Glover v. Lockheed Corp.

• Decision Date: 16 July 1991
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 2:90-1212-18.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Franklin GLOVER, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED CORPORATION, d/b/a Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, Defendant.

772 F. Supp. 898

Franklin GLOVER, Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED CORPORATION, d/b/a Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 2:90-1212-18.

United States District Court, D. South Carolina, Charleston Division.

July 16, 1991.

Synthia R. Glover, Charleston, S.C., for plaintiff.

David B. McCormack, Charleston, S.C., for defendant.

ORDER

NORTON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court for review of the plaintiff's objections to the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge. For reasons discussed more fully below, this Court adopts the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that summary judgment be granted in favor of the defendant as to all causes of action.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The plaintiff Franklin Glover went to work for defendant Lockheed Corporation ("Lockheed") in October of 1963. Through a series of promotions, Glover eventually attained a salaried position as "Structures and/or Installation Supervisor." Glover's promotion roughly coincided with Lockheed receiving a contract with the United States Air Force for the construction of fifty C-5B airplanes. This contract was completed sometime in mid-1987, and was not replaced by any new contract of the same magnitude. As a result, Lockheed made plans to "surplus" employees. "Surplus" is a Lockheed term which describes the procedure at Lockheed of demoting and terminating certain employees when business downturns so necessitate.

As a result of the 1988 surplus, Glover was demoted to an hourly position in bond assemblies production, which paid $13.57 per hour. This constituted a loss in income to him of $139.00 per week in gross pay. Glover's former supervisor, a white male named Wendell Richardson, was surplussed also, and demoted to Glover's former position as supervisor. Of course, Glover and Richardson were not the only persons affected by the surplus. The plant's original work force of approximately 627 employees dropped to 134 employees. The total number of supervisors dropped from 21 to 7. Of these original 21 supervisors, 15 were white, and 6 were black. After the surplus, 5 of the supervisors were white, and 2 were black.

Glover complains that he was discriminated against because he was replaced by a white male and because the company failed to give adequate weight to his seniority in making its decision to demote him. Lockheed contends that Glover was treated fairly and that Richardson was more qualified than Glover for the position. In support of this claim, Lockheed submitted that Glover's most recent evaluation just prior to his demotion indicated a 50.7 rating out of a possible 100, as compared to Richardson, whose rating was 81.6. Lockheed further contends that it followed its established race neutral procedure for determining who was demoted and into which position. Lockheed further cites to its review process which calls for a special committee to review any adverse decisions affecting a minority employee.

Glover submitted the affidavits of several of his co-employees who opined that Glover was more qualified than Richardson and that they felt Glover had suffered an adverse employment action because he was an outspoken employee, especially on issues of racial equality. As a result of his demotion, Glover filed a complaint alleging violations of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981¹, and state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and "detrimental reliance." Defendant Lockheed moved for summary judgment on all claims. The matter was referred to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the local rules of this district concerning reference to a magistrate judge. See United States Magistrates, Local Rule 19, D.S.C.; Bowman v. Bodenkircher, 522 F.2d 209 (4th Cir.1975). The Magistrate Judge filed his Report and Recommendation on May 30, 1991. On June 13, 1991, the plaintiff filed his objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation.²

When a party properly objects to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, this Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the report and recommendation to which specific objections are made, and the Court may accept, reject, modify in all or in part, the recommendation, or recommit the matter to him with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The plaintiff did not object to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation that his state claims be dismissed; therefore this Court need not review those claims.³ This Court need only address plaintiff's objections with regard to his Title VII claim, which are that (1) "Lockheed's criteria for surplussing the plaintiff were subjective and not validated as related to job performance;" (2) "that plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits raise an inference of discriminatory animus which was not adequately rebutted by the defendant;" and (3) "that defendant's attempt to establish a legitimate business necessity for the surplus criteria which has not been shown to be job-related does not meet the required burden under Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)." Since the plaintiff's objections are somewhat difficult to follow, this Court has reviewed plaintiff's entire Title VII claim de novo, based on the evidence of record as well as the above mentioned facts.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

In deciding a summary judgment motion, this Court must determine whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. A party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Although the burden is on the party seeking summary judgment, the non-moving party nonetheless must point to specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, rather than resting on the assertion of his pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element of his case and on which he will bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a failure of proof concerning an essential element of the case renders all other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552. "The moving party is `entitled to judgment as a matter of law' because the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case with respect to which he has the burden of proof." Celotex at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

DISCUSSION

In McDonnell-Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1982), the Supreme Court set forth the framework within which a plaintiff must establish a Title VII claim. Under these cases, the plaintiff must first establish prima facie case of discrimination. Once he has made out a prima facie case, the defendant must then come forward with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action it took. If the defendant articulates such a reason, the plaintiff must then prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason was not the defendant's true reason, but was instead a pretext for discrimination.

This case is analogous to a reduction in force case. In order to establish prima facie discrimination in a reduction in force case, a plaintiff must show that (1) he was in the protected class; and (2) that he suffered an unfavorable employment action at the hands of his employer; (3) that he was qualified to assume another position at the time of his discharge or demotion; and (4) that the employer has not treated race neutrally, but instead has discriminated based upon it. Gilyard v. South Carolina Department of Youth Services, 667 F.Supp. 266 (D.S.C.1985).

In this case, the plaintiff has established that he is a member of a protected class and that he suffered an adverse employment action. However, his prima facie case fails as to the third and fourth elements. First, with regard to his qualifications, he has failed to produce sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was more qualified than Richardson, the white male who was demoted into plaintiff's position. Second, he has failed to produce direct evidence that Lockheed did not treat his race neutrally in deciding to demote him. Although the plaintiff produced affidavits of persons who opined that he had been discriminated against because he was an outspoken employee, this, coupled only with the plaintiff's own subjective opinion, is not sufficient to create an issue as to whether his race was treated neutrally in the decision regarding him.

After adequate time for discovery a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his or her case, and for which he has the burden of proof at trial, cannot withstand a properly supported summary judgment motion by relying on mere allegations or denials in his pleadings. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys, 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987). Where the record, taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538. Even assuming that the plaintiff has managed to make out a prima facie case, such that the burden shifts to Lockheed to articulate a...