GMS Mine Repair & Maint. v. Baize
| Decision Date | 22 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 2:21-cv-00184 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | GMS MINE REPAIR & MAINTENANCE, INC., Plaintiff, v. BRADLEY BAIZE, et al., Defendants. |
Pending before the Court is Defendant Bradley Baize's (“Baize” or “Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons explained in greater detail below, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion.
This action, brought by Plaintiff GMS Mine Repair & Maintenance, Inc. (“GMS”) under Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), arises out of a state-court lawsuit filed by Baize against Defendants Arch Resources, Inc. (“Arch Coal”), Mingo-Logan, LLC (“Mingo-Logan”), and Harold Napier, a Mingo-Logan employee, for injuries suffered while performing services related to his job as an underground contract mine laborer. The following factual allegations are taken from GMS's Petition. (ECF No. 1.)
GMS is engaged in the business of providing contract underground mining labor and supervision to owners and operators of underground mines. (Id. at 2-3, ¶¶ 1, 9.) GMS contracted with Arch Coal and Mingo-Logan to supply underground miners and supervisory employees to work at one of their mine sites located in Logan County, West Virginia, known as the Mountain Laurel Mining Complex (the “Mountain Laurel site”). (Id. at 3, ¶ 10.) GMS's contract with Arch Coal and Mingo-Logan required it to indemnify, hold harmless and defend Arch Coal and Mingo-Logan for claims for bodily injury, if any, sustained by GMS employees while working at the Mountain Laurel site. (Id. at 3, ¶ 11.)
At all times relevant hereto, GMS employed Baize as an underground miner at the Mountain Laurel site. (Id. at 3, ¶ 12.) In consideration of his employment, Baize was required to execute an “Employer/Employee Arbitration Agreement” (the “Arbitration Agreement”), which states as follows:
You [Baize] agree that any dispute which You [Baize] may have arising out of, in connection with, or relating to Your employment with GMS, including but not limited to any claims or disputes related to payment for services rendered or other amounts of money allegedly owed to You [Baize] by GMS or any of GMS's agents, principals, or affiliated entities; or related in any way, in whole or in part, to any term or condition of Your employment with GMS; or related in any way, in whole or in part, to any circumstance under which Your employment with GMS ceases; or regarding the validity, interpretation, construction, application, or enforcement of any of GMS's personnel policies, shall be submitted to binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association, which arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, as the case may be, may grant any relief which, in the absence of the Agreement, could be granted by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(Id. at 3, ¶ 13; ECF No. 1-1.)
On August 19, 2020, Baize commenced an action in the Circuit Court of Logan County, West Virginia against Arch Coal, Mingo-Logan and Napier, alleging that he suffered bodily injuries while “performing services related to his job” at the Mountain Laurel site. (ECF No. 1 at 4, ¶ 15-16.) GMS was not named as a defendant in that lawsuit, but has nevertheless brought the instant action seeking an order from this Court directing Baize-a signatory to the Arbitration Agreement-to proceed to arbitration of his state-court claims against Arch Coal, Mingo-Logan, and Napier-nonsignatories with respect to the Arbitration Agreement-pursuant to the terms set forth in the Arbitration Agreement. (Id. at 4.)
On June 22, 2021, Baize moved this Court to dismiss GMS's Petition pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (ECF No. 7.) Alternatively, Baize requested that this Court abstain from exercising jurisdiction over GMS's Petition pursuant to the abstention doctrine articulated in the Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 419 (1942), Mitcheson v. Harris, 955 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1992), and Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Winchester Homes, Inc., 15 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 1994) trio of cases, as well as the abstention doctrine set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). GMS timely responded on June 25, 2021, (ECF No. 10), and Baize timely replied on July 1, 2021, (ECF No. 11). In accordance with the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered by this Court on November 10, 2021, GMS was permitted to file a surreply to Baize's Reply. (ECF No. 30.) GMS timely filed its Surreply to Baize's Reply on November 17, 2021. (ECF No. 32).
By Memorandum Opinion and Order dated February 3, 2022, this Court denied in part Baize's Motion to Dismiss, to the extent that it argued that this Court should abstain from deciding GMS's Petition. (ECF No. 33 at 10-21.) However, because the parties' briefing did not adequately address the extent to which the Arbitration Agreement could be read to encompass claims made against third-party nonsignatories, this Court ordered the parties to submit additional briefing on the following issues:
(Id. at 26.) GMS and Baize timely submitted their supplemental briefing on February 18, 2022. (ECF Nos. 34, 35.) Each party timely responded on February 28, 2022. (ECF Nos. 38, 39.) Accordingly, Baize's Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 7), has been fully briefed and is now ripe for adjudication.
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted tests the legal sufficiency of a civil complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to relief under a cognizable legal claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-55 (2007). A case should be dismissed if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the complaint does not contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. In applying this standard, a court must utilize a two-pronged approach. First, it must separate the legal conclusions in the complaint from the factual allegations. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Second, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, the court must determine whether the plaintiff's complaint permits a reasonable inference that “the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Well-pleaded factual allegations are required; labels, conclusions, and a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) . A plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, ” thereby “nudg[ing] [the] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570.
Baize has moved to dismiss GMS's Petition for two reasons. First, Baize contends that GMS has failed to state a claim because Baize has not brought a claim against GMS requiring arbitration, and he did not otherwise agree to arbitrate claims against Arch Coal, Mingo-Logan, or Napier. (ECF No. 8 at 5-6.) Second, Baize argues that GMS's Petition must be dismissed because it does not have standing to sue.[2] (Id. at 6-7.) GMS, however, contends that the language of the Arbitration Agreement “clearly embraces” Baize's state-court claims against Arch Coal, Mingo-Logan, and Napier because they arise out of, are connected with, and relate to his employment with GMS. (ECF No. 10 at 10.) In this respect, GMS maintains that “nothing in the [A]rbitration [A]greement limits the disputes that must be arbitrated to disputes with GMS, nor does the broad language of the [A]rbitration [A]greement exclude disputes with third parties.” (Id. at 11.) GMS further contends that, even if it is unclear whether the Arbitration Agreement encompasses Baize's state-court claims against Arch Coal, Mingo-Logan, and Napier, the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration requires the Court to resolve ambiguities in the language of the Arbitration Agreement in favor of arbitration. (Id. at 11.)
Section 2 of the FAA, which has been described as the “primary substantive provision of the [FAA], ” AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing Hall Street Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc. 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008)), provides that written agreements to arbitrate controversies arising out of an existing contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. Congress passed the FAA “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., ...
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