Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Murphy

Citation2016 UT App 185,382 P.3d 631
Decision Date01 September 2016
Docket NumberNo. 20140822–CA,20140822–CA
Parties Go Invest Wisely LLC, Appellee, v. Blaine Murphy, Appellant.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Utah

Karthik Nadesan, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant.

Victor A. Sipos, Attorney for Appellee.

Judge Michele M. Christiansen authored this Memorandum Decision, in which Judges Stephen L. Roth and Kate A. Toomey concurred.

Memorandum Decision

CHRISTIANSEN

, Judge:

¶1 Appellant Blaine Murphy appeals the district court's denial of his rule 60(b) motion for postjudgment relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)

. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In November 2013, Go Invest Wisely LLC (GIW) filed an amended complaint against Murphy, a resident of North Carolina, alleging three causes of action: (1) fraud, (2) negligent misrepresentation, and (3) unlawful formation and use of Bryce Peters Financial Corporation (BPFC) in violation of law. The complaint also named as defendants Odell Barnes and BPFC. See generally Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Barnes , 2016 UT App 184, 382 P.3d 623

.

¶3 Copies of the summons and amended complaint were served on Murphy at the correctional facility in Ohio where he was then incarcerated. Several days later, Murphy sent a letter to the district court and GIW's counsel “to request an extension of time in which to submit [a] response/answer due to [his] current incarceration.” At a pretrial conference on January 6, 2014, the district court acknowledged that it had received Murphy's letter; however, the court did not respond to, or formally rule on, Murphy's request for an extension. Ultimately, in March 2014, the district court entered a default judgment against Murphy for $1,183,496.14.

¶4 Three months later, Murphy's current counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

. In his motion, Murphy requested oral argument and asked the court to set aside the judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction under rule 60(b)(4) and on grounds of mistake and excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1). In support of his motion, Murphy submitted a declaration setting forth his version of the facts regarding jurisdiction and his reasons for failing to timely answer GIW's complaint. Thereafter, GIW filed an opposition to Murphy's rule 60(b) motion, contending that the district court could exercise jurisdiction over Murphy because, among other things, “Murphy had numerous contacts with GIW, knowing it was a Utah company. Murphy received hundreds of thousands of dollars from GIW related to his criminal acts.” GIW's opposition was not supported by any affidavits, declarations, or other sworn testimony, but GIW did submit approximately 430 pages of documents as exhibits (the Motion Exhibits), including what purported to be (1) Murphy's Ohio criminal indictment; (2) a press release from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office stating that Murphy had been released from prison on January 17, 2014; (3) several email exchanges between GIW and Marty Franks acting on behalf of BPFC; (4) several email exchanges between GIW and Sandy Warren acting on behalf of BPFC; (5) unsigned copies of purported sales agreements between GIW and BPFC; (6) several email exchanges between GIW and Andi Davis acting on behalf of BPFC; and (7) the district court's order denying codefendant Odell Barnes's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See

Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Barnes , 2016 UT App. 184, 382 P.3d 623.

¶5 Murphy then filed a reply memorandum, asserting that GIW had “failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Murphy” and “failed to proffer an affidavit or other admissible evidence in support of its argument for personal jurisdiction.” Murphy contended that the Motion Exhibits constituted “inadmissible hearsay in the absence of a supporting affidavit” and that the district court was therefore required to accept as true the facts in Murphy's declaration. In addition, Murphy attached a supplemental declaration, a copy of a complaint filed against GIW for fraud, an Ohio Court of Appeals decision affirming GIW's misdemeanor convictions entered on no contest pleas, and a Cleveland Municipal Court Capias Warrant Report showing an outstanding warrant for GIW.1

¶6 In August 2014, after the conclusion of Barnes's trial, see generally Barnes , 2016 UT App 184, ¶ 7 n.1, 382 P.3d 623, 627 n.1

, the district court entered an order denying Murphy's motion for relief from the default judgment. In denying Murphy's motion, the district court stated that “Murphy did not support his motion with any admissible evidence.”

The court then found that it had jurisdiction over Murphy pursuant to section 78B–3–205 of the Utah Code

:

Murphy claims the court lacks general and specific jurisdiction over him. However, he offers no affidavit supporting his alleged facts. Sin[c]e he wants instead to rely on the complaint and seemingly convert his motion to a motion to dismiss on this point, the Court notes the complaint contains facts indicating Murphy was transacting real estate sales with [GIW] which was located in Utah and Murphy received payments sent [to] him from Utah by that Utah company. He did business using emails and couriers going to and from Utah and provided fraudulent materials to Utah. He thus engaged in transactions, supplied documents and caused injury in Utah according to the complaint. Plaintiff also provided exhibits establishing these facts.

The court further concluded that “Murphy also made a general appearance in the case when he wrote and filed a letter asking for an extension of time.” Regarding Murphy's mistake claim, the court ruled that Murphy had “assumed the Court gave him more time to answer” and that

he received no such grant from the Court and his claim to making such an assumption is belied by the fact he waited a half year after being served, including four and a half months after getting out of jail, to do anything, far beyond any reasonable amount of time even if his assumption was correct (he conveniently left out of his “facts” the date he got out of jail—plaintiff had to research the date to respond to the motion).

Likewise, the district court found no excusable neglect for Murphy's failure to respond to the complaint because Murphy provided “no facts showing that once he got out of jail, circumstances made him unable to act for six weeks.” According to the district court, even if Murphy had “been served the day of his release, he would have had to answer in 30 days, but did nothing for 45 days to the default date, and then continued to do nothing thereafter for another 90 days.” Consequently, the district court denied Murphy's rule 60(b)

motion in its entirety. The court did not address Murphy's claim that the Motion Exhibits submitted by GIW constituted “inadmissible hearsay in the absence of a supporting affidavit.”

¶7 Apparently recognizing that the district court's order contained factual errors, GIW filed a motion to correct the record. Specifically, GIW observed that the district court's order erroneously stated “that Murphy did not request oral argument and that Murphy did not support his motion with admissible evidence.” Murphy opposed the motion, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter the order because Murphy had already filed his notice of appeal and because the relief GIW sought was not authorized under the rules for correcting the record. The district court granted GIW's motion and amended its order, concluding that [e]ven if [Murphy] requested a hearing related to his motion for relief from the default judgment, a hearing would not have materially affected the Court's decision.” In addition, the district court acknowledged that Murphy had filed two declarations related to his motion for relief. The district court stated that it had “reviewed those affidavits and nothing contained therein alters the substantive nature of the rulings in this Court's August 5 Order. Plentiful evidence shows that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Murphy related to this action.” Murphy appeals.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶8 On appeal, Murphy first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(4)

because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. “A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Department of Social Services v. Vijil , 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). “However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs.” Id. Thus, “the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court.” Id.

“Although jurisdictional questions present issues of law, the burden of demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction.” Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs , 2004 UT 89, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 1211. ‘When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence.’ Id. (quoting Vijil , 784 P.2d at 1133 ).

¶9 Alternatively, Murphy contends that he “should be granted relief as a result of mistake and excusable neglect.” We review the district court's denial of Murphy's motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(1)

for an abuse of discretion. See

Jones v. Layton/Okland , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 859.

ANALYSIS

I. Personal Jurisdiction

¶10 Murphy first contends that he “should be granted relief from the default judgment because Utah does not have personal jurisdiction over [him].” As part of this contention, Murphy argues that, “in the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
2 cases
  • Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Barnes
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 2016
  • Mathena v. Vanderhorst
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • July 2, 2020
    ...due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." (cleaned up)); Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Murphy , 2016 UT App 185, ¶ 21, 382 P.3d 631 ("The movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circum......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT