Gloetzner v. Lynch

Decision Date02 December 2016
Docket NumberCase No: 4:14–cv–686–Orl–ACC–PRL
Parties Michael GLOETZNER, Plaintiff, v. Loretta LYNCH, Attorney General, Department of Justice, In Her Official Capacity, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

Michael L. MacNamara, Marie A. Mattox, Marie A. Mattox PA, Tallahassee, FL, for Plaintiff.

Stewart Randolph Brown, US Attorney, Macon, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

ANNE C. CONWAY, United States District Judge

This cause comes before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Loretta Lynch as Attorney General in her official capacity (Doc. 46), filed on May 18, 2016, to which Plaintiff Michael Gloetzner, filed a Response (Doc. 53), and Defendant has filed a Reply (Doc. 54). After careful consideration of the matter, the Court finds Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is due to be GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently a Deputy Marshal with the United States Marshals Service (the "Marshals Service" or "Defendant"), where he has been serving as a Deputy Marshal since January 1992. Doc. 50–1 (Gloetzner Dep.) at 6–7; Doc. 48–10 (Gloetzner Aff.) ¶ 3; Doc. 46–Ex. C at 87.2 Plaintiff was born in 1966, and was 45 years old at the time he initiated an internal (Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaint by seeking counseling from the Marshals Service's internal EEO Office in June 2012. Doc. 50–1 at 6–7; Doc. 48–10 ¶ 2.

From 2003 through September of 2014, Plaintiff was assigned to the Marshals Service in the Tallahassee Office of the Northern District of Florida (the "Tallahassee Office"). Doc. 48–10 ¶ 3. Prior to transferring to Tallahassee in 2003, Plaintiff had served as a Deputy Marshal in the Southern District of Florida for approximately fourteen years. Doc. 48–10 ¶ 4. Plaintiff was transferred to the Tallahassee Office in 2003 "against his will"3 after he received a credible death threat. Doc. 46–Ex. K at 317, 462. Since September 2014, Plaintiff has been assigned to the Marshals Service in the Southern District of New York. Doc. 1 at 6.

Plaintiff's age–related discrimination claims in this case arise out of treatment that occurred between 2012 and 2014 while he was assigned to the Tallahassee Office. Id. During the relevant time period, Plaintiff's direct supervisor in the Tallahassee Office was Supervisory Deputy U.S. Marshal Scott Wilson (born 1971), whose supervisor was Assistant Chief Deputy4 U.S. Marshal Kelly York (born 1956); York reported to the Chief Deputy United States Marshal Brian Nerney (born 1966) who in turn reported to the United States Marshal Edward Spooner (born 1950). Doc. 46–Ex. A, 220, 234, 248, 269.

In early June 2012, Plaintiff told Assistant Chief Deputy York that he would "really like to go" to training to become a firearms instructor and to fitness training to become a fitness coordinator who would administer fitness evaluations for the office.5 Doc. 48–10 ¶¶ 9, 11; Doc. 50–1 at 32. Assistant Chief Deputy York asked Plaintiff to "let him know where it was and how much it costs." Doc. 50–1 at 32.

When Plaintiff asked Supervisory Deputy Wilson on June 19, 2012 for some leave to go to this training, Wilson told Plaintiff that he could not give Plaintiff the leave to attend the training because he was sending two other deputies: Josh Lowery to firearms training and Kerry Phillips to fitness training. Doc. 50–1 at 32–33. According to Plaintiff, when he asked, "[W]hy, I mean I have use or lose [annual leave]?" Supervisory Deputy Wilson replied: "I'm sending Josh [Lowery] to firearms school and Kerry [Phillips] to [fitness instructor] school." Id. at 32–33. Plaintiff asked, "[E]xcuse me?" to which Wilson replied, "I'm sending them." Id. at 33. Plaintiff said, "[B]ut you know that I'm the senior guy and I've been requesting that forever." Id. Wilson responded that he wanted to send a newer, younger deputy: "You're not going to be around for the next twenty years and Josh [Lowery] is ... [I]t's a cost–effective decision." Doc. 50–1 at 33; Doc. 48–10, ¶ 9 ("Mr. Wilson told me that he could not send me to firearms instructor school, despite my repeated requests to attend, because he wanted to send a younger deputy who would be around for the next twenty years, unlike me, who was older.")6 . Deputy Lowery, who attended the firearms training in July 2012 instead of Plaintiff, is now a firearms instructor for the Tallahassee Office. Doc.48–8 at 20; Doc. 48–12 at 36.

Despite Plaintiff's request to attend fitness instructor training7 , Deputy Kerry Phillips was selected to attend fitness instructor training instead. Assistant Chief Deputy York made the decision to send Deputy Phillips to the fitness instructor training8 ; he did not consider anyone else for the training. Doc. 48–14 (York Dep.) at 41–42. Supervisory Deputy Wilson subsequently assigned Deputy Phillips to an out of town judicial detail in Naples, Florida; Wilson stated to Plaintiff that he assigned Phillips specifically because he is a younger, newer deputy. Doc. 48–10 ¶ 11. Assistant Chief Deputy York subsequently told Plaintiff (after York became aware that Plaintiff had filed an EEO complaint) that he (York) was the one who made the decision to send the younger deputy to training because Wilson had advised York that it would be better to send the newer, younger deputies. Doc. 48–10 ¶ 13.

Plaintiff sought counseling regarding alleged age discrimination from the internal Marshals Service EEO office on June 29, 2012; an EEO counselor was assigned to review Plaintiff's claims on July 3, 2012.

Doc. 48–10 ¶ 12; Doc. 46–Ex. A at 53. The firearms instructor training program that Plaintiff had sought to attend took place from July 16, 2012 to July 27, 2012 at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. Doc. 46–Ex. L at 3–6. Plaintiff was on annual leave on July 23, 2012 through July 27, 2012. Doc. 46–Ex. C at 60.

Plaintiff was under investigation by the Marshals Service Office of Internal Affairs from July 5, 2012 through July 30, 2012 for false statements made in connection with three incidents in June 2012. Id. ; Doc. 46–Ex. J at 855–60. Plaintiff was referred to Internal Affairs because on June 12 through 18, 2012 he was scheduled to work an operation in Panama City (about a two-hour drive from the Tallahassee Office); although he scheduled extra travel time, he did not attend the June 12 briefing and did not request leave, but his timesheet showed a full eight hour day, and he cost the district an extra expense when he missed the briefing. Id. at 860–61. He was also referred for his misleading statements regarding why he was reviewing video of another deputy in the cellblock (discussed in more detail below), and for reportedly providing conflicting information about destruction of the fleet management gas credit card assigned to his government vehicle. Id. After a review of the allegations, Internal Affairs determined that the matters were best addressed by district management. Id. at 856–57.

As a result of a separate district investigation, on July 27, 2012, Assistant Chief Deputy York issued a letter to Plaintiff proposing a five-day suspension for Plaintiff's failure to follow procedures in apprehending a fugitive three months before, on April 19, 2012. Doc. 46–Ex. I at 30–32; Doc. 46–Ex. M at 54–59. Marshal Spooner issued his final decision on the matter on September 10, 2012, requiring that Plaintiff be suspended for five days.9 Doc. 46–Ex. A at 189; Doc. 46–Ex. I at 30–32; Doc. 48–10 ¶ 21.10 Two days later, the management in the Tallahassee Office first learned that Plaintiff had contacted the Marshals Service EEO office in Washington, D.C. when an EEO investigator contacted by phone Supervisory Deputy Wilson and Chief Deputy Nerney on September 12, 2012. Doc. 46–Ex. A at 58, 189, 223, 237, 251; Doc. 46–Ex. M at 31–37. On September 17, 2012, the EEO Office notified Plaintiff of his right to file a formal complaint. Doc. 46–Ex. M at 2 ¶ 7. On October 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed his formal discrimination complaint with the Marshals Service EEO Office within the Department of Justice. Doc. 50–1 at 65. According to Plaintiff, at some point after this, Assistant Chief Deputy York asked Plaintiff whether he had a "666" under the band–aid on his forehead11 . Doc. 48–10 ¶ 18.

During the Marshals Service's internal EEO investigation, Plaintiff alleged that he had been "harassed" by Marshals Service personnel since moving to the Northern District of Florida in 2003. Doc. 46–Ex. G at 119–21. Plaintiff testified that he had been disciplined on several occasions between 2005 and June 2012, but, he contends, these were based on "false" or "unfounded" allegations having to do with his ex-wife. Doc. 46–Ex. P at 98–100. Plaintiff received performance evaluations of "successful" or "excellent" in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Doc. 48–1 to 48–3.

On December 12, 2005, Plaintiff received a letter of instruction for misconduct in the use of unnecessary force against a fugitive and threatening a witness based on an incident on January 14, 2004. Doc. 46–Ex. M at 39–40; Doc. 46–Ex. I at 2–7. On November 2, 2005, Plaintiff was suspended for one day for misconduct and misuse of office based on allegations that Plaintiff used his official position to pressure local police to serve a restraining order on his ex-wife (who simultaneously sought one against him) and allegations that Plaintiff threatened the local police officer to immediately serve the restraining order on her. Doc. 46–Ex. M at 42–44; Doc. 46–Ex. I at 64–66; Doc. 48–10 ¶ 5. From February 25, 2008 to March 15, 2008, Plaintiff was suspended for fourteen days for conduct unbecoming a deputy marshal when he misrepresented himself as his ex–wife on three occasions to gain access to her personal accounts and subsequently threatened her boyfriend. Doc. 46–Ex. M at 46–47; Doc. 46–Ex. I at 8–15. Plaintiff characterizes the latter two incidents as "solely related to the unfortunate and extremely hostile...

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