GMAC v. City of Red Bay
| Decision Date | 11 January 2002 |
| Parties | GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION v. CITY OF RED BAY and Franklin County. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
D.W. Wilson and David E. Rains of Tanner & Guin, L.L.C., Tuscaloosa, for appellant.
Andrew P. Campbell, Janet R. Varnell, and Brian W. Warwick of Campbell, Waller & Loper, L.L.C., Birmingham; and Jeffrey L. Bowling and Robert I. Rogers, Jr., of Bedford, Rogers & Bowling, P.C., Russellville, for appellees.
Robert A. Huffaker and R. Austin Huffaker, Jr., of Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett, P.A., Montgomery, for amici curiae Automobile Dealers Association of Alabama and Business Council of Alabama, in support of the appellant.
General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") appeals from a class-certification order obtained by the plaintiffs in this case, the City of Red Bay and Franklin County. We vacate the class-certification order and remand the case.
GMAC is a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors Corporation; it also operates under the name GMAC Financial Services. In addition to insurance, mortgages, and commercial finance, GMAC engages in financing automobile purchases and leases. GMAC Leasing Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of GMAC that leases General Motors vehicles to GMAC.
The City and the County filed this action against GMAC Leasing Corporation and GMAC Financial Corporation1 on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, alleging that the defendants had entered into lease agreements with consumers for the leasing of automobiles and trucks and that the lease agreements were negotiated and signed by automobile dealerships on behalf of the defendants. The City and the County further alleged that local taxing jurisdictions are authorized by ordinances to levy sales and/or rental taxes, and that the defendants are required by law to collect, in connection with the leases issued by GMAC, local sales or rental taxes and to remit those taxes to the various local taxing jurisdictions, including the City and the County; the City and the County alleged that GMAC has failed to collect such taxes on its leases and to remit those taxes to the local taxing jurisdictions.
The City and the County filed a motion for class certification. The trial court scheduled a hearing on class certification for January 11, 2001, at 2:00 p.m. While traveling to Franklin County for the hearing, GMAC's counsel was involved in an automobile accident, and he did not arrive at the courthouse until 4:30 p.m. After the trial court was notified of the accident, it allowed the City and the County's counsel to present oral arguments and to submit numerous documents while awaiting the arrival of GMAC's counsel.
At the January 11 hearing, the trial court allowed GMAC's counsel additional time (until January 22) to present any additional evidence for the record related to GMAC's opposition to the motion for class certification, and at GMAC's request, extended that deadline until February 9. Nevertheless, on January 12, the trial court entered a brief order on the case action summary sheet granting the City and the County's motion for class certification. In that order, the trial court asked counsel for the City and the County to draft an order for the court. Counsel did so, and the trial court entered a longer, more detailed order on January 12. GMAC later submitted the additional evidence allowed by the trial court; that evidence is included in the record before us. GMAC appeals pursuant to § 6-5-642, authorizing an immediate appeal of a class-certification order.
Section 6-5-641(e), Ala.Code 1975, requires a trial court to conduct a rigorous analysis to determine whether the party seeking class certification has met the burden of proving that the requirements of Rule 23, Ala. R. Civ. P., have been satisfied. Conducting a rigorous analysis requires that a judge in drafting a class-certification order must, at a minimum, identify each of the four elements of Rule 23(a) and explain in detail how the proponents of the class have proven each of these elements, as well as at least one of the additional elements of Rule 23(b). Ex parte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 So.2d 6 (Ala.1998).
GMAC argues that the trial court in this case did not conduct the required rigorous analysis. It is impossible, GMAC contends, for the trial court to have subjected the evidence submitted to a rigorous analysis if it held the class-certification hearing on January 11, allowed GMAC's counsel until February 9 to submit additional evidence, and entered the class-certification order on January 12. GMAC further contends that the trial court's asking the plaintiffs' counsel to prepare the class-certification order is evidence indicating that the trial court did not conduct its own rigorous analysis. Finally, GMAC contends that the trial court should not have entered the class-certification order before the deadline it had given to GMAC for the submission of additional evidence—February 9—had passed.
The City and the County contend that the trial court was able to conduct the appropriate rigorous analysis because the parties had submitted briefs setting forth their respective positions on class certification before the hearing. The order, they say, listed each of the prerequisites for class certification, stated the applicable law on each, and specified which evidence established each element. Furthermore, the City and the County contend, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in conducting the rigorous analysis without GMAC's subsequent evidentiary submission because delaying the entry of its order would have rewarded GMAC for not having that evidence available at the class-certification hearing and would have allowed GMAC additional time in which to attack the City and the County's evidence.
We first address the...
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