Goble v. City of Smyrna

• Decision Date: 31 March 2017
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-0801-AT.
• Citation: 248 F.Supp.3d 1351
• Parties: William Allen GOBLE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SMYRNA, GEORGIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia

248 F.Supp.3d 1351

William Allen GOBLE, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF SMYRNA, GEORGIA, Defendant.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-cv-0801-AT.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Filed March 31, 2017

Andrew Yancey Coffman, Parks Chesin & Walbert, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Tracy Lynn Glanton, Sharon P. Morgan, Elarbee, Thompson, Sapp & Wilson, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

ORDER

Amy Totenberg, United States District Judge

Plaintiff William Allen Goble was a firefighter who, after disclosing he suffered from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder("PTSD"), was terminated after more than twenty years of employment with the City of Smyrna Fire Department. Plaintiff argues that he was discriminated against based on his disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The matter is currently before the Court on the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation ("R & R") [Doc. 55] that the Defendant City of Smyrna's ("Smyrna" or "City") Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 44] be granted. Plaintiff has filed Objections [Doc. 59], the City has filed its Response [Doc. 61], and Plaintiff has filed a Reply thereto [Doc. 62].

I. OVERVIEW

The Court reviews a Magistrate Judge's R & R for clear error if no objections are filed, and it may "accept, reject, or modify" these findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files objections, the district court must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that is the subject of a proper objection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) ; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). As Plaintiff filed timely objections to certain findings and recommendations in the R & R, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in so far as they were objected to on a de novo basis but his findings and recommendations to which no objections posed on a clear error basis.

No objections were made to the following portions of the R & R:

(a) The Magistrate Judge's determination that Plaintiff elected not to pursue claims that he was subjected to illegal fitness-for-duty testing or that he was denied a reasonable accommodation and his recommendation that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims that allege a failure to accommodate and illegal fitness-for-duty testing. (R & R at 30–31.)

(b) The Magistrate Judge's determination that Plaintiff has abandoned his claim of retaliation due to his failure to present any evidence or argument in support of that claim in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and his recommendation that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act retaliation claim. (R & R at 30–31.)

(c) The Magistrate Judge's determination that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing of disability discrimination with regard to his Return to Work Agreement and his recommendation that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted as to that claim. (R & R at 43–49.)

(d) The Magistrate Judge's determination that Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case that he would not have been terminated but for his PTSD. (R & R at 49–51.)

(e) The Magistrate Judge's determination that, to the extent Plaintiff can demonstrate he is qualified, there would no grounds to grant summary judgment to Defendant on the specific issue of failure to show evidence of pretext. (R & R at 55–56.)

The Court has reviewed these determinations, finds no clear error, and adopts them here. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the City's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 44] as to Plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims for retaliation, failure to accommodate, illegal fitness-for-duty testing, and disability discrimination with regard to his Return to Work Agreement.

Plaintiff has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations that (1) Plaintiff was not qualified to perform the essential functions of his job as a lieutenant with the fire department, (R & R at 35–42); (2) Plaintiff cannot rely on his positive performance history in establishing that he was qualified for his position, (R & R at 38–39); (4) undisputed evidence established that Plaintiff demonstrated an "insubordinate refusal to work overtime," (R & R at 51–55); (5) "Defendant was not required to employ a firefighter who was incapable of controlling anger, communicating appropriately with others, and handling stress," (R & R at 53–54); and (6) the decision-maker's consideration of Plaintiff's PTSD was "not inappropriate" when reviewing his alleged insubordination (in relation to the determination that Defendant had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for termination), (R & R at 54). Plaintiff also asserts that the Magistrate Judge overlooked significant evidence of discriminatory intent in finding that Plaintiff was not qualified and subjected Plaintiff to a higher standard of conduct than other employees who were not similarly disabled.

Based on finding that Plaintiff was not qualified, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff had failed as a matter of law to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The Court has reviewed on a de novo basis the record in connection with Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claims. Based on its thorough review of the record, the Court finds that material issues of fact exist that preclude entry of summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA discrimination claim as a matter of law. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff cannot establish that he is a qualified individual under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND ¹

The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff as the non-movant and resolves all factual disputes in his favor, as it must on summary judgment. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). The facts² before the Court on summary judgment detailed by the Magistrate Judge, are set forth below. Where a dispute of fact is not identified in the R & R or the facts discussed are incomplete, the Court identifies it in the footnotes and below in Section III:

Plaintiff William Allen Goble began his employment as a firefighter with Smyrna in 1990. Def. SMF at ¶ 1; Goble Dep. [41] at 68. Plaintiff was promoted to Lieutenant around 2007. Def. SMF at ¶ 2; Goble Dep. at 68. As a Lieutenant, Plaintiff's responsibilities included responding to emergency calls for service, supervising assigned personnel, administering firefighter training, and communicating with others to coordinate work activities, review the status of work, exchange information, resolve problems, or give and receive advice and direction. Def. SMF at ¶ 3; Goble Dep. at 77–84, Ex. 7. Plaintiff reported to a Battalion Chief. Def. SMF at ¶ 4; Goble Dep. at 73; Day Dep. [49] at 10–11.

In June 2013, Plaintiff received his annual performance evaluation from his then-Battalion Chief, Eric Farmer. Def. SMF at ¶ 5; Goble Dep. at 99–101; Ex. 11. Farmer's evaluation gave Plaintiff a "2" (Successful Minus/Needs Improvement) in the "Attitude" category and noted that Plaintiff had received a reprimand for insubordination in March 2013. Def. SMF at ¶ 6; Goble Dep. Ex. 11. In the evaluation, Farmer also noted that Plaintiff "has a lot of potential but refuses to engage in the department and lacks commitment" and "at times is disrespectful towards other co-workers and upper management." Def. SMF at ¶ 7; Goble Dep. Ex. 11. Plaintiff disagreed with the evaluation and brought it to Roy Acree, then-Deputy Chief, for further review. Def. SMF at ¶ 8; Goble Dep. at 102–104.

In July of 2013, during Plaintiff's meeting with then-Deputy Chief Acree, or shortly thereafter, Plaintiff told Acree that he had been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD") and asked whether Smyrna could do anything to accommodate him. Def. SMF at ¶ 9; Acree Dep. [48] at 28–31. Acree referred Plaintiff to Human Resources and agreed to reconsider Plaintiff's evaluation. Def. SMF at ¶ 10; Acree Dep. at 21–23, 30–31, 51. Acree later revised Plaintiff's score in the Attitude category from a 2 to a 3, which brought Plaintiff's overall score up to a 3.0 (Successful) from a Successful Minus/Needs Improvement rating. Def. SMF at ¶¶ 11, 83; Acree Dep. at 21–23, Ex. 6; Goble Dep. at 107–10, Ex. 12. This change was made as a "concession" for Plaintiff's PTSD. Def. SMF at ¶¶ 12, 82; Acree Dep. at 51; Goble Dep. Ex. 11.

On or about July 5, 2013, Kay Bolick, Director of Human Resources, received a letter from Plaintiff's treating psychologist, Dr. Richard Blue. Def. SMF at ¶ 13; Bolick Dep. [47] at 32–33, Ex. 10. The letter informed Smyrna that Dr. Blue had been treating Plaintiff for three years for "severe Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder brought on by twenty-three years of service in the fire department" and the treatment had focused on "severe symptoms of anger and rage along with severe depression and anxiety."³ Def. SMF at ¶ 14; Bolick Dep. at 32–33, Ex. 10. Dr. Blue said his "original recommendation was that [Plaintiff] be placed on full disability. Unfortunately Smyrna was not able to provide adequate insurance coverage for a mental disorder. This left Mr. Goble no alternative but to return to work. The other alternative was no disability and no income." Def. SMF at ¶ 15; Bolick Dep. at 32–33. Dr. Blue recommended that Plaintiff "sit down with management to determine the necessary reasonable accommodations required by law for him to complete his service." Def. SMF at ¶ 16; Bolick Dep. at 32–33.

On July 12, 2013, Bolick sent a letter to Dr. Blue requesting information about how Plaintiff was limited in the performance of his job so that Smyrna could determine whether any reasonable accommodations could be offered. Def. SMF at ¶ 17; Bolick Dep. at 40–41, Ex. 11. Bolick advised Dr. Blue that Plaintiff works in a "safety

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