Glynn v. Edo Corp.
| Decision Date | 27 February 2008 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. JFM 07-1660. |
| Citation | 536 F.Supp.2d 595 |
| Parties | Dennis P. GLYNN Plaintiff, v. EDO CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Robert Scott Oswald, Gregory Robert Sharma-Holt, The Employment Law Group, PC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
William M Sullivan, Jr., Eric James Marcotte, Ryan S. Spiegel, Sarah Mali Hall, Winston and Strawn LLP, Washington, DC, for Defendant&
Plaintiff Dennis Glynn ("Glynn") has filed this suit against defendants EDO Corporation ("EDO"), Impact Science and Technology, Incorporated ("IST"), Michael Caprario ("Caprario"), and Dean Puzzo ("Puzzo"), alleging retaliation in violation. of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 et seq., and wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under New Hampshire and Maryland, common law. Glynn seeks reinstatement, economic damaged, compensatory damages, non-economic emotional distress damages, punitive damages, costs, fees, attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief. (Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 185-192.)
A variety of motions are now pending. First, Glynn has filed motions for leave to file a second amended complaint and a third amended complaint. These motions are granted; consequently, Glynn's motion for leave to supplement his opposition to defendants' motion is dismissed as moot. Next, defendants have filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. This motion is denied in part and granted in part. Relatedly, Glynn's motions to stay decision on the motion to dismiss and for preliminary discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction with respect, to defendants Caprario and Puzzo are; denied. Finally, defendants motion to dismiss Glynn's claim for injunctive relief is granted.
Glynn, an Air Force veteran and experienced engineer, began working for IST as a Principal Engineer in March 2004 after he sold his own defense contracting company to IST.1 (Third Am. Compl. ¶ 21.) At all times relevant to this lawsuit, defendants Caprario and Puzzo were IST employees, serving as IST's Program Manager and Information Warfare Director respectively. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 25.)
While employed with IST, Glynn worked on a United States government contract to (Id. ¶ 33.) In June 2006, Glynn and other IST employees discovered that the countermeasure systems did not function properly at high temperatures; in particular, the devices did not "transmit sufficient power to jam the IEDs." (Id. ¶ 41.)
In response to this problem, Glynn and his co-workers developed a solution "which entailed using a temperature component that automatically adjusts the power output level." (Id. ¶ 42.) As of late July 2006, this component was being installed in the countermeasure systems that were the subject of the government contract. (Id. ¶ 43.) However, Glynn remained concerned about the systems that had previously been manufactured, provided to the government, and presumably "shipped to Iraq without the temperature components that enable the devices to perform in high temperatures." (Id. ¶ 44.)
In light of these lingering, concerns, Glynn approached Caprario and informed him that the flaw in the systems "called into question all the units shipped to date." (Id. ¶ 45.) In response, Caprario and Puzzo "told Glynn that IST would not recall the units and would not notify [the Department of Defense (`DOD')] (Id. ¶ 47.) Later, Glynn asked Caprario and Puzzo if he could see the contract documents in order to "determine the extent of IST's violation of the contracts," but both Caprario and Puzzo refused. (Id. ¶ 48.)
On or about July 26, 2006, Puzzo told Glynn that IST was going to be sold to EDO and that Glynn would be offered an employee retention agreement to "ensure that he would continue working after the acquisition." (Id. ¶ 29.) On September 15, 2006, EDO provided Glynn with a retention agreement offering him $60,000. (Id. ¶ 31.) Glynn never signed the agreement. (Id. ¶ 113.) Around this time, several employees were removed from Glynn's supervision, allegedly in retaliation for Glynn's continued vocalization of his concerns about the previously-shipped defective systems. (Id. ¶ 85.)
On September 11, 2006, Glynn discovered that Caprario and Puzzo were IST stockholders set to benefit from EDO's acquisition of IST. (Id. ¶ 52.) On September 15, 2006, EDO finalized its purchase of IST. (Id. ¶ 60.) On September 20, 2006, Glynn met with Special Agent Ben Hochberger of the DOD's Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") to inform the government of his employer's actions with respect to the defective systems.2 (Id. ¶ 76.) In early October, Colonel Grisby of the DOD "made an unannounced visit to IST to test the" systems; he tested the repaired systems but not the defective ones that had already been shipped for use in Iraq. (Id. ¶¶ 78-79.)
After Colonel Grisby's visit, Glynn was instructed "not to go into the Assembly area or give work to the assemblers."3 (Id. ¶ 86.) On October 11, 2006, Puzzo orchestrated a transfer so that another employee was removed from Glynn's supervision. (Id. ¶ 87.) Caprario subsequently stated that Glynn had "drawn a line in the sand" and would be responsible for any repercussions resulting from his conduct. (Id. ¶ 88.) In November 2006, IST management ordered employees not to associate with Glynn. (Id. ¶ 89.) On December 14, 2006, IST terminated Glynn informing him that the discharge was "for the good of the company." (Id. ¶¶ 90-91.)
Glynn has filed motions for leave to file second and third amended complaints, Defendants strenuously oppose these motions, arguing that the proposed amendments are prejudicial, dilatory, in bad faith, and futile. Defendants' arguments are overwrought and unavailing. Glynn's initial complaint was filed on June 21, 2007, and an amended complaint was filed, as of right, on September 21, 2007. On October 23, 2007 and November 12, 2007, plaintiff filed the pending motions for leave to file second and third amended complaints.
Although it certainly would have been more efficient if Glynn had filed all the amendments in a single amended complaint, such slight inefficiencies are no reason to prevent him from pleading his case as he sees fit. Some of plaintiff's proposed amendments are attributable to highly technical objections lodged `in defendants' pending motion to dismiss.4 Pleading is not a "game of skill," Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), and courts "should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires," Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). In light of the liberal amendment standards, and the largely technical nature of the proposed amendments, I find that Glynn's amendments are not prejudicial, dilatory, in bad faith, or futile. Accordingly, the motions for leave to file second and third amended complaints are granted.5
In response to defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants Caprario and Puzzo, see infra § IV(A), Glynn has filed a motion for preliminary discovery on the question of jurisdiction and a related motion to stay this Court's determination of that question. While discovery is "broad in scope and freely permitted," a court can deny jurisdictional discovery when "plaintiff offers only speculation or conclusory assertions about contacts with a forum state." Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402 (4th Cir.2003).
Here, Glynn proffers only that defendants Caprario and Puzzo may have made phone calls or sent emails to Maryland, have perhaps visited the state several times, and owned stock in IST during the relevant period. .) Such limited contacts are clearly insufficient for this Court to exercise personal jurisdiction when the lawsuit does not arise out of those contacts, see infra § IV(A), and any other claims are purely speculative. See Hill v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 383 F.Supp.2d 814, 819 (D.Md.2005) (); Quinn v. Bowmar Publ'g Co., 445 F.Supp. 780, 787 (D.Md.1978) (). This conclusion is bolstered by defendants' affidavits, which highlight their extremely limited contacts with Maryland. (See Caprario Aff.; Puzzo Aff.) Accordingly, Glynn's motion is denied. See McLaughlin v. McPhail, 707 F.2d 800, 806-07 (4th Cir.1983) ().
Defendants move under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) to have all counts dismissed against defendants EDO, Caprario, and Puzzo for lack of personal jurisdiction.6 (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss ( ) at 4-18.) In support of this motion, defendants present several affidavits attesting to their limited contacts with Maryland. (See Smith Aff.; Caprario Aff.; Puzzo Aff.) Glynn counters by proffering several connections between Maryland and the defendants and by arguing that this Court has both general and specific jurisdiction over each of the defendants. (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss at 3-21.) Because I make...
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