Glover v. State, Dot, Marine Hwy. System
| Decision Date | 18 January 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. S-12329.,No. S-12220.,S-12220.,S-12329. |
| Citation | 175 P.3d 1240 |
| Parties | Jesse GLOVER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. STATE of Alaska, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ALASKA MARINE HIGHWAY SYSTEM, Appellee/Cross-Appellant. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
James P. Jacobsen, Beard Stacey Trueb & Jacobsen, LLP, Anchorage, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee.
Susan D. Cox, Assistant Attorney General, and David W. Márquez, Attorney General, Juneau, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: FABE, Chief Justice, MATTHEWS, EASTAUGH, and CARPENETI, Justices.
A state-employed seaman injured on the job presents a declaratory challenge to AS 09.50.250(5), a recently enacted provision rescinding the state's waiver of sovereign immunity from suits under the federal Jones Act and referring state employees exclusively to the state workers' compensation system. The employee argues that the statute violates the Alaska Constitution's waiver of sovereign immunity, is preempted by federal law, and violates his due process and equal protection rights. The superior court upheld the amended statute. We affirm because (1) the Alaska Constitution's waiver of sovereign immunity is not absolute, (2) the federal government's jurisprudence defers to state assertions of sovereign immunity, and (3) the statute survives due process and equal protection challenges.
The facts relevant to this declaratory challenge are undisputed. In 2003 the Alaska Legislature passed an amendment to AS 09.50.250 to revoke the state's waiver of sovereign immunity for suits by state-employed seamen.1 The effect of this amendment was to require injured seamen previously entitled to sue the state under the federal Jones Act2 to seek compensation for injury through the state workers' compensation system3 instead. The amendment added a fifth type of exception to the state's general waiver of sovereign immunity. In relevant part AS 09.50.250 states:
A person or corporation having a contract, quasi-contract, or tort claim against the state may bring an action against the state in a state court that has jurisdiction over the claim.... However, an action may not be brought if the claim
....
(5) arises out of injury, illness, or death of a seaman that occurs or manifests itself during or in the course of, or arises out of, employment with the state; AS 23.30 provides the exclusive remedy for such a claim and no action may be brought against the state, its vessels, or its employees under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C. 688), in admiralty or under the general maritime law.
The bill was introduced into both the house and the senate at the request of then-governor Frank Murkowski. In a letter that accompanied the initial bill, the governor explained that the bill
On February 6, 2004, after the effective date of the statute, Jesse Glover was working for the Alaska Marine Highway System (AMHS) as a crew member on the MN TUSTAMENA. The vessel was afloat on navigable waters off the coast of Alaska. As the ship approached Cordova, the car deck hatch was opened using a substitute motor. Glover was on the forecastle deck as the ship was approaching the dock and fell through the hatch. Glover suffered injuries in the fall that required surgery on his feet.
Glover claims (and the state denies) that his injuries—including head, spine, and foot injuries—were "a direct and proximate result of the carelessness and negligence of defendant and the unseaworthiness of the vessel." Glover stated in his October 2004 declaration that he was undergoing daily rehabilitation and anticipated needing additional surgery in the future.
Glover's employer, pursuant to AS 09.50.250(5), handled Glover's injury under the workers' compensation system. Glover brought this case in the superior court, presenting a declaratory challenge to AS 09.50.250(5)'s revocation of the state's sovereign immunity waiver with respect to stateemployed seamen. Glover challenges AS 09.50.250(5) on several grounds. First, Glover states that the statute violates article II, section 21 of the Alaska Constitution, which Glover contends is an unequivocal and selfexecuting complete waiver of state sovereign immunity. Second, Glover argues that the statute impermissibly violates the United States Constitution because it attempts to displace supreme federal law with a state remedy and because it discriminates against a federal cause of action. Third, Glover argues that the statute violates his rights under the Alaska Constitution, including his right to a jury trial, his due process right to access the courts, and his right to equal protection.
In December 2005 Superior Court Judge Patricia A. Collins issued a comprehensive order denying Glover's motion for declaratory judgment and granting the state's motion for declaratory and summary judgment. In January 2006 Judge Collins entered an order for final judgment. Glover appeals those determinations.
The state moved for partial attorney's fees pursuant to Alaska Civil Rule 82(b)(2). Glover argued that he was a public interest litigant and therefore not subject to an attorney's fee award under Rule 82. Judge Collins found that Glover was not a public interest litigant because his action was "clearly motivated primarily by a private economic interest in damages even though other public policy questions . . . are implicated." Judge Collins nonetheless found that "other equitable factors" justified a downward departure in the fee award and awarded the state only $1000 in attorney's fees. The state appeals the attorney's fee award. The two appeals have been consolidated.
Our review of the constitutional and statutory interpretation issues raised in this case is de novo.4
We review the superior court's award of attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard, and will disturb the award only if it is manifestly unreasonable.5
Article II, section 21 of the Alaska Constitution states: "The legislature shall establish procedures for suits against the State." The question before us is whether this section of the constitution operates as an absolute waiver of sovereign immunity—in which case the legislature has no statutory authority to reclaim immunity for specific types of claims—or, in the alternative, if the provision only waives absolute immunity—in which case the legislature may specify the circumstances under which the state's less-thanabsolute sovereign immunity will apply. Glover advocates the former approach, the state the latter. Glover's first basis for challenging the constitutionality of AS 09.50.250(5) is that the constitutional provision is an absolute waiver of sovereign immunity.6
Glover's interpretation of the constitution is a major departure from the way the provision has been addressed in the past by both the legislature and this court. In 1962 the legislature first enacted AS 09.50.250, which both provided the statutory scheme for the implementation of article II, section 21 and included three exceptions to the state's general waiver of its sovereign immunity.7 These exceptions and their later amendments have been enforced repeatedly by the Alaska courts.8 Additionally, we addressed the specific issue of the state's immunity from Jones Act suits by employee seamen in State, Department of Public Safety v. Brown9 and indicated that the legislature could create a statutory exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity for seamen, but that without such an exception the state's general waiver of immunity allowed suit.10
Glover argues that in spite of this long history of state sovereign immunity, this case presents an issue of first impression for the court. Glover suggests that a careful investigation of the constitutional history of article II, section 21 leads to the conclusion that it was intended to be an absolute waiver of sovereign immunity. Glover approaches the constitutional history from three different angles: He argues: (1) that the debates from the Constitutional Convention show that the provision absolutely waived sovereign immunity, (2) that the self-executing provision of the constitution requires his interpretation, and (3) that the history surrounding the final language of the constitutional provision warrants his interpretation. He also argues that the legislative history of AS 09.50.250 supports his position. The state argues that interpretation of similar constitutional provisions in other states supports its interpretation of the constitution and argues that even if Glover were correct in his most narrow reading of the constitutional provision, AS 09.50.250(5) still passes constitutional muster because it provides a procedure for Glover to sue the state for his injuries. We address each of Glover's contentions in turn.
The clause of the Alaska Constitution waiving sovereign immunity11 was presented to the constitutional convention in draft form by the Legislative Branch Committee ("legislative committee") as part of the proposed article on the legislative branch.12 On December 14, 1955, the legislative committee presented its first proposal of the legislative branch article. The provision regarding sovereign immunity stated:
The legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what court suits may be brought against the state or agencies thereof.[13]
This proposal was...
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Kuebel v. Depart. of Wildlife and Fisheries
...a seaman the right to bring suit against the state (in state court) without the state's consent in Glover v. State, Dep't. of Transp., Alaska Marine Highway Sys., 175 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2008). In 2003, Alaska's legislature added a provision to a statute regarding waiver of immunity from suit......
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Fulmer v. State, Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries
...at 7).13 Turning to a post- Alden case with a fact pattern most analogous to the instant case is Glover v. State, Dep't. of Transp., Alaska Marine Highway Sys., 175 P.3d 1240 (Alaska 2008). In Glover, the Supreme Court of Alaska examined U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence in light of Alden v.......