Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Corr.

• Citation: 813 F.3d 662
• Decision Date: 17 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15–1419.,15–1419.
• Parties: Alma GLISSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nicholas L. GLISSON, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

813 F.3d 662

Alma GLISSON, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Nicholas L. GLISSON, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Defendants–Appellees.

No. 15–1419.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 26, 2015.

Decided Feb. 17, 2016.

Michael K. Sutherlin, Attorney, Samuel Mark Adams, Sutherlin & Associates, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

David A. Arthur, Attorney, Office of the Attorney General, Carol A. Dillon, Bleeke Dillon Crandall, PC, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant, Alma Glisson ("Appellant"), sued Correctional Medical Services, Inc., also known as Corizon, Inc. ("CMS"), its employees Dr. Malaka G. Hermina ("Dr. Hermina"), Mary Combs, R.N. ("Nurse Combs"), and the Indiana Department of Corrections ("IDOC") (collectively "Appellees"), on behalf of her deceased son, Nicholas Glisson ("Glisson"). Glisson died while incarcerated at Plainfield Correctional Facility ("Plainfield") in Plainfield, Indiana. The lawsuit's federal claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"), specifically alleging that Appellees did not offer Glisson constitutionally adequate medical care, and that this failure violated his Eighth Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all federal claims, and remanded the remaining state law claims. Appellant now only appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of CMS, arguing that CMS's failure to implement a particular IDOC Health Care Service Directive (the "Directive") violated Glisson's Eighth Amendment rights. However, because Appellant has not produced legally sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact on this matter, we affirm summary judgment for CMS.

I. BACKGROUND

Glisson's medical history is tragic. Diagnosed with laryngeal cancer in 2003, he underwent surgery that removed his larynx and part of his pharynx. The surgery also removed portions of Glisson's mandible and thirteen teeth. The surgery left him with a permanent stoma, or opening in his throat, accompanied by a tracheostomy tube. He was later fitted with a voice prosthesis, and received postoperative radiation treatment. After the surgery, he suffered from painful swallowing (dysphagia ) and neck pain, both resulting from progressive neck instability. In 2008, doctors inserted a gastrojejunostomy tube ("G-tube") through his stomach to help with nutrition. In March 2010, a cancerous lesion was found on his tongue, but was successfully excised.

Exacerbating the effects of Glisson's cancer and surgery were ongoing memory issues, hypothyroidism, depression, smoking, and alcohol abuse. Despite these many health issues, Glisson lived independently and cared for himself; he even cared for his grandmother when she was sick and his brother when he was dying.

On August 31, 2010, Glisson was sentenced to incarceration for dealing in a controlled substance. He came into the custody of IDOC on September 3, 2010. IDOC housed him in its Reception Diagnostic Center from September 3 through September 17. During this time, CMS medical personnel noted spikes in Glisson's blood pressure, an occasional low pulse, and low oxygen saturation level. He also demonstrated signs of confusion and anger, and was at one point deemed a suicide risk. As a result, IDOC placed him in segregation and had him undergo a psychiatric evaluation.

IDOC transferred him from the Reception Diagnostic Center to Plainfield on September 17. At Plainfield, Glisson's condition further deteriorated. At Plainfield, he came under the medical care of Dr. Hermina and Nurse Combs. Plainfield personnel quickly determined that Glisson's medical issues were worsening. On September 29, he presented with symptoms suggesting acute renal failure. In response, IDOC personnel transferred him to a local hospital, where he remained until October 7.

Upon returning to Plainfield, Glisson appeared stable. However, on the morning of October 10, Nurse Combs witnessed Glisson exhibiting strange behavior and transferred him to a medical isolation room. While isolated, Glisson was restless, moving from one side of the bed to the other. At 8:20 a.m., IDOC staff reported that Glisson was sitting upright in his bed, unresponsive. Emergency personnel arrived at 8:30 a.m., and pronounced Glisson dead at 8:35 a.m. The coroner concluded that Glisson died of natural causes, resulting from complications of laryngeal cancer with contributory renal failure. A pathologist agreed with these findings, and added that Glisson's various medical issues—diminished mental state, oxygen deficiency, and acute renal failure —were directly attributable to his throat cancer and laryngectomy.

After Glisson's death, Appellant sued Appellees in Indiana state court. She alleged that Dr. Hermina and Nurse Combs were deliberately indifferent to Glisson's medical needs. She also alleged, under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and its progeny, that CMS's failure to implement the Directive led to this deliberate indifference. The Directive reads:

Each facility must develop a site[-]specific directive that guides the management of the chronic disease management and clinics. Each site must have easily available a compilation of instructions for proper management [of] chronic diseases in the chronic disease clinic setting.

Related IDOC guidelines further note that the Directive is necessary because "[o]ffenders with serious chronic health conditions need to receive planned care in a continuous fashion" and that care provided to such inmates "should be organized and planned and should be consistent across [IDOC] facility lines."

CMS has argued throughout the litigation that it is not obligated to implement IDOC directives. It also admitted that it did not implement the Directive, stating instead that Glisson's care was "based on standards of medical and nursing care." CMS acknowledged that while IDOC "implement[s] Health Care Service Directives ... generally none of those directives were relied on in rendering medical care and treatment to Mr. Glisson."

Appellant claims that because CMS did not adopt the Directive and did not create a centralized treatment plan for Glisson, his care was fractured and disorganized. She argues that CMS's lack of a policy of centralized care for inmates like Glisson led to the deliberate indifference of Dr. Hermina, Nurse Combs, and other CMS personnel. She specifically argues that CMS's failure to adopt any policy mandating coordinated care "prevent[ed] [CMS] medical personnel from communicating properly and ensuring appropriate continuity of care for inmates with serious medical problems," such as Glisson.

After Appellant filed the suit in Indiana court, Appellees removed the case to federal court, and then moved for summary judgment on the federal law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for Appellees, and remanded the remaining state law claims. In granting summary judgment, the district court found that Dr. Hermina's and Nurse Combs's actions did not constitute deliberate indifference, and that as a result Glisson did not suffer any constitutional injury. Having determined that Glisson suffered no constitutional injury, the district court then held that Appellant could not prove a Monell claim against CMS as a matter of law.

Appellant appealed the district court's order.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellant only appeals the dismissal of her Monell claim against CMS. But this claim fails for want of necessary evidence. Specifically, Appellant has not presented evidence that CMS's failure to implement the Directive led to a widespread practice of deliberate indifference against not only Glisson, but other inmates as well.

We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party—here, Appellant. Rahn v. Bd. of Trustees of N. Ill. Univ., 803 F.3d 285, 287 (7th Cir.2015) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) ; Lalowski v. City of Des Plaines, 789 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir.2015). That is, at this stage, Appellant must have produced evidence that indicates a genuine issue of material fact. See Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir.2014) (quotations and citations omitted). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) in holding that non-moving party must "designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial’ ").

Here, Appellant must produce evidence that CMS's failure to adopt the Directive led to deliberately indifferent medical care by CMS personnel. Government entities¹ "have an affirmative duty to provide medical care to their inmates." Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 678–79 (7th Cir.2008) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) ). Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's "serious medical needs ... constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ and violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments." Duckworth, 532 F.3d at 679 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. 285 (internal quotation and citation omitted)).

Here, Appellant has not produced the necessary evidence for a Monell claim against CMS. Private corporations like CMS cannot be liable in a § 1983 suit under respondeat superior.² E.g., Iskander, 690 F.2d at 128 ; Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 622 (7th Cir.2010) ; Maniscalco v. Simon, 712 F.3d 1139, 1145 (7th Cir.2013). Thus, even if Dr. Hermina and Nurse Combs were deliberately indifferent to Glisson's medical needs, a court cannot impute this liability to...