Glover v. People ex rel. Raymond

• Citation: 66 N.E. 820,201 Ill. 545
• Parties: GLOVER v. PEOPLE ex rel. RAYMOND, County Treasurer.
• Decision Date: 18 February 1903
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

201 Ill. 545

66 N.E. 820

GLOVER

v.PEOPLE ex rel. RAYMOND, County Treasurer. ^*

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 18, 1903.

Appeal from Cook county court; O. N. Carter, Judge.

Objections by Henry W. Glover against entry of judgment and order of sale against his property for the nonpayment of a special assessment levied by the city of Chicago. From a judgment of sale, objector appeals. Reversed.Marston & Tuttle, for appellant.

Edgar Bronson Tolman and Charles M. Walker, Corp. Counsel (Robert Redfield and William M. Pindell, of counsel), for appellee.

This is an appeal from the judgment of sale for certain lots located in Cook county, Ill., for the nonpayment of a special assessment levied by the city of Chicago for water service pipes in West Superior street, from North Forty-Sixth avenue to North Fiftieth avenue, in said city. The proceedings for the special assessment were commenced and prosecuted under the local improvement act of 1897. Appellant filed objections to the entry of judgment and order of sale against his property, but on motion of appellee certain of the objections were by the county court stricken from the files. The objections so stricken off were as follows: ‘(2) For that the specifications covering the work called for by the ordinance for said alleged improvement, upon which specifications the contractors made their bids, and which such contractors were obliged to accept, contained a provision that eight hours should constitute a day's labor, and that no laborers employed by such contractors should be allowed to labor more than eight hours per day, and that any violation of such provision should be ground for forfeiture of the contract; that said specifications also contained the limitation that no laborer should be employed upon said work unless he was a citizen of the United States, or had declared his intention to become such; and that by reason of such restrictions the bids upon said work were limited to such contractors as employed only citizen labor, and who would agree that eight hours only should constitute one day's labor, by reason whereof the competition in bidding for said work was not such as is contemplated by the statute in that regard; and the proceedings with reference to said contract were not in accordance with the statute covering the advertising and posting of notices for bids upon such work and the letting of contracts therefor. (3) For that, by reason of the restrictions and limitations contained in the specifications attached to the proposal of the contract, there was not free and unrestricted competition for the contract. (4) For that said bidding and letting of said contracts was contrary to law, in that it unjustly and arbitrarily discriminated between persons of the same class in designating whose bid would be received and considered in the letting of the contract. (5) For that the provisions contained in the specifications upon which the contract was let include restrictions which constitute a discrimination between different classes of citizens, and are of such a nature as to restrict competition and to increase the cost of the work. (6) For that the restrictions contained in the specifications under which said contract was let were in conflict with the constitution of the state, and constitute an infringement upon the constitutional rights of the citizens of the state. (7) For that the entry of a judgment herein, and the sale of this objector's property thereunder, would constitute a taking of private property without due process of law.’ The remainder of the objections were overruled by the county court, and judgment of sale was entered against the property of appellant as prayed for by the county collector. An appeal was prayed from said judgment of the county court and allowed, and the present hearing is upon said appeal.

RICKS, J. (after stating the facts).

Prior to the hearing of this cause in the county court, and in apt time, appellant filed the objections set forth in the foregoing statement. The cause came on for a hearing, and appellee offered all the formal proofs showing sufficient compliance with the law to entitle the people to a judgment for the sale of the property in question, unless the matters set forth in the objections above mentioned were sufficient to defeat the right to such judgment of sale. On motion of appellee, made at the close of the evidence for the people, and without any hearing thereon, or without giving appellant opportunity to produce evidence in support of said objections, they were stricken from the files. The court heard evidence upon other objections, which are contained in the record, and rendered judgment of sale. Appellant prayed this appeal, and the only matter discussed or error insisted upon is the action of the court in striking these objectionsfrom the files. There is evidence in the record tending to support these objections, but it was not admitted under them, as they were out of the record before such evidence was offered, or allowed to go to the court at all. It is, therefore, plain that in considering...