Gocha v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 12–cv–03143–RM–CBS |
| Citation | 75 F.Supp.3d 1304 |
| Parties | Richard L. Gocha, Plaintiff, v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation (d/b/a Amtrak), Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Jennifer C. Robinson, Robinson & Associates Law Offices, LLC, Aurora, CO, for Plaintiff.
Emily Anne Glunz, Ross Harlan Friedman, Morgan Lewis & Bockius, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE'S RECOMMENDATIONS (ECF No. 47) AND OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS (ECF No. 51)
This matter is before the Court on United States Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer's Recommendation (“the Recommendation”) (ECF No. 47) that the Court grant Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 12) and that the Court deny Plaintiff's Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 16). Plaintiff has timely objected to the Recommendation. (ECF No. 51). For the reasons below, Plaintiff's objections are OVERRULED, and the Recommendation is ADOPTED.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Rule 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter.See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir.1994) (). A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceeding in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir.1974). A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss “must be determined from the allegations of fact in the complaint, without regard to mere conclusory allegations of jurisdiction.” Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F.2d 674, 677 (10th Cir.1971). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Basso, 495 F.2d at 909. Accordingly, Plaintiff in this case bears the burden of establishing that this court has jurisdiction to hear his claims.
A motion for judgment on the pleadings “should not be granted unless the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Park Univ. Enters. v. Am. Cas. Co., 442 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir.2006), abrogated on other grounds by Magnus, Inc. v. Diamond State Ins. Co., 545 Fed.Appx. 750, 753 (10th Cir.2013) ; see also 5A Charles A.Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1367 (3d ed.2004). The Court accepts all facts pleaded by the non-moving party as true and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the same.” Park Univ. Enters., 442 F.3d at 1244.
Section 153 First (q) of the Railway Labor Act (“RLA”) allows for limited judicial review of a labor board's ruling. The statute provides:
On such review, the findings and order of the division shall be conclusive on the parties, except that the order of the division may be set aside, in whole or in part, or remanded to the division, for failure of the division to comply with the requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the division's jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division making the order.
45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q). “Only upon one or more of these bases may a court set aside an order” of a labor board. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 91, 99 S.Ct. 399, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978). The scope of judicial review of a labor board's decision “is among the narrowest known to law.” Robinson v. Union Pacific Railroad, 245 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also LB & B Assoc., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 461 F.3d 1195, 1197 (10th Cir.2006) () (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Ala. State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir.1970) ; cf. Loveless v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 681 F.2d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.1982) (). It is only when the arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively “dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice” that his decision may be unenforceable. Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).
The test “is not whether the reviewing court agrees with the Board's interpretation of the bargaining contract, but whether the remedy fashioned by the Board is rationally explainable as a logical means of furthering the aims of the contract.” Bhd. of Ry., Airline & Steamship Clerks v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 587 F.2d 903, 906–07 (8th Cir.1978) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Even “improvident ... silly factfinding” does not provide a basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce an arbitration award. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, AFL–CIO v. Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 39, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987).
When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive matter, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3) requires that the district court judge “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommendation] that has been properly objected to.” In conducting its review, “[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
The dispute between the parties in this matter has little to do with the facts. The dispute centers on the actions of a Special Board of Adjustment which heard the facts and issued a decision pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. No party has objected to the recitation of facts set forth in the Recommendation in that section captioned “Statement of the Case.” That recitation is adopted by this Court and largely replicated below.
During the period relevant to his suit, Richard L. Gocha (“Plaintiff”) was a Colorado employee of Defendant, National Railroad Passenger Corporation, d/b/a Amtrak (“Amtrak”). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 13). In May 2009, he served as Lead Service Attendant (“LSA”) with Amtrak's Los Angeles On Board Services Crew Base. (Id. at ¶ 20). As the LSA, Plaintiff was responsible for accounting for an inventory list that tracks the sale of food and beverages that coach passengers buy aboard the train. (Id. at ¶¶ 23–24). Per Amtrak's rules, the “LSA and the Chef are responsible for ensuring that all paperwork and reports are complete and accurate before submitting to the crew base in the proper report envelope.” (Id. at ¶ 48). Plaintiff was accountable to Amtrak for the difference between the value of the stock at the beginning and the end of the trip. (Id. at ¶ 22–¶ 24). LSAs and other crew members account for sleeping car passengers' meals on an accounting form by noting a credit for the meal. (Id. at ¶ 25). Food and beverage items on a sleeping car passenger's meal check reduced the amount of cash an LSA remitted to Amtrak at the end of a trip. (Id. ). Because LSAs were not “charged” for food given to sleeping car passengers, an LSA falsely reporting selling food to a sleeping car passenger could retain the charged item's monetary value.
To guard against this potential for employee theft, Amtrak hires revenue protection consultants to ride its trains posing as sleeping car passengers and report their observations. (See ECF No. 1 at ¶ 29). On May 7, 2009, Kaye Stewart, a revenue protection consultant, posed as a sleeping car passenger on an Amtrak route from Los Angeles to Chicago. (Id. at ¶ 28). Her job was to observe how the crew handled meal checks and dining room procedures. (Id. at ¶ 29). On May 8, 2009, Stewart alleged that the claim check for her lunch order included a slice of cheesecake which she did not order. Stewart also alleged that she ordered a baked potato, vegetables, and a glass of milk for dinner, but her check showed a steak that she did not order. (Id. at ¶ 31). Stewart alleges that Plaintiff took her dinner order. (Id. at ¶ 31, ¶ 32). On or about May 15, 2009, Stewart turned in her report on the May 8, 2009, trip, claiming that she did not order the referenced cheesecake or steak. (Id. at ¶ 38). Plaintiff was then investigated for the May 8th incident, and...
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Mero v. Nat'l R.R. Adjustment Bd.
...jurisdiction to consider the CBA's timing provisions and determine if any violation warrants reversal. See Gocha v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1304 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding timeliness falls within jurisdiction of arbitration board). In fact, the Board considered this argumen......