Glover v. State
| Decision Date | 05 February 1887 |
| Docket Number | 13,409 |
| Citation | 10 N.E. 282,109 Ind. 391 |
| Parties | Glover v. The State |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Fountain Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
G. W Paul, J. E. Humphries and W. M. Reeves, for appellant.
T. F Davidson and H. H. Conley, Prosecuting Attorney, for the State.
Appellant was township trustee, and ex officio trustee of the school township. He was convicted upon a charge of having accepted money as an inducement and bribe to enter into a contract, as such trustee, for the purchase of school furniture and supplies, for the use of the township. There were, originally, seven counts in the indictment.
The court sustained a motion to quash as to the fifth, and overruled it as to the others. That ruling is assigned as error. The objections urged, in argument, are not to any particular count, but to each and all, upon the assumption that if one of them is bad, all are bad, and that if one is good, all are good.
Adopting that assumption as being correct, we pass to the objections to the indictment, specifically pointed out. This prosecution, as indicated by the indictment, is based upon section 2009, R. S. 1881. The first portion of the section makes it a crime for any person to corruptly give, or offer to give, to any State or other officer, any money or valuable thing to influence his action in any matter pending, or that may legally come before him. The latter portion is, in substance, that whoever, holding any office of trust or profit under the laws of this State, solicits or accepts any such money or valuable thing, to influence him with respect to his official duty, or to influence his action in any matter pending, or that may legally come before him, shall, upon conviction thereof, be imprisoned in the State prison, etc.
It is charged in the indictment, that appellant was a township trustee, and ex officio trustee of the school township; that as such trustee, it was his duty to contract for, purchase, and furnish to the school township, for its use, school furniture, materials and supplies; that on the 5th day of September, 1885, while holding the office of trustee of the school township, and acting as such, he unlawfully, feloniously, and corruptly, accepted from one Pollard the sum of $ 3,500 in money as a bribe, and to influence him, appellant, as such trustee, in the discharge of his duties as such trustee, and that he was influenced, as such trustee, by the acceptance of the money, to enter into a contract with said Pollard for the purchase from him, in behalf of, and for the use of the school township, of a large amount of school furniture, material and supplies, to the amount, price and value of $ 10,000.
As we understand the brief of appellant's counsel, three objections, and only three, are urged to the indictment. The first is, that there is no statement of the kind of furniture purchased; that the terms of the contract are not specifically stated; that, hence, it is not shown how or wherein appellant was bribed, or influenced; and that it does appear that he was not improperly influenced, because the furniture, etc., contracted for, was worth all he gave, or agreed to give, for it.
It is not particular as to the kind of property purchased. The purchase of the property is not the gravamen of the offence, as defined by the statute.
It is entirely immaterial as to the amount, quality, or description of the property contracted for and purchased. That which the statute prohibits, and declares to be a crime, is the soliciting or accepting of money or other valuable things by the trustee to influence him with respect to his official duty, or to influence his action in any matter pending, or that may legally come before him.
It is not a crime for a trustee of a school township to purchase school furniture for, and on behalf of, the corporation; but it is a crime to accept money to influence him to enter into such a contract, or make such a purchase.
The vital charge presented by the indictment, to be met by appellant, was, that he had accepted money to influence his official conduct.
If he could meet that charge he would overthrow the case against him. And to enable him to meet that charge, it was not necessary that he should be furnished with a detailed list of the articles contracted for and purchased, nor that he should be informed of the specific terms of the contract. He may have paid the full amount in cash, out of the township funds; he may have issued certificates of indebtedness, payable at different times, or he may have purchased the articles with a warrant; but, manifestly, none of these supposed terms or conditions could be important or material to him in preparing for or making his defence. Nor does it make any difference that the furniture, etc., contracted for or purchased, was of the value agreed upon. It may be as great an injury to the township to purchase a large amount of furniture, etc., not needed, as to pay for a proper amount more than it is worth.
Did appellant accept the money to influence his official action, in contracting for, and purchasing the furniture, etc.? That is the question to be settled. If he did, he is guilty under the statute, without regard to the particular articles of the purchase or the terms of the contract.
We may as well notice here an argument urged as a reason why the motion for a new trial should have been granted. It is argued, that because the contract for the purchase of the furniture is not shown to have been in writing, it must be assumed that it was not; that not being in writing, under the statute of frauds, it could not be enforced, and that, therefore, appellant could not be guilty of the crime defined by the statute, upon which this prosecution is based.
It is not material whether the contract entered into could have been enforced against the township or not.
If it was already executed, and the amount paid out of the township funds, of course it could not be material whether or not the contract was in writing. Nor could it be material in any event. The question is not whether appellant entered into a contract binding upon the township, but whether he accepted the bribe.
If he did, he can not be heard to say that the contract was not enforceable against the township. If he did, he is guilty of the crime defined by the statute. Shircliff v. State, 96 Ind. 369; State v. McDonald, 106 Ind. 233, 6 N.E. 607; Woodward v. State, 103 Ind. 127, 2 N.E. 321.
It is insisted, in the second place, that the indictment is bad, because it is not specifically averred therein that Pollard gave the money to appellee, with the intent of inducing him to do some act to favor and aid him, Pollard. We do not think such an averment is necessary.
The case of Hutchinson v. State, 36 Tex. 293, cited by counsel, is not authority here, for the reason that the case arose under a statute very different from that upon which this prosecution rests.
From all the facts stated in the indictment before us, the inference is irresistible, that Pollard, or some one for whom he was acting, was to, and did, profit by the arrangement with appellant.
Such an inference is not material or important here, nor is it essential that aid or profit to Pollard, or those for whom he may have acted, should be charged. It is a crime under the statute for a township trustee to solicit or accept money to influence his official conduct, whether those from whom it is solicited or received are profited or not. The indictment is not as specific and formal, in some respects, as the rules of good pleading require, but, taken as a whole, the offence is charged, substantially, in the language of the statute, and plainly enough informed appellant of the crime with which he was charged. R. S. 1881, sections 1755, 1756; State v. Anderson, 103 Ind. 170, 2 N.E. 332, and cases there cited; Myers v. State, 101 Ind. 379, and cases there cited; Malone v. State, 14 Ind. 219; Marble v. State, 13 Ind. 362.
It is finally contended, in the third place, that the motion to quash should have been sustained, because different counts in the indictment charge distinct and different offences.
In one of the counts, it is charged that appellant accepted $ 3,500 from one Pollard, and was induced by such acceptance to contract with him for, and purchase from him, school furniture, etc., for the township.
In another count, it is charged that appellant accepted from one Davis the same amount of money, and by such acceptance was induced to contract for, and purchase from him, the same amount of school furniture.
The dates, the amounts accepted, and the amounts of the school furniture, etc., are the same in each count. The difference is, that where the name of Pollard is used in some of the counts, the name of Davis is used in others.
It is not certain, from an inspection of the indictment, that the several counts do not, in different modes, charge the same offence, growing out of the same transaction. There are, doubtless, cases where the court will, and ought to, quash an indictment, where different and distinct felonies, and such as can not be joined, are charged in different counts of an indictment. But those are cases where it is made certain from an inspection of the indictment, that different and distinct felonies, which can not be joined, are charged in different counts, and that the same offence is not charged in the several counts in different modes.
Whether or not an indictment will be quashed for the reason that different felonies are charged in different counts, is much in the discretion of the court, for the reason that it is often difficult to determine from an inspection of the indictment, whether such distinct and different felonies are so...
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