Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Murphy
Citation | 2016 UT App 185,382 P.3d 631 |
Decision Date | 01 September 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 20140822–CA,20140822–CA |
Parties | Go Invest Wisely LLC, Appellee, v. Blaine Murphy, Appellant. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Utah |
Karthik Nadesan, Salt Lake City, Attorney for Appellant.
Victor A. Sipos, Attorney for Appellee.
Memorandum Decision
CHRISTIANSEN
, Judge:
¶1 Appellant Blaine Murphy appeals the district court's denial of his rule 60(b) motion for postjudgment relief. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)
. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
¶2 In November 2013, Go Invest Wisely LLC (GIW) filed an amended complaint against Murphy, a resident of North Carolina, alleging three causes of action: (1) fraud, (2) negligent misrepresentation, and (3) unlawful formation and use of Bryce Peters Financial Corporation (BPFC) in violation of law. The complaint also named as defendants Odell Barnes and BPFC. See generally Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Barnes , 2016 UT App 184, 382 P.3d 623
.
¶3 Copies of the summons and amended complaint were served on Murphy at the correctional facility in Ohio where he was then incarcerated. Several days later, Murphy sent a letter to the district court and GIW's counsel “to request an extension of time in which to submit [a] response/answer due to [his] current incarceration.” At a pretrial conference on January 6, 2014, the district court acknowledged that it had received Murphy's letter; however, the court did not respond to, or formally rule on, Murphy's request for an extension. Ultimately, in March 2014, the district court entered a default judgment against Murphy for $1,183,496.14.
¶4 Three months later, Murphy's current counsel entered an appearance and filed a motion for relief from the judgment pursuant to rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
. In his motion, Murphy requested oral argument and asked the court to set aside the judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction under rule 60(b)(4) and on grounds of mistake and excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1). In support of his motion, Murphy submitted a declaration setting forth his version of the facts regarding jurisdiction and his reasons for failing to timely answer GIW's complaint. Thereafter, GIW filed an opposition to Murphy's rule 60(b) motion, contending that the district court could exercise jurisdiction over Murphy because, among other things, GIW's opposition was not supported by any affidavits, declarations, or other sworn testimony, but GIW did submit approximately 430 pages of documents as exhibits (the Motion Exhibits), including what purported to be (1) Murphy's Ohio criminal indictment; (2) a press release from the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office stating that Murphy had been released from prison on January 17, 2014; (3) several email exchanges between GIW and Marty Franks acting on behalf of BPFC; (4) several email exchanges between GIW and Sandy Warren acting on behalf of BPFC; (5) unsigned copies of purported sales agreements between GIW and BPFC; (6) several email exchanges between GIW and Andi Davis acting on behalf of BPFC; and (7) the district court's order denying codefendant Odell Barnes's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. See
Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Barnes , 2016 UT App. 184, 382 P.3d 623.
¶5 Murphy then filed a reply memorandum, asserting that GIW had “failed to establish personal jurisdiction over Murphy” and “failed to proffer an affidavit or other admissible evidence in support of its argument for personal jurisdiction.” Murphy contended that the Motion Exhibits constituted “inadmissible hearsay in the absence of a supporting affidavit” and that the district court was therefore required to accept as true the facts in Murphy's declaration. In addition, Murphy attached a supplemental declaration, a copy of a complaint filed against GIW for fraud, an Ohio Court of Appeals decision affirming GIW's misdemeanor convictions entered on no contest pleas, and a Cleveland Municipal Court Capias Warrant Report showing an outstanding warrant for GIW.1
¶6 In August 2014, after the conclusion of Barnes's trial, see generally Barnes , 2016 UT App 184, ¶ 7 n.1, 382 P.3d 623, 627 n.1
, the district court entered an order denying Murphy's motion for relief from the default judgment. In denying Murphy's motion, the district court stated that “Murphy did not support his motion with any admissible evidence.”
The court then found that it had jurisdiction over Murphy pursuant to section 78B–3–205 of the Utah Code
:
Likewise, the district court found no excusable neglect for Murphy's failure to respond to the complaint because Murphy provided “no facts showing that once he got out of jail, circumstances made him unable to act for six weeks.” According to the district court, even if Murphy had “been served the day of his release, he would have had to answer in 30 days, but did nothing for 45 days to the default date, and then continued to do nothing thereafter for another 90 days.” Consequently, the district court denied Murphy's rule 60(b)
motion in its entirety. The court did not address Murphy's claim that the Motion Exhibits submitted by GIW constituted “inadmissible hearsay in the absence of a supporting affidavit.”
¶7 Apparently recognizing that the district court's order contained factual errors, GIW filed a motion to correct the record. Specifically, GIW observed that the district court's order erroneously stated “that Murphy did not request oral argument and that Murphy did not support his motion with admissible evidence.” Murphy opposed the motion, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction to alter the order because Murphy had already filed his notice of appeal and because the relief GIW sought was not authorized under the rules for correcting the record. The district court granted GIW's motion and amended its order, concluding that “[e]ven if [Murphy] requested a hearing related to his motion for relief from the default judgment, a hearing would not have materially affected the Court's decision.” In addition, the district court acknowledged that Murphy had filed two declarations related to his motion for relief. The district court stated that it had Murphy appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶8 On appeal, Murphy first contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(4)
because the court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. “A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under rule 60(b) is ordinarily reversed only for an abuse of discretion.” Department of Social Services v. Vijil , 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989). “However, when a motion to vacate a judgment is based on a claim of lack of jurisdiction, the district court has no discretion: if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs.” Id. Thus, “the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, and hence the decision not to vacate, becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court.” Id.
“Although jurisdictional questions present issues of law, the burden of demonstrating a lack of jurisdiction lies on the party challenging jurisdiction.” Jackson Constr. Co. v. Marrs , 2004 UT 89, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 1211. “ ‘When a judgment, including a default judgment, has been entered by a court of general jurisdiction, the law presumes that jurisdiction exists, and the burden is on the party attacking jurisdiction to prove its absence.’ ” Id. (quoting Vijil , 784 P.2d at 1133 ).
¶9 Alternatively, Murphy contends that he “should be granted relief as a result of mistake and excusable neglect.” We review the district court's denial of Murphy's motion for relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(1)
for an abuse of discretion. See
Jones v. Layton/Okland , 2009 UT 39, ¶ 10, 214 P.3d 859.
ANALYSIS
¶10 Murphy first contends that he “should be granted relief from the default judgment because Utah does not have personal jurisdiction over [him].” As part of this contention, Murphy argues that, “in the...
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...due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control." (cleaned up)); Go Invest Wisely LLC v. Murphy , 2016 UT App 185, ¶ 21, 382 P.3d 631 ("The movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing by circum......