not end the inquiry into whether a federal court has power to hear the nonfederal claims along with the federal ones. Beyond this constitutional minimum, there must be an examination of the posture in which the nonfederal claim is asserted and of the specific statute that confers jurisdiction over the federal claim, in order to determine whether "Congress in that statute has ... expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim.

437 U.S. at 373, 98 S.Ct. at 2402 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976)). Assuming without deciding that Owen adds a third level of inquiry to the pendent jurisdiction analysis, this Court concludes that Congress did not intend to negate pendent jurisdiction in cases arising under Title VII.

The language of the jurisdictional grant in Title VII, that federal district courts "shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this subchapter," does not expressly indicate Congressional intent with respect to pendent jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3).

Some courts have argued that the structure of the Act implicitly indicates that Congress intended to negate pendent jurisdiction in Title VII cases. They note that Congress wanted such cases "to be in every way expedited," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5), and that joinder of state law claims would conflict with that goal. Specifically, delay might be caused by discovery and proof regarding damages available under state law but not under Title VII. See Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 730, 734 (D.S.C.1983); Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F.Supp. 115, 117 (M.D.Fla.1982); and Jong-Yul Lim v. Int'l Inst. of Metro. Detroit, 510 F.Supp. 722, 725 (E.D.Mich.1981). Furthermore, they contend, because Title VII provides for equitable relief only, Congress impliedly expressed a policy disfavoring the award of compensatory and punitive damages in employment discrimination cases. Joinder of state law claims under which a plaintiff may be entitled to such damages directly conflicts with this Congressional intent of limited relief. See Frye, supra, 555 F.Supp. at 733; Bennett, supra, 531 F.Supp. at 117; and Lim, supra, 510 F.Supp. at 725.

This Court finds such arguments unpersuasive. Congress has twice rejected amendments making Title VII an exclusive remedy for employment discrimination. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459, 95 S.Ct. 1716, 1719-20, 44 L.Ed.2d 295 (1975). The Supreme Court has held that Title VII claims may be joined with other federal claims for discrimination even though the other federal claims provide for a jury trial and a full range of legal as well as equitable remedies. Johnson, supra, 421 U.S. at 459-60, 95 S.Ct. at 1719-20. Pendent state claims affording a jury trial and legal remedies would cause no more delay than conjoined federal claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court has clearly found that awarding legal remedies for joined federal claims does not contravene Congressional intent under Title VII. Thus, the awarding of monetary relief for pendent state claims is little reason to find implicit Congressional intent to negate pendent jurisdiction.

"When Title VII is construed together with the long-standing presumption in favor of pendent jurisdiction and district courts' broad discretion to assume jurisdiction over pendent claims, there is nothing unclear about Title VII. Against the backdrop of the volume of pendent jurisdiction cases, one would...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Cuello-Suarez v. AUTORIDAD DE ENERGIA ELECTRICIA
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • April 25, 1990
    ...not be forced to sue simultaneously in two different courts." Flowers v. Rebo, 675 F.Supp. at 1168, cf. Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, 651 F.Supp. 1271, 1277 (D.Md.1987). Finally, we express our opinion as to whether Congress, in enacting Title VII, intended to negate our exercise of......
  • Burger v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater New York
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York
    • April 15, 1988
    ...to the litigants would weigh heavily in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the state claims. See Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, 651 F.Supp. 1271, 1275-77 (D.Md. 1987); Studint v. LaSalle Ice Cream Co., 623 F.Supp. 232, 234-35 (E.D.N.Y.1985). However, there are other factors to The......
  • Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • May 30, 1990
    ...(1989); Parlato v. Abbott Laboratories, 850 F.2d 203, 206 (4th Cir.1988), aff'd, 886 F.2d 1429 (1989); Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 1271, 1275-76 (D.Md. 1987). The violation of public policy that Conkwright seeks to remedy through his abusive discharge claim is cl......
  • Childers v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • September 7, 1989
    ...a limited amount of back pay"). See also Parlato v. Abbott Laboratories, 850 F.2d 203 (4th Cir.1988); Glezos v. Amalfi Ristorante Italiano, Inc., 651 F.Supp. 1271, 1275-76 (D.Md.1987); Chekey v. BTR Realty, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 715 Childers' sole avenue of redress was thus to the Maryland Huma......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT