Glover v. People

Decision Date26 October 1903
Citation68 N.E. 464,204 Ill. 170
PartiesGLOVER v. PEOPLE.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to Circuit Court, Moultrie County; W. G. Cochran, Judge.

Frank Glover was convicted of maliciously threatening to kill another, with intent to extort money from him, and he brings error. Affirmed.John R. Eden, John E. Jennings, and Frank Spitler, for plaintiff in error.

H. J. Hamlin, Atty. Gen., W. K. Whitfield, State's Atty., and George B. Gillesple, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Emery Andrews, of counsel), for the People.

The grand jury, at the September term of the circuit court of Moultrie county, returned an indictment against Frank Glover, consisting of three counts. The first count charged robbery from the person of one Joseph Wiley by violence; the second, by intimidation; and the third, a violation of section 93a of the Criminal Code, which reads as follows: ‘Whoever, either verbally or by written or printed communication, maliciously and willfully threatens to * * * kill or murder another person, * * * with intent thereby to extort any money, goods, chattels, or other valuable thing, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than twenty years' (Laws 1901, p. 144), and was, omitting the formal part, in the following language: ‘That Frank Glover, late of said county, on the first day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and two, at and within the said county of Moultrie, and state of Illinois, aforesaid, knowingly, feloniously and maliciously, verbally did then and there threaten to kill and murder one Joseph Wiley, with intent then and there upon the part of him, said Frank Glover, by means of the threat so made by him, the said Frank Glover, thereby then and there unlawfully and feloniously to extort money from him, the said Joseph Wiley.’ A motion was made to quash the indictment and each count thereof, which was overruled, and, a plea of not guilty having been entered, a trial was had, and the defendant was found guilty under the third count of the indictment; and, after overruling a motion for a new trial and in arrest of judgment, the court sentenced him to the penitentiary for an indeterminateperiod, and a writ of error has been sued out from this court to reverse said judgment.

The facts upon which the conviction was based were substantially as follows: A feud between the Wiley and Glover families, who were neighbors, in Moultrie county, had existed for many years. Some time prior to the difficulty out of which this indictment arose, a fight had occurred between Wiley and the defendant. A prosecution was instituted by Wiley against Glover, and he was fined a considerable amount. Thereafter they met near their homes, and the defendant demanded of Wiley that he pay to him the sum of $500 to reimburse him for the amount he had paid out in fines and attorney's fees growing out of said prosecution. Wiley refused to pay said claim, and said he had paid out a considerable sum himself, and had lost an eye in the difficulty, to which Glover replied, ‘If you think more of $500 than you do of your life and your family's life, go ahead.’ This meeting was in April. In the following August the parties met in Allenville, when Glover demanded of Wiley that he pay to him $200, which he claimed they had agreed was to be paid him by Wiley in settlement of all matters in difference between them. After they had had a few words with reference to the payment of said money, Wiley started to run, and called for help. Glover ran after him. Wiley jumped on the platform in front of McCabe's store. Glover followed him, and got between him and the store door. After they were upon the platform, Glover took Wiley by the right arm with his left hand, during which time he had his right hand in the right-hand pocket of his sack coat. Two witnesses testified that about that time they saw what they thought was a revolver in the right-hand coat pocket of Glover. As they stood upon the platform, the defendant still holding Wiley by the arm, with his right hand in his coat pocket, he said to him: ‘You big Irish son of a bitch! You promised me $200, and she's got to come.’ At that time, Wiley was begging the bystanders to assist him. Glover, still holding him by the arm, said: ‘You've got to get it. It's got to come. This is Frank Glover a-hold of you. You've got to get me that money. It's got to come. I mean business.’ At that time McCabe came out of the store, and ordered them from the platform. J. R. Martin, a justice of the peace, ordered Glover to desist, and directed the bystanders to arrest him. No one interfered, although six or eight men were present. A constable who was present testified he did not interfere because he was unarmed. Wiley said to those present: ‘I want you to help me, boys. He is going to kill me. I have got to get away from here. I have got to have some help.’ He further testified that ‘just at that time I heard him cock his gun. I did not see his gun. I thought I heard it.’ He also testified Glover said, ‘The first son of a bitch that lays hands on me, I will kill you.’ Wiley then called to McCabe to bring him $100. McCabe brought that amount of money from the store and gave it to Wiley, and Wiley gave it to Glover, when Glover released him and went away.

HAND, C. J. (after stating the facts).

It is assigned as error that the court erred in overruling a motion to quash the third count of the indictment, and in arrest of judgment. The count was substantially in the language of the statute creating the offense, and was sufficient. Section 6 of division 11 of the Criminal Code (1 Starr & C. Ann. St. 1896 [2d Ed.] p. 1389) provides: ‘Every indictment or accusation of the grand jury shall be deemed sufficiently technical and correct which states the offense in the terms and language of the statutes creating the offense, or so plainly that the nature of the offense may be easily understood by the jury.’ In Strohm v. People, 160 Ill. 582, 43 N. E. 622, the indictment charged a violation of the statute prohibiting the selling, giving, or showing to minors of any publication principally made up of criminal news; and it was held sufficient to describe the offense in the language of the statute, without setting out the supposed prohibited matter, or excusing a failure so to do. In Honselman v. People, 168 Ill. 172, 48 N. E. 304, the indictment charged the defendant with having committed the ‘crime against nature,’ and it was held, the offense having been charged in the language of the statute, the indictment was good. In White v. People, 179 Ill. 356, 53 N. E. 570, it was held that an indictment for an attempt to commit burglary, which stated the offense in the language of the statute, and described the overt act to be that the accused ‘did then and there attempt to push back the lock on the door of said dwelling house,’ was sufficiently plain in its description of the offense. In Cannady v. People, 17 Ill. 158, it was said: ‘Where statutes create offenses, indictments should contain proper and sufficient averments to show a violation of the law. * * * Great niceties and strictness in pleading should only be countenanced and supported when it is apparent that the defendant may be surprised on the trial, or unable to meet the charge or make preparation for his defense, for want of greater certainty or particularity in the charge. Beyond this, it tends more to the evasion than the investigation of the charge, and becomes rather a means of escaping punishment for crime, than of defense against the accusation.’

It is, however, urged that the indictment is insufficient in this: that it does not set out the words constituting the threats. Such averment was unnecessary. 21 Ency. of Pl. $ Pr. p. 673; Commonwealth v. Moulton, 108 Mass. 307;State v. O'Mally, 48 Iowa, 501. In Commonwealth v. Moulton, supra, it was said: ‘This indictment is for attempting to extort money by the threat of a criminal accusation. Gen. St. 1860, c. 160, § 28. It was moved to quash it because the language...

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    ...R. 535, 25 S. W. 21, 40 Am. St. Rep. 791. See, also, Commonwealth v. Major, 198 Pa. 290, 47 Atl. 741, 82 Am. St. Rep. 803; Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464; People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 61 N. E. 286, 62 L. R. A. 193, and elaborate note; State v. Vance, 119 Iowa, 685, 94 N.......
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  • People v. Folignos
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    ...fully informed of the charge against him, and had a full opportunity to prepare his defense. The indictment is sufficient. Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170, 68 N. E. 464. It is also contended that it was not proven on the trial that the persons threatened could read or understand the letters.......
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