Glisson v. State
| Decision Date | 05 June 1967 |
| Docket Number | 3 Div. 281 |
| Citation | 281 Ala. 187,200 So.2d 498 |
| Parties | Jessie D. GLISSON v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., and Robt. F. Miller, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.
Elno A. Smith, Jr., Montgomery, opposed.
As pointed out in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals on rehearing, since the Penal Code of 1866, Section 260, it has been the established policy of this state that terms of sentences are to run consecutively, and not concurrently.
As observed in State ex rel. McQueen v. Horton, 31 Ala.App. 71, 14 So.2d 557:
For substantially a century, prior to Act No. 82 (), the courts of this state were without authority to provide for concurrent sentences.
By Act No. 82, supra, the legislature amended Section 32, Title 45, Code of Alabama 1940, to read as follows:
'When a convict is sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary on two or more convictions, unless it is specifically ordered in the judgment entered that such sentences be served concurrently, such sentences shall be cumulative, and shall be served consecutively; * * *'
To our thinking, this provision is clear, and unambiguous in showing the intent of the legislature. This intent is that unless it is Specifically ordered in the judgment that such sentences are to be served concurrently, the sentences shall be served consecutively.
The majority of the Court of Appeals takes the view that the last sentence of the judgment, i.e., 'Said sentence to begin this day,' is an expression of the intent of the lower court that the sentences run concurrently. Such inference cannot be indulged in view of the plain mandate of Act No. 82, supra, requiring a specific order of concurrency.
In Chaney v. State, 9 Ala.App. 45, 63 So. 693, we find the following:
'That part of the judgment entry specifying the day of the month and the year upon which the sentence should commence and expire is surplusage, and as it is inappropriate as applied to the changed conditions as to time, due to the...
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Eldridge v. State
...as amended, words of concurrency must be explicit and probably must set out the other sentence by an exact description. Glisson v. State, 281 Ala. 187, 200 So.2d 498. Only the judgment (not a prison record notation) can prove or disprove concurrency. This, because the statute, § 32, supra, ......
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Isbell v. State, 2 Div. 65
...as amended, words of concurrency must be explicit and probably must set out the other sentence by an exact description. Glisson v. State, 281 Ala. 187, 200 So.2d 498. 'Only the judgment (not a prison record notation) can prove or disprove concurrency. This, because the statute, § 32, supra,......
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Lee v. State, 3 Div. 756
...be entertained in view of the clear and plain command of Title 45, § 32, requiring a specific order of concurrency. Glisson v. State, 281 Ala. 187, 200 So.2d 498, reversing, 43 Ala.App. 700, 200 So.2d 493 (1967). Here there was no specific order of concurrency. This case is governed by Glis......
- Opinion of the Justices, 191