Glinski v. Glinski

• Decision Date: 11 February 1992
• Docket Number: No. 10143,10143
• Citation: 26 Conn.App. 617,602 A.2d 1070
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: George GLINSKI v. Barbara GLINSKI.

Page 1070

602 A.2d 1070

26 Conn.App. 617

George GLINSKI v. Barbara GLINSKI.

No. 10143.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 12, 1991.

Decided Feb. 11, 1992.

Jason E. Pearl, with whom was J. Bruce Sussman, for appellant (plaintiff).

Bernard E. Francis, with whom, on the brief, was Nicholas W. Francis, for appellee (defendant).

Before DUPONT, C.J., and DALY and EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, JJ.

DUPONT, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court, denying his motion to modify his obligation to pay child support and ordering a reduction, rather than a suspension, of his obligation to pay alimony. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¹

The plaintiff is an American citizen and a resident of this state. On June 10, 1987, the plaintiff married the defendant, then a citizen of Poland residing in New Britain, who had applied for American citizenship. A child was born to the parties during their marriage. On October 1, 1990, the parties' marriage was dissolved. Pursuant to the judgment of dissolution, the plaintiff was ordered to pay $75 per week as alimony "for a period of two years or until [the defendant] is employed on a full-time basis or until she is legally permitted to accept employment in the United States." The plaintiff was also ordered to pay $49 per week as support for the minor child.

In November, 1990, the defendant was deported to Poland by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. She continues to reside in Poland with the parties' minor child.

On January 2, 1991, the plaintiff filed a motion for modification of support and suspension of alimony. In the motion and at the hearing on the motion, the plaintiff argued that there had been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the financial orders because the defendant was now living in Poland. The plaintiff produced expert testimony to substantiate his contention that rent, utilities, food, and other necessities of life are not as costly in Poland as in New Britain.

The trial court denied the motion to modify child support, but reduced the alimony award to $50 per week. In its articulation of the basis for its decision, the court found that "the financial assets, liabilities and expenses of both the defendant and the parties' minor child were not able to be determined as to whether there was a substantial change in their financial circumstances since taking residence in Poland" and that "the evidence presented by the plaintiff was not credible as to the specific financial circumstances of the defendant nor of the defendant's expenses." With respect to its prior order of time limited alimony, however, the court did find that "the defendant wife has a potential earning capacity based on her educational background as a teacher" and that "this was sufficient for the court to reduce the alimony payments to her, but not sufficient to suspend them as no specific income of the defendant was presented to the court; nor was evidence presented that she was, in fact, employed."

In this appeal, the plaintiff raises a number of arguments attacking the procedures used and conclusions reached by the trial court in deciding the motion for modification of support and suspension of alimony. We summarize these arguments as follows: (1) The trial court was required to suspend the plaintiff's alimony obligation because a condition of the original order had been met; (2) the trial court improperly prevented the plaintiff from presenting additional evidence comparing the cost of living in Poland with the cost of living in Connecticut; (3) the decision of the trial court ignores the undisputed evidence; (4) the trial court was required either to credit the plaintiff's evidence regarding the cost of living in Poland or to order the defendant to provide a financial affidavit; (5) it was inconsistent for the trial court to find a substantial change in circumstances justifying a reduction in alimony and to have ignored the same evidence with respect to the cost of living of the child in setting child support; (6) the trial court did not apply the Connecticut child support guidelines properly because the plaintiff is now left with less than $135 in net income.

"A trial court is endowed with broad discretion in domestic relations cases. Our review of such decisions is confined to two questions: (1) whether the court correctly applied the law, and (2) whether it could reasonably have concluded as it did. Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 4, 495 A.2d 704 (1985); Flynn v. Flynn, 7 Conn.App. 745, 746, 510 A.2d 1005 (1986). As an appellate court, we do not review the evidence to determine whether a conclusion different from the one reached could have been reached. Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 221, 435 A.2d 24 (1980). The goal of our analysis is simply to decide whether the trial court's conclusion was reasonable. The trial court has the advantage of reviewing and assessing the demeanor, attitude and credibility of the witnesses and is therefore better equipped than we to assess the circumstances surrounding the dissolution action. Thus, we do not retry the facts. Leo v. Leo, supra; Koizim v. Koizim, 181 Conn. 492, 498, 435 A.2d 1030 (1980)." Palazzo v. Palazzo, 9 Conn.App. 486, 488, 519 A.2d 1230 (1987).

The plaintiff first claims that the trial court was required to suspend alimony payments because a condition that would result in the termination of alimony under the original judgment had been met. He argues that the condition that alimony be terminated when the defendant is legally permitted to accept employment in the United States must be interpreted as though the words "in the United States" were absent. If those words are eliminated, the plaintiff contends, the alimony payments should cease because the defendant is legally permitted to accept employment in Poland.

We find nothing in the record, however, to support the contention that the condition would be fulfilled should the defendant return to Poland and legally be able to work there. The defendant is still not permitted to accept employment in the United States, and having been deported, she is precluded from living in this country. Moreover, in construing a judgment, "[t]he determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 196, 496 A.2d 491 (1985); Scoville v. Scoville, 179 Conn. 277, 282, 426 A.2d 271 (1979) (Healey, J., dissenting). Here, the same trial court established this condition in its original judgment only six months earlier and was in the best position to interpret the wording of its orders and whether the condition had been met.

The plaintiff's next two claims revolve around the trial court's use of the evidence presented on the cost of living in Poland. The fact that the trial court did not find this information to be useful in determining the specific financial circumstances of the defendant, however, undermines each of these arguments.

Although the trial court permitted the plaintiff to introduce testimony regarding the comparative costs of only a few basic necessities rather than the costs of the many items for which his expert witness was prepared to testify, this limitation on the evidence could not have affected the court's decision in light of its conclusion that evidence of comparative costs did not provide it with a basis for determining the defendant's actual expenses. It was well within the discretion of the trial court to reach this conclusion. Similarly, the plaintiff misunderstands the trial court's conclusion when he asserts that the court ignored the evidence he presented regarding the cost of living in Poland. Rather than ignoring this evidence, the court found it to be of limited value in assessing the defendant's particular financial situation. The plaintiff's argument that a $50 per month order is more consistent with the evidence that he presented than the court's order of $50 per week is similarly flawed in that it ignores the fact that the trial court was not convinced that the plaintiff's evidence required the conclusions that he wanted the trial court to draw.

As to each of these claims, the trial court determined that the plaintiff failed to sustain his burden of proof. We, as a reviewing court, will not retry the facts. Morganti, Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 20 Conn.App. 67, 74, 563 A.2d 1055 (1989). The plaintiff's second and third claims, therefore, must fail.

The plaintiff's fourth claim...