Glidewell v. Hughey

Citation314 S.W.2d 749
Decision Date14 July 1958
Docket NumberNo. 45972,45972
PartiesW. E. GLIDEWELL, O. J. Jones, Individually and for and on Behalf of all Members of Local Union 453 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, L. G. DeCamp and Louis O'Neal, Individually and for and on Behalf of All Members of 591 of Springfield, Missouri, of the Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railways and Motor Coach Employees of America, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. George K. HUGHEY, Dorsey Heer, C. Frank Knox, Herman Powell, Peyton Enloe, Frank Clark, Herman Cox, David C. Scott and J. V. Cloud, Members of and Constituting the Board of Public Utilities of the City of Springfield, Missouri, Daniel C. Rogers, G. H. Frieling, Albert Fults, Carl L. Spaid and John A. White, Members of and Constituting the Missouri State Board of Mediation, John M. Dalton, Attorney General of the State of Missouri, Phil M. Donnelly, Governor of the State of Missouri, and The City of Springfield, Missouri, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants-Appellants
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Walker, Daniel, Clampett & Rittershouse, B. H. Clampett, Springfield, for plaintiffs-appellants.

J. Weston Miller, Mayte B. Hardie, Miller, Fairman & Sanford, Springfield, for George K. Hughey et al., Members of Board of Public Utilities of City of Springfield, Mo., and City of Springfield, Mo.

HYDE, Judge.

Declaratory judgment action by plaintiffs, representing labor unions, for declarations as to the rights of the parties under Art. 16 of the Charter of the City of Springfield; that unions have the right to enter into collective bargaining agreements with the Board of Public Utilities of the city respecting wages, hours and working conditions, as set forth in certain proposed contracts; and that the State Board of Mediation has jurisdiction to furnish mediation services in any labor disputes that might arise between the unions and the Board. The court entered judgment making some declarations favorable to plaintiffs' contentions but declaring that the Board did not have the right to enter into the proposed contracts; and both plaintiffs and defendants have appealed.

The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, and some other evidence, including proposed contracts submitted to the Board by the unions, the Constitution and By-Laws of the unions, membership applications and obligations of union members and the new Charter of the city. The City of Springfield adopted its own charter on March 17, 1953, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. VI, 1945 Constitution, V.A.M.S. Prior to that time, it had been a city of the second class and had acquired an electrical generating and distribution system and a bus transportation system, which were operated by a Board of Public Utilities under authority of Secs. 91.330-91.440. (Statutory references are to RSMo. and V.A.M.S.) Prior to the adoption of the charter, and after our decision in State ex rel. Moore v. Julian, 359 Mo. 539, 222 S.W.2d 720, concerning the applicability of the King-Thompson Act to cities of the second class, the former Board, operating under Secs. 91.330-91.440, made collective bargaining agreements with the unions concerning wages, hours and working conditions. After the adoption of the charter, the city notified the unions that it considered it had no legal authority to enter into such contracts and that the State Board of Mediation had no jurisdiction over it.

The judgment entered made the following declarations:

'1. Defendants George K. Hughey, Dorsey Heer, Herman Cox, Herman Powell, C. Frank Knox, Frank Clark, Peyton Enloe, David C. Scott and J. V. Cloud, members of the Board of Public Utilities of Springfield, Mo., are agents of the said City entrusted with the duty and clothed with the power to operate the utilities owned by the said City, and as such are proper parties to this action since their powers and duties are affected by this judgment.

'2. The King-Thompson Act, Chapter 295, R.S.1949, is a valid legislative enactment of the State, and applies to public utilities municipally owned as well as those privately owned.

'3. The State Board of Mediation, created by said King-Thompson Act has jurisdiction to use its mediation services in labor disputes between the Board of Public Utilities of the said City and its employees.

'4. By an Act of 1945, Secs. 91.330 to 91.440 R.S.1949, the State effected a separation of governmental and proprietary functions of cities of the second class, which then included the City of Springfield, and provided that as to such cities the operation of municipally owned utilities was a proprietary function.

'5. The charter of the said City, adopted March 17, 1953, by popular vote did not materially alter the status of the City Utilities of Springfield as a proprietary function of the City.

'6. Under the laws of the State and the said charter of the City of Springfield the said City, acting through its Board of Public Utilities, had the power to enter into collective bargaining agreements with its employees operating said Utilities relating to wages, hours and working conditions, subject to certain limitations hereinafter mentioned.

'7. Under said charter, employees of the Utilities can be hired, promoted, reduced or discharged only in accordance with rules established by the Board. Therefore, the said Board of Public Utilities cannot enter into such agreements providing:

'A. A closed shop, or the employment of only members of a labor union, or a requirement that employees join a union, or that employees shall not join a union.

'B. That employees be promoted, demoted, laid off, reemployed or discharged according to seniority or any other form of favoritism.

'C. Approval by a union or any board or committee of a union as a prerequisite to the employment or promotion of any person.

'D. Recognition of a labor union as the sole bargaining agent for all of the employees of said Board, but may bargain with a union as agent for such employees as have chosen the union as their bargaining representative.

'8. For the foregoing reasons the Board of Public Utilities of said City does not have the right to enter into agreements as set forth in exhibits A and B attached to plaintiffs' second amended petition.'

We have jurisdiction because this appeal involves the construction of Sec. 29, Art. 1, Constitution, and the constitutionality of the King-Thompson Act, Chapter 295, Secs. 295.010-295.210. State officers also are parties.

Before reaching the merits, it is necessary to consider defendants' contention that the members of the Board are not proper parties to this action. Defendants say this is true because the Board does not have power or capacity to sue or be sued as such and the individuals who constitute the Board at any time cannot in their individual capacities bind the Board or the city. It is true, of course, that the city is the real party and the necessary party defendant; and, as defendants say, citing 64 C.J.S. Municipal Corporations Sec. 2195, p. 1034, and McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed., Sec. 49.16, suits against a municipal corporation should be in its corporate name and not against its officers, corporate authorities or the individuals composing them. However, that does not mean that the individual members of the Board are not proper parties in a declaratory judgment suit in which the city is made a party. See 39 Am.Jur. 853, Sec. 5, also p. 889, Sec. 27; 67 C.J.S. Parties Sec. 1, p. 889; Brotherhood of Stationary Engineers v. City of St. Louis, Mo.App., 212 S.W.2d 454, 458; Durwood v. Dubinsky, Mo.Sup., 291 S.W.2d 909. Section 507.040(1) (which is the same as Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 20, 28 U.S.C.A.) gives broad authority for permissive joinder of defendants; and it was intended to extend to all civil actions the principles of permissive joinder which had been followed in equity. See also Sec. 527.110. This authority should be liberally construed in a declaratory judgment suit, which had its historical affinity in equity, and with which may be heard claims for affirmative equitable relief. (See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932, 130 S.W.2d 945, 125 A.L.R. 1149; Union National Bank v. Jessell, 358 Mo. 467, 215 S.W.2d 474.) Therefore, in view of the duties imposed upon the members of the Board by the city charter and the equitable remedies that would be available against them in connection with this action, we hold they were proper parties.

On the merits, plaintiffs say the court's declarations were correct concerning the validity and applicability of the King-Thompson Act and the separation of the governmental and proprietary functions, with authority to make collective bargaining contracts, but contend the court erroneously declared the Board's power to so contract was limited to the extent stated in paragraph 7, and in subparagraphs A to D thereof, and in paragraph 8. Defendants say the declaration in paragraph 8, that the Board does not have the right to enter into the specified proposed agreements, is correct but that the court erred in making every other declaration and also contend that all the other declarations are merely advisory in character as to abstract matters without the purview of the Declaratory Judgment Act. We think more is presented here than merely the authority to enter into the two specified proposed contracts because the city contends it has no authority to make any contract with plaintiffs about wages, hours, and working conditions and plaintiffs seek a declaration of the rights of the parties to make such contracts under Sec. 16 of the city's charter. We hold there is a justiciable controversy between the unions and the city as to the authority of its Board to enter into collective bargaining contracts relating to wages, hours and working conditions, the validity and applicability of the King-Thompson Act to the public utilities owned by the city and the jurisdiction of the...

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    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1958
    ... ... 29 does not impair. See City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542, 544 and Glidewell v. Hughey, Mo., 314 S.W.2d 749. We find no valid distinction which would prefer this over other constitutional guarantees of personal liberties ... ...
  • State ex rel. McCubbin v. McMillian
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    ... ... Glidewell v. Hughey, Mo., 314 S.W.2d 749. It is clear from a reading of Sec. 507.040, supra, that joinder is permitted only when two elements are present: ... ...
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    ... ... 7. Glidewell v. Hughey, 314 S.W.2d 749 (Mo. banc 1958), which applied Clouse to employees of a municipal utility, also should no longer be followed ... 8 ... ...
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