Goad v. State

• Citation: 516 N.E.2d 26
• Decision Date: 15 December 1987
• Docket Number: No. 82S00-8702-CR-179,82S00-8702-CR-179
• Parties: Harold Dexter GOAD, II, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 26

516 N.E.2d 26

Harold Dexter GOAD, II, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 82S00-8702-CR-179.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 15, 1987.

John C. Cox, Evansville, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty.Gen., John D. Shuman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

DICKSON, Justice.

Defendant-appellant Harold Dexter Goad II directly appeals his conviction for attempted murder. Following waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, a jury found defendant guilty of attempted murder and the trial court sentenced defendant to thirty years, twenty years of the sentence to be executed, ten years suspended to probation.

Defendant's brief raises three issues for review:

1) sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction;

2) exclusion of psychological test results and testimony; and,

3) admissibility of photographic evidence of victim's wounds.

The defendant was charged with the attempted murder of a seven-year-old male neighbor of the defendant. On May 27, 1985, during a walk in the woods near their homes, defendant brandished a steak knife and repeatedly stabbed the victim, who fortunately survived the attack.

Issue 1--Sufficiency

Defendant first challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting the trial court's ruling waiving jurisdiction of the trial court and subjecting the defendant to prosecution as an adult.

The waiver of jurisdiction by a juvenile court is a procedure prescribed by statute. Ind.Code Sec. 31-6-2-4(b) provides:

Upon motion of the prosecutor and after full investigation and hearing, the juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if it finds that:

(1) The child is charged with an act:

(A) That is heinous or aggravated, with greater weight given to acts against the person than to acts against property; or

(B) That is a part of a repetitive pattern of delinquent acts, even though less serious;

(2) The child was fourteen (14) years of age or older when the act charged was allegedly committed;

(3) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act;

(4) The child is beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system; and

(5) It is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community that he stand trial as an adult.

Defendant argues that insufficient evidence existed to show: 1) he was "beyond rehabilitation under the juvenile justice system;" and 2) "[i]t is in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community that he stand trial as an adult."

When reviewing claims alleging insufficient evidence to support waiver from juvenile court, we will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. We will look only to the evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, considering both the record of the waiver hearing and the reasons given for the waiver by the juvenile court. Smith v. State (1984), Ind., 459 N.E.2d 355. We note further that because of "the general civil nature of juvenile proceedings and the fact that a waiver hearing is not an adjudicatory proceeding, the burden upon the State is to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that juvenile jurisdiction should be waived. The criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not applicable." In re Tacy (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 919, 922, trans. denied, later proceeding, Tacy v. State (1983), Ind., 452 N.E.2d 977.

The juvenile court's waiver order provided as follows:

The Court having heard evidence concerning, and having taken judicial notice of all possible dispositions available to the juvenile court within the juvenile court system as set forth in [the Indiana Code]. Such dispositions having been carefully considered by the Court and the Court finds that said child is beyond rehabilitation under the regular statutory juvenile system; that such possible dispositions are not adequate in this particular case to serve the child's welfare and the best interest of public welfare and security, in that: Indiana Boys' School cannot provide adequate rehabilitation for said child because of the fact that the Indiana Boys' School is not set up for long term psychological and psychiatric counselling and/or treatment as would be available in private institutions; and/or the minimal time that he would spend in the institution, probably less than a year and probably not providing adequate treatment. Other private institutional placements, three of which were contacted by Probation Officer Gregory Combs, could provide the psychological testing, counselling and treatment but could not provide the security necessary to protect the general public and children in said private institutions from the possibility of further serious criminal assaults.

Juvenile jurisdiction should be waived and the child held for trial under the regular procedure of a court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult.

(R. 186). These findings are supported by and consistent with the evidence at the waiver hearing.

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