Glover ex rel. Former v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg.
| Decision Date | 14 October 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14-4829,14-4829 |
| Parties | MARY E. GLOVER, individually and on behalf of other similarly situated former and current homeowners in Pennsylvania, Appellant v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE; GOLDMAN SACHS MORTGAGE COMPANY; MARK J. UDREN; UDREN LAW OFFICES, P.C. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 5, 2015
Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
Mary Glover sued Wells Fargo Home Mortgage ("Wells Fargo"), Goldman Sachs Mortgage Company ("Goldman Sachs"), and Mark J. Udren and Udren Law Offices, P.C. ("Udren") for improperly charging her fees in connection with her mortgage loan. The District Court approved the appointment of a special master to supervise discovery, denied motions Glover's for additional discovery and to amend her class definition, and dismissed her claims against Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and 56. Glover appeals from the District Court's orders addressing these issues. We will affirm.
On August 2, 2002, Glover obtained a $9,997 residential mortgage loan from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. ("WaMu") to purchase property in Clairton, Pennsylvania. The mortgage obligated Glover to make timely payments and, if she failed to do so, required her "to pay costs and expenses including reasonable and customary attorneys' fees" associated with collecting the unpaid amounts. App. 199. In March 2005, Glover defaulted on her loan. WaMu notified Glover that it would foreclose on her home unless she paid amounts equaling her three overdue monthly payments (in addition to late fees). Glover asked WaMu to modify her loan repayment schedule and WaMu agreed to postpone Glover's loan payments until April 2006. Meanwhile, in September2005, Goldman Sachs purchased WaMu's loan to Glover, exclusive of the servicing rights, and WaMu continued to collect the loan payments.
Glover remained in default, and in April 2006, WaMu's counsel, Udren, filed a foreclosure complaint against her for $12,652.36 in unpaid principal, interest, costs, and attorney's fees. In June 2006, WaMu offered Glover a loan modification agreement, which, among other things, recalculated Glover's monthly required payment to $170.31 and required that Glover immediately pay WaMu $3,696 for "foreclosure fees & costs." Supp. App. 2648. Glover accepted the offer, and began making the $170.31 monthly payments to WaMu, even though WaMu never executed the 2006 LMA or formally modified the terms of the loan. She did not pay WaMu the $3,696, and WaMu never repeated its demand for that amount.
On December 1, 2006, WaMu transferred its servicing duties to Wells Fargo. Glover made her partial mortgage payments to Wells Fargo but did not pay the outstanding deficiency.
By letter dated January 4, 2008, Wells Fargo conveyed a written "loan modification offer" (the "2008 LMA"), which Glover accepted. Among other things, the 2008 LMA increased Glover's unpaid principal balance from $9,508.36 to $12,152.02 and lengthened her repayment period by six years. The 2008 LMA also contained a "[b]reakdown of [a]mounts [d]ue," including a $1,571.02 charge for "Corp Recov/Title/Mod Fees/Atty/FC/BPO/Appraisal." Supp. App. 2612. Glover haspresented no evidence showing that these items were incorporated into her principal loan balance or that Wells Fargo collected foreclosure-related attorney's fees from her.
Glover brought her loan out of default on March 5, 2008 and the foreclosure complaint was withdrawn on March 25, 2009.
On June 9, 2010, Glover filed a 17-count Second Amended Class Action Complaint (the "SAC") for the unlawful collection of attorney's fees and other foreclosure-related charges relating to her mortgage. Wells Fargo and Goldman Sachs moved to dismiss portions of the SAC under Rule 12(b)(6); their motions were granted in part and denied in part. The District Court also dismissed all of Glover's claims against Udren and certified the dismissal of her claims against Udren.1 The District Court also approved a stipulation that Glover and Udren entered (the "Stipulation"), in which they agreed to provide initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) and Udren warranted that it had "not destroyed any documents" relating to Glover's (or the putative class's) claims against the defendants.
Discovery began in or about June 2011. Between August 11, 2011 and September 8, 2011, the parties filed approximately sixteen discovery-related motions, twelve of which were filed by Glover. During a September 8 status conference, the Magistrate Judge told the parties that "continuation of th[eir] outrageous motions practice wouldresult in those discovery matters being referred to a special master." App. 1370. Notwithstanding the Magistrate Judge's admonition, the parties filed an additional twelve discovery motions between September 9 and October 12, prompting the Magistrate Judge to order on October 12 that the parties "confer and see if they can agree on a special master to whom all such matters will be referred; if they fail to do so, the Court will make its own selection of such special master." App. 1370. The parties selected a Special Master2 and the Magistrate Judge entered an order on October 18 appointing him to handle "discovery matters" and directing that his "fees will be paid . . . 50% by plaintiff and 50% by defendants" (the "50/50 fee allocation"). App. 1417-18.
Glover lodged numerous objections to the Special Master appointment, including an objection to the 50/50 fee allocation, which the Magistrate Judge overruled on October 20. Glover then filed with the District Judge objections to the appointment order and fee allocation. Despite her protests, Glover conceded that there was "a need" for a Special Master to assist with "ESI discovery," App. 1448, and that despite her "low income," App. 1451, she was prepared to contribute "up to $50,000.00" toward the Special Master's fees, App. 1808.
The District Court responded by order dated November 9, 2011, directing the Magistrate Judge to issue a more "detailed" order containing the terms of the appointment, and overruling Glover's objections to the Magistrate Judge's: (1) authorityto appoint the Special Master; (2) referral to the Special Master of all discovery disputes; and (3) the 50/50 fee allocation, finding that it "indicates a thoughtful consideration of the equities, balanced against the need to protect against unreasonable expense or delay." App. 13-14. The Magistrate Judge then issued an "Amended Order" on November 9, 2011, confirming the appointment to handle discovery and reiterating the fee allocation, App. 1487.
After we denied Glover's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the District Court's Special Master appointment order, Glover's counsel stated during a September 24, 2012 status conference that Glover would not proceed with any further discovery before the Special Master, prompting the Magistrate Judge to deem discovery complete. The Magistrate Judge had set October 2, 2012 as the deadline for her to file her class certification motion and offered to allow her to file an "amended" submission concerning her putative class. App. 1886. Glover rejected the offer but did file her Motion for Class Certification by the court-ordered deadline (the "Initial Class Motion").3 One month later, she filed a separate motion to certify a "limited class of homeowners" (the "Limited Class Motion"), App. 1777, redefining the proposed class in a way she claimed would "obviat[e] the need for a special master," App. 1884. Glover also filed a motion to enforce the Stipulation with Udren (the "Motion to Enforce"), seeking documents shecontended "Udren agreed to produce [and that] are quite relevant to [Glover's] now-pending Motion for Class Certification of a Limited Class." App. 1808.
The Magistrate Judge denied Glover's Limited Class Motion and Motion to Enforce. With respect to the Limited Class Motion, the Magistrate Judge held that Glover had "relinquished her right to re-characterize her class definition" when her counsel represented that she did not seek amended briefing, and because the motion was filed one month after the October 2 deadline. App. 1886. In denying Glover's Motion to Enforce her Stipulation with Udren, the Magistrate Judge noted that Glover had already sought the same discovery from Udren through two prior motions to compel, which were denied, and that the discovery period was now closed due to Glover's counsel's representation at the September 24 status conference that she would not participate in further discovery. The District Court affirmed both orders.4
The District Court ultimately granted summary judgment to Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo on Glover's remaining claims and, in doing so, denied Glover's request for further discovery under Rule 56(d). Glover appeals.
Glover appeals the District Court's: (A) appointment of the Special Master; (B) denial of discovery under Rule 56 and her Motion to Enforce the Stipulation with Udren;(C) dismissal of her claims against Goldman Sachs and Wells Fargo; and (D) denial of her Limited Class Motion. We will address each in turn.
We first address Glover's four challenges to the District Court's appointment of the Special Master. As we explain below, none of these challenges have merit and the appointment was within the District Court's discretion.5
We begin with Glover's contention that the appointment lacked a proper purpose under Rule 53(a). The purpose of a special master is "to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the progress of a cause." La Buy v. Howes...
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