Glover v. Union Pacific R. Co.
| Decision Date | 17 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-04-00100-CV.,06-04-00100-CV. |
| Citation | 187 S.W.3d 201 |
| Parties | Angela GLOVER, Betty Hoffman, and Carman Tucker, Appellants, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Anadarko Holding Co., Anadarko Land Corporation, The Unknown Stockholders of Gregg Oil Co., and The Unknown Stockholders of N.P. Powell, Inc., Appellees. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Ron W. Boorman, The Law Office of Ron Boorman, Longview, R. Crist Vial, Dallas, for appellants.
Mark A. Calhoun, David F. Johnson, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick, PC, Dallas, Greg S. Matews, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick, PC, Houston, Craig T. Enoch, Winstead, Sechrest & Minick, PC, Austin, for Union Pacific Railroad Company.
Michael E. McElroy, McElroy, Sullivan & Miller, LLP, Austin, for Anadarko Holding Co., Anadarko Land Corp., The Unknown Stockholders of Gregg Oil Co., & The Unknown Stockholders of N.P. Powell, Inc.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
Before he became governor of Texas in 1907, T.M. Campbell owned a particular parcel of Gregg County real property which straddled a railroad right-of-way and included the minerals beneath that light-of-way. In 1904, Mr. Campbell executed a deed conveying to G.B. Turner the 165 acres of that land lying south of the south boundary line of the railroad right-of-way, which 165-acre tract is herein called the "Nettleton Tract."1 Though the deed to Turner did not describe Campbell's six acres lying within the railroad right-of-way and south of the track centerline —the six acres herein called the "Campbell Tract"—central to this case is whether that deed to Turner conveyed not only the Nettleton Tract, but also the Campbell Tract's minerals. In 1940, the Texas Supreme Court ruled that the minerals in Campbell's railroad right-of-way, but north of the track centerline, passed to the grantee of Campbell's acreage lying north of the right-of-way. See Cox v. Campbell, 135 Tex. 428, 143 S.W.2d 361 (1940). Through a rather detailed history of the Campbell and Nettleton Tracts,2 Angela Glover, Betty Hoffman, and Carman Tucker (herein called "Claimants") ultimately succeeded to a fractional mineral interest in the Nettleton Tract, while Defendants3 Anadarko and Union Pacific succeeded to a fractional mineral interest in the Campbell Tract.
Claimants appeal4 the trial court's granting the summary judgment motions and pleas to the jurisdiction urged by Defendants. Alleging that they own the Campbell Tract mineral interests, Claimants argue that, when T.M. Campbell did not reserve the Campbell Tract minerals in this deed of the Nettleton Tract to Turner, the Campbell Tract minerals—under the strips and gores doctrine—passed to Turner with the Nettleton Tract. Therefore, when Gregg Oil (Anadarko's predecessor) and Texas & Pacific (Union Pacific's predecessor) accepted a 1932 quit-claim deed of a fractional interest in the Campbell Tract minerals from Nettleton, they became cotenants with Claimants or Claimants' predecessors in title. Therefore, according to Claimants, the Campbell Tract minerals have not been adversely possessed because there has been no repudiation of the cotenancy to allow limitations to run. Also, they argue, estoppel by deed applies, and no cotenant claimed more than 43.75% of the mineral estate. Further, according to Claimants, any statute of limitations has been tolled because Union Pacific, Anadarko, and their predecessors fraudulently concealed their failure to account to their cotenants.
In response, Union Pacific and Anadarko argue that Claimants never owned any mineral interests in the right-of-way because T.M. Campbell implicitly reserved his interest in the right-of-way in 1904. In addition, Union Pacific and Anadarko both argue that Claimants lack standing to sue for injuries to land and have waived error by failing to comply with the appellate briefing rules. They also claim title to the minerals through adverse possession. Union Pacific also argues that the suit is barred by the four-year statute of limitations for suits for accounting.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court, based on six holdings:
(1) Claimants have properly brought these claims because (a) they have standing as heirs to the property interests in question, and (b) the claims need not have been brought as a trespass to try title suit.
(2) By law, because T.M. Campbell did not expressly reserve rights to the minerals under the Campbell Tract, they passed to his grantee, Claimants' predecessor.
(3) Defendants Anadarko and Union Pacific have title to the Campbell Tract mineral interests through adverse possession because (a) they and their predecessors in title actually possessed the mineral estate adversely, and (b) though a cotenancy existed in the property, there was constructive notice of repudiation of the cotenancy by long and open mineral production from the property.
(4) Estoppel by deed does not apply.
(5) There is no evidence of fraudulent concealment.
(6) Limitations bars any claim for an accounting for the production taken from the property before adverse possession title ripened.
(1) Claimants Have Properly Brought These Claims Because (A) They Have Standing as Heirs to the Property Interests in Question, and (B) the Claims Need Not Have Been Brought as a Trespass to Try Title Suit
Before addressing the substance of Claimants' claims, we must first determine if we have subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal. Anadarko and Union Pacific each filed a plea to the jurisdiction challenging Claimants' standing to bring suit. Because Claimants inherited the property in question and the cause of action survives the death of the decedent, Claimants have standing to bring this suit.
A plea to the jurisdiction challenges a trial court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the controversy. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex.2000). "A plea to the jurisdiction is a dilatory plea, the purpose of which is to defeat a cause of action without regard to whether the claims asserted have merit." Id. Whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849, 855 (Tex.2002); Cook v. Exxon Corp., 145 S.W.3d 776, 780 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.). Accordingly, we review de novo the trial court's determination of standing.
Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to maintaining a suit under Texas law. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex.1993). Standing, as a necessary component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived. Id. Standing requires the claimant to demonstrate a particularized injury distinct from that suffered by the general public. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 556; see Rodgers v. RAB Invs., Ltd., 816 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no writ). The claimant must have an actual grievance, not one that is merely hypothetical or generalized. Brown v. Todd, 53 S.W.3d 297, 302 (Tex.2001).
Only the person whose primary legal right has been breached has standing to seek redress for an injury. Nobles v. Marcus, 533 S.W.2d 923, 927 (Tex.1976); Cook, 145 S.W.3d at 781. In other words, a person has standing to sue only when he or she is personally aggrieved by an alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex.1996). "Without a breach of a legal right belonging to a plaintiff, that plaintiff has no standing to litigate." Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co., 123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.); Brunson v. Woolsey, 63 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).
We review de novo the issue of standing. Tex. DOT v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex.2004).
Union Pacific and Anadarko argue Claimants lack standing because they did not own the property when the cause of action accrued. Union Pacific and Anadarko cite this Court's opinions in Cook, 145 S.W.3d at 780, and Denman, 123 S.W.3d 728, for the proposition that Claimants lack standing. In Denman and Cook, this Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing when any injury to the property occurred before the plaintiffs purchased the property and their deeds contained no assignment of any cause of action. Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 734-35. The cause of action for an injury to property belongs to the person owning the property at the time of the injury. Cook, 145 S.W.3d at 781; Lay v. Aetna Ins. Co., 599 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tex.App.-Austin 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Without express provision, the cause of action does not pass to a subsequent purchaser of the property. Cook, 145 S.W.3d at 781. Without such an express provision, a subsequent purchaser cannot recover for an injury committed before his or her purchase. Id.
Our decision in Denman is distinguishable from the current case. Claimants in this case are not subsequent purchasers of the property, but rather the heirs of the deceased party. Further, this case concerns a suit for damages based on an alleged failure to account rather than for damages to real property. Therefore, the issue is whether the cause of action survived the death of the originally injured party.
To determine whether a cause of action survives, we must first determine whether the survivability of the cause is controlled by common law principles or whether a statute provides for survival. Neither party argues that a statute controls the survivability, and our own research has yielded none. When a cause of action is not covered by a survival statute, the common law will control. First Nat'l Bank of Kerrville v. Hackworth, 673 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1984, no writ).
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