Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co.

• Decision Date: 13 December 1943
• Docket Number: 37223.
• Citation: 204 La. 896,16 So.2d 471
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court
• Parties: GLIPTIS et al. (TRAPANI et al., Intervenors) v. FIFTEEN OIL CO.

16 So.2d 471

204 La. 896

GLIPTIS et al. (TRAPANI et al., Intervenors) v. FIFTEEN OIL CO.

No. 37223.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

December 13, 1943

Rehearing Denied Jan. 3, 1944. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

O'Niell & O'Niell, of New Orleans Brumby & Bauer, of Franklin, and McGown, McGown, Godfrey & Logan, of Fort Worth, Tex., for plaintiff and intervenors, appellants.

Liskow & Lewis, of Lake Charles, and Rene H. Himel, of Franklin for defendant-appellee.

ODOM Justice.

This is a suit to collect damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff as the result of the destruction, or 'killing', by defendant of a producing oil well owned by plaintiff, known as 'Parro No. 1', in the Parish of St. Mary.

It appears from the record that plaintiff's well was drilled to a depth of approximately 6000 feet and was bottomed in oil and gas producing sand, and produced gas first and then oil. Plaintiff's complaint, as disclosed by its pleadings, is that, after its well was completed as a producer, the defendant drilled a well, known as 'Parro No. 4', 333 feet, measured on the surface, from plaintiff's well, or only 33 feet from the line of the property set apart to plaintiff for the location and drilling of its well, and that defendant's well is bottomed so close to the bottom of plaintiff's well that plaintiff's well was killed or destroyed as a result of the drilling of defendant's well; that defendant's well was drilled at an angle from a vertical or upright line, causing it to pass into and through, and have its bottom in, property from which plaintiff alone had the right to extract gas and oil, and that defendant is guilty of a tortious subsurface trespass, which renders it liable for the damage resulting from the destruction of plaintiff's well.

The record shows that in the year 1939 the defendant, Fifteen Oil Company, held and owned a mineral lease covering a tract of land in St. Mary Parish, granted by Dolph Parro to Roy B. Siler in 1932, and that the defendant company had the right under the terms of the lease 'to transfer and assign either in whole or in part, the rights granted it thereunder', and that on September 21, 1939, the defendant entered into a contract with William A. Brown, reciting that the 'Fifteen Oil Company does hereby grant, convey, transfer and assign to the said William A. Brown, the right to drill one (1) well for oil, gas and other minerals on the aforesaid land [the location of the well being specified], with the understanding that, with respect to the said one (1) well, the said Brown shall succeed to all of the rights accorded to the lessee in the aforesaid lease only, however, as to said well location, together with the rights of ingress thereto and egress therefrom, and the right to construct mud pits, drill water well for boiler purposes, erect derrick', and, generally, the right to do all things necessary in connection with the drilling of the well. (The above quotation is from the contract, a certified copy of which is attached to plaintiff's original petition.)

The contract further provides that, if a well producing minerals in commercial quantities should be brought in by Brown under the agreement, 'then, that the said Fifteen Oil Company will not drill any well within a distance of three hundred (300') feet of the said well as long as minerals are produced therefrom or workover or deepening operations are being conducted by the said Brown, his heirs or assigns'. (Italics are the writer's.) The contract further provides that the Fifteen Oil Company 'does not intend hereby to assign said lease as to any specified area or number of acres, but intends to grant unto Brown the right to drill one (1) well at the location above described', and that no part of the expense of drilling the well is to be borne by the Fifteen Oil Company, and that 'it shall have no proprietary ownership in said well or the production therefrom'.

Brown availed himself of the privilege granted in the contract and drilled a well which was completed as a producer in December, 1939. On January 15, 1940, Brown transferred the well and all his rights under the contract to the Franklin Petroleum Corporation, the plaintiff in this suit.

Subsequently, the Fifteen Oil Company drilled a well located 333 feet on the surface from the Brown or Franklin well, or 33 feet beyond the 300-foot limit specified in the contract. By locating the well where it did, defendant did not violate its contract, and there was no surface trespass. But it did make its location as near to the 300-foot limit as it could without encroaching upon plaintiff's territory.

Plaintiff alleged that, under the rules and regulations of the Conservation Department of Louisiana, 'drilling operations within 150 feet of land on which the operator has no right to drill are prohibited unless the operator agrees in advance in writing, to survey the hole during the course of drilling to guard against bottomhole trespass; your petitioner avers on information and belief that the Fifteen Oil Company is familiar with said regulations. * * * that the tip of said Parro No. 4 is only 333 feet from the said location, or only 33 feet from the prohibited area, and your petitioner shows that the Fifteen Oil Company failed to survey the hole during the course of the drilling, in violation of the aforesaid regulation of the Conservation Commission'.

It is conceded that during drilling operations some oil and gas wells drilled normally--i. e., without effort to direct their downward course--drift or deviate from a vertical or upright line, and that it frequently happens that a well located on the surface of the owner's land near to his property line deviates or swings so far away from the vertical that it passes through, and is bottomed in, his neighbor's property. When this happens, there is a 'subsurface trespass', whether the deviation is normal or whether it is brought about by intentional controlled directional drilling. Any unlawful physical invasion of the property of another is a trespass.

Plaintiff alleged on information and belief that defendant's well is bottomed in plaintiff's land and in the same sand to which plaintiff had drilled and in which it had bottomed its well. Plaintiff alleged in its third supplemental petition that its well was bottomed beneath the surface of the ground allotted to it for the drilling of its well, which was completed as a producer; in other words, that its well was drilled through, and bottomed in, its own land.

Plaintiff does not own the fugitive minerals, such as oil and gas, which are in, or which may pass through, the earth underneath the surface of the small area allotted to it by defendant for the drilling of a well. Under the terms of the contract entered into by and between Brown and the defendant, Brown and his successors were given the exclusive right to extract minerals from the earth beneath the surface of the land enclosed within a circle, the center of which was to be the well, the circle to have a radius of 300 feet.

We assume that there is now no dissent from the rule established by the jurisprudence of this state, which is in accord with that of other states, that, while the owner of land is not the owner of the fugitive minerals therein, yet he has the exclusive right to explore his land for the production of manerals and to extract therefrom, and reduce to possession and ownership, all such minerals as may be found in the earth beneath the surface of his land.

This necessarily excludes the right of any person to invade the subsurface of his neighbor's land and to extract therefrom fugacious minerals, such as oil and gas. Such invasion would be a trespass.

Among the numerous pleas and exceptions filed by defendant was an exception of no cause of action. The trial judge saw no merit in this exception and overruled it. His ruling was correct.

Plaintiff alleged in its third supplemental petition that its well was bottomed beneath the surface of the ground allotted to it for the drilling of its well; and alleged in its original petition, and reiterated elsewhere, that the defendant, in drilling it well known as Parro No. 4, has committed a subsurface trespass upon plaintiff's property; that defendant's well was bottomed within plaintiff's territory and so close to the bottom of plaintiff's well that its well was killed or destroyed as a direct result of such trespass; that, when defendant had drilled its well into the same oil and gas producing sand from which plaintiff's well was producing, defendant opened its well first as a gas well and permitted 2,500,000 cubic feet of gas to escape from it each day for five consecutive days, and that as a result the gas pressure of plaintiff's well immediately dropped sharply, and that defendant allowed gas to escape from its well until the Conservation Department ordered the well closed; that, as the result of defendant's well's being bottomed close to the bottom of plaintiff's well, plaintiff's well 'went dead', and that plaintiff has suffered serious damage. These pleadings set out a cause of action.

Plaintiff filed its suit on September 23, 1941, and on October 18 filed its first supplemental and amended petition. Thereafter, on October 30, plaintiff filed a motion styled: 'Motion Filed by Plaintiff for Rule to Show Cause Why the Court Should Not Appoint an Expert to Survey the Defendant's Well Known as Parro No. 4.' It is alleged in this motion that 'a survey of the Fifteen Oil Company's Parro No 4 well will show that it is bottomed within 300 feet of the location of Franklin Petroleum Corporation's well known as Parro No. 1; and on further suggesting and showing unto the Court that such survey can be made without stopping the flow of the well, or...