Gloria L. Ritz v. Colvin, CASE NO. 1:15-cv-00388-CCC-GBC

Decision Date09 March 2016
Docket NumberCASE NO. 1:15-cv-00388-CCC-GBC
PartiesGLORIA L. RITZ, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

(CHIEF JUDGE CONNER)

(MAGISTRATE JUDGE COHN)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL

Docs. 1, 9, 10, 15, 17, 18

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction

The above-captioned action is one seeking review of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant") denying the application of Gloria L. Ritz ("Plaintiff") for supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB") under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§401-433, 1382-1383 (the "Act") and Social Security Regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§404.1501 et seq., §§416.901 et. seq.1 (the "Regulations"). The Act places the burden on Plaintiff to demonstrate that she lacks the residual functional capacity ("RFC") toperform any work in the national economy.2 Under the deferential substantial evidence standard of review, the Court must uphold administrative law judge ("ALJ") findings unless no reasonable person would view the relevant evidence as adequate to deny benefits.

Plaintiff alleges onset of disability on October 1, 2010, when she was forty-two years old. She has a high school education. She asserts that she is disabled primarily because of arthritis in her right knee. She also suffers from morbid obesity and other musculoskeletal complaints. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments caused limitations. However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work in the national economy. One of the jobs identified by the ALJ was a surveillance system monitor. A vocational expert ("VE") testified that this job would allow Plaintiff to sit or stand whenever she needed. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") provides that this job does not require an individual to reach, handle, finger, balance, stoop, or perform any other postural movements. DOT 379.367-010. The surveillance system monitor simply watches television screens and telephones for police assistance when necessary. DOT 379.367-010. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that any of her musculoskeletalimpairments prevent her from doing a job that allows her to sit or stand at will and does not require other physical functions.

Plaintiff asserts that pain or drowsiness would preclude her from sufficiently concentrating to perform work on a regular and continuing basis. (Pl. Brief). However, the only evidentiary records of an impact on concentration are her subjective claims. No treating physician authored a medical opinion in support of Plaintiff's claims. Doc. 10. Her treating orthopedist authored an uncontradicted opinion that she could perform light work and stand for up to an hour. An uncontradicted state agency psychologist opined that she had only mild limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace. The ALJ relied on the objective medical evidence, as interpreted by the medical professionals, Plaintiff's inconsistent claims, and other factors, to find her less than fully credible. This is an accurate characterization of the record and a proper reason to discount Plaintiff's credibility. Plaintiff asserts that other factors affecting credibility weigh in her favor, but the Court affords deference to ALJ credibility determinations and may not independently re-weigh the evidence.

Plaintiff makes other claims in this appeal, but they all rely on her subjective complaints. The Court finds no merit to these allegations of error because the ALJ properly found her subjective complaints to be less than fully credible. The Courtrecommends that Plaintiff's appeal be denied, the decision of the Commissioner be affirmed, and the case closed.

II. Procedural Background

On September 7, 2011, Plaintiff obtained counsel to pursue benefits under the Act. (Tr. 118). On September 12, 2011, Plaintiff applied for SSI and DIB. (Tr. 190-98). On December 23, 2011, the Bureau of Disability Determination ("state agency") denied Plaintiff's application (Tr. 94-117), and Plaintiff requested a hearing. (Tr. 131-33). On June 10, 2013, an ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff—who was represented by an attorney—and a vocational expert ("VE") appeared and testified. (Tr. 26-93). On June 13, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits. (Tr. 10-24). Plaintiff requested review with the Appeals Council (Tr. 6), which the Appeals Council denied on January 6, 2015, affirming the decision of the ALJ as the "final decision" of the Commissioner. (Tr. 1-5). See Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 107 (2000).

On February 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to appeal the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 1). On May 7, 2015, the Commissioner filed an answer and administrative transcript of proceedings. (Docs. 9, 10). On July 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief in support of the appeal ("Pl. Brief"). (Doc. 15). On August 24, 2015, Defendant filed a brief in response ("Def. Brief"). (Doc. 17). On September 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed a brief inreply ("Pl. Reply"). (Doc. 18). On June 29, 2015, the Court referred this case to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. The matter is now ripe for review.

III. Standard of Review and Sequential Evaluation Process

To receive benefits under the Act, a claimant must establish an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Act requires that a claimant for disability benefits show that:

He is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work.

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

The ALJ uses a five-step evaluation process to determine if a person is eligible for disability benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ must sequentially determine: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment; (3) whether the claimant's impairment meets or equals a listed impairment from 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("Listing"); (4) whether the claimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing past relevant work; and (5) whether theclaimant's impairment prevents the claimant from doing any other work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. Before step four in this process, the ALJ must also determine Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC"). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e).

The disability determination involves shifting burdens of proof. The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four. If the claimant satisfies this burden, then the Commissioner must show at step five that jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). The ultimate burden of proving disability under the Act lies with the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a).

When reviewing the denial of disability benefits, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence supports the denial. Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). Substantial evidence is a deferential standard of review. See Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004). Substantial evidence "does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). Substantial evidence is "less than a preponderance" and "more than a mere scintilla." Jesurum v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 48 F.3d 114, 117 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)).

IV. Relevant Facts in the Record

Plaintiff was born in 1967 and was classified by the Regulations as a younger individual through the date of the ALJ decision. (Tr. 22); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563. Plaintiff has at least a high school education and past relevant work as a solderer, home attendant, and hand packager. (Tr. 22). As of September 9, 2010, Plaintiff was "work[ing] as an electrician soldering." (Tr. 410).

On October 1, 2010, Plaintiff's alleged onset date, a right knee MRI indicated "[d]egenerative change. Bone bruise versus degenerative osseous signal... Degenerative intrameniscal signal with complex predominantly vertically oriented tear posterior horn medial meniscus." (Tr. 372-73, 575-76). Plaintiff treated with an orthopedist, Dr. Douglas J. Hofmann, M.D., over the next six months. (Tr. 395, 402-04, 565-70). Dr. Hoffmann documented various objective findings, including a rolling gait, crepitus, painful range of motion, tenderness, positive McMurray sign, ankle puffiness, pre-cellulitic changes, antalgic gait, and edema. (Tr. 395, 402-04). He diagnosed her with "advanced" degenerative joint disease in her right knee, with "varus collapse," a "degenerative" meniscus tear, morbid obesity, and history of deep vein thrombosis and pulmonary embolus. Id. He opined that "arthroscopy may have little subjective value." (Tr. 405). He observed that she was using a cane and reported only twenty-five percent relief after knee injections. (Tr. 395). Despite these observations, he opined in Februaryof 2011 that she could perform light duty with up to one hour of continuous standing. (Tr. 395). At this time, Plaintiff reported that she was "currently not working but a...

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