Goble v. New World Life Ins. Company

• Decision Date: 26 March 1937
• Docket Number: 6345
• Citation: 67 P.2d 280,57 Idaho 516
• Parties: HARVEY N. GOBLE, Respondent, v. NEW WORLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

67 P.2d 280

57 Idaho 516

HARVEY N. GOBLE, Respondent, v. NEW WORLD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant

No. 6345

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 26, 1937

INSURANCE-CONSTRUCTION OF PROVISIONS AS TO WHAT CONSTITUTES TOTAL DISABILITY-INJUNCTION, WHEN GRANTED-COMPLAINT, SUFFICIENCY OF.

1. Under statute governing use of injunction, lack of adequate remedy at law is not requisite to issuance of injunction.

2. Complaint alleging that insurer threatened to cancel policy for nonpayment of premiums, notwithstanding provision for waiver of premiums for permanent disability, and that insured was permanently, totally disabled by diabetes except in so far as he could perform lighter duties on farm with help of insulin held to authorize injunction against cancelation of policy, since insured should not be forced to run hazard of losing all protection by unsuccessfully pursuing his legal remedy of damages for cancelation.

3. To constitute disability rendering insured "permanently continuously and wholly prevented from pursuing any and all gainful occupations" within language of premium waiver clause of life policy, it is not necessary that insured be absolutely helpless or entirely unable to earn money, if substantially all avenues of gainful employment are substantially closed to him.

4. Incurable diabetes, rendering farmer unable to live without constant and increasing use of insulin and even with help of insulin capable of no farm work except lighter tasks and exhausted by them, held sufficient disability to require waiver of life policy premiums under clause in policy providing for such waiver if insured becomes "permanently, continuously, and wholly prevented from pursuing any and all gainful occupations."

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Canyon County. Hon. John C. Rice, Judge.

Action to enjoin defendant, a life insurance company, from canceling an insurance policy issued by it to plaintiff. Judgment for plaintiff. Affirmed.

Affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

Walter Griffiths, for Appellant.

A threatened breach of contract will not be enjoined where the only obligation of the contract is for the payment of money. (Javierre v. Central Alta Gracia, 217 U.S. 502, 30 S.Ct. 598, 54 L.Ed. 859; General Elec. Co. v Westing-house Elec. etc. Co., 151 F. 664; Long Beach School Dist. v. Lutge, 129 Cal. 409, 62 P. 36; Bartholomae & R. Brewing etc. Co. v. Modzelewski, 269 Ill 539, 109 N.E. 1058.)

An injunction will not be granted to prevent the breach of a contract in case the contract itself would not be specifically enforced. (Shubert v. Woodward, 167 F. 47, 92 C. C. A. 509; Peterson v. McDonald, 13 Cal.App. 644, 110 P. 465.)

One who is able to do his accustomed task and such work as he has been trained to do and upon which he depends for a living, is not totally disabled. (Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Owen, 31 F.2d 862; Nordberg v. United States, 51 F.2d 271.)

Geo. H. van de Steeg and Frank Estabrook for Respondent.

Total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness, or inability to perform any work. It means rather such disability as prevents one from engaging in the prosecution of his work or business in substantially the customary and usual manner; this without peril to his health. Inability to do any substantial portion of the work connected with one's vocation or business is sufficient to establish total disability. Or where the work one is engaged in is of such character that common care and prudence require that he refrain from its doing because of any disease he may have, it constitutes total disability. (Notes, 98 A. L. R. 788, 79 A. L. R. 857, 51 A. L. R. 1048, 41 A. L. R. 1376, 37 A. L. R. 151, 23 L. R. A., N. S., 352, 24 A. L. R. 203, 38 L. R. A. 529; Couch on Insurance, vol. 7, sec. 1670; Aetna L. Ins. Co. v. Person, 188 Ark. 864, 67 S.W.2d 1007; Collis v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 260 N.Y.S. 241, 191 N.E. 507; Temples v. Prudential Ins. Co., 18 Tenn.App. 506, 79 S.W.2d 608.)

Defendant having admitted by its answer that it had threatened to and would, unless restrained, terminate and cancel the policy, unless plaintiff paid the premiums as therein provided, plaintiff had the right to protect himself by seeking the aid of equity to enjoin such anticipatory breach of the policy. (Kelly v. Security Mut. L. Ins. Co., 186 N.Y. 16, 78 N.E. 584, 9 Ann. Cas. 661.)

The threatened cancelation of a policy may be enjoined where the insurer denies total disability and insists that it is not obligated to waive premiums, where it is established that total disability exists. (Craft v. Bankers Life Co., 265 Ill.App. 111; Couch: Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, vol. 6, sec. 1429, vol. 8, secs. 1915, 1969; Day v. Connecticut G. L. Ins. Co., 45 Conn. 480, 29 Am. Rep. 693.)

MORGAN, C. J. Holden, Budge and Givens, JJ., concur. Ailshie, J., did not sit at the hearing nor participate in the decision.

OPINION

MORGAN, C. J.

--This is an appeal from a judgment and decree perpetually enjoining appellant from terminating, or canceling, a policy issued by it to respondent insuring his life; adjudging said policy to be in full force and effect and requiring appellant to issue and forward to respondent its receipt for the premium thereon falling due December 26, 1933, and for all subsequent premiums, as they become due, during the remainder of his life without payment therefor. Appellant questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint to constitute a cause of action, or to entitle respondent to the relief prayed for, or any relief; also the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the judgment, or to warrant granting an injunction.

After a statement of the corporate existence of appellant and of its authorization to transact business in Idaho, the complaint contains an allegation that it executed and delivered to respondent a life insurance policy wherein it agreed to pay, on his death, the sum of $ 5,000, together with $ 80 for each annual premium paid thereon and with accumulations thereof. It is further alleged the policy provides, among other things, that:

"If the insured shall before attaining age sixty, and prior to default in payment of any premium, be so disabled by bodily injuries or disease as to become permanently, continuously and wholly prevented from pursuing any and all gainful occupations, the Company, on satisfactory proof of such disability, will, by forwarding official premium receipt, waive payment of each subsequent premium as it becomes due under this policy during the continuance of such disability and the guaranteed loan and surrender values shall increase in the same manner as if such premium were paid by the insured. Should the insured recover so as to be able to engage in any gainful occupation, the premiums thereafter falling due shall be paid by the insured in conformity with the contract."

It is further alleged in the complaint that respondent (at the time of the commencement of the action) was fifty-four years old and had complied with all the terms, conditions and provisions of the policy to be by him performed, including that for the payment of premiums. It also contains this allegation:

"That the plaintiff is now and has been for more than a year last past so disabled by disease, towit: diabetes, as to become permanently, continuously and wholly prevented from pursuing any and all gainful occupations, except by the constant and increasing use of a drug, known as insulin, the plaintiff is able to perform some of the lighter duties of farming, which is the only occupation for which the plaintiff is fitted by training and education or which he could pursue were he not afflicted with the disease aforesaid."

It is further alleged that, prior to the commencement of the action, respondent made proof to appellant, in writing, of his physical condition and made claim for the disability benefit provided for in the policy, above quoted, with respect to the waiver of payment of premiums and the issuance of receipts therefor, but that said claim had been by appellant rejected and refused. Also, that appellant had threatened to and would, unless restrained by order of court, terminate and cancel the policy if payment of premiums thereon were not made, and that respondent had no plain, speedy or adequate remedy at law.

Appellant contends the facts set forth in the complaint are insufficient to show respondent is entitled to an injunction restraining it from canceling the policy, in that, if the policy should be wrongfully canceled, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law, i. e., an action for damages for its cancelation, is available to...