Godcharles & Co. v. Wigeman

• Decision Date: 04 October 1886
• Docket Number: 196
• Citation: 113 Pa. 431,6 A. 354
• Parties: Godcharles and Company v. Wigeman
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

6 A. 354

113 Pa. 431

Godcharles and Company v. Wigeman

No. 196

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 4, 1886

Argued April 28, 1886

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland county: Of January Term 1886, No. 196.

Assumpsit by Frank Wigeman against Reuben Johnson, C. A. Godcharles, R A. Bortly, C. Godcharles, S. A. Andrews, William Godcharles and H. M. Taggart, trading and doing business under the firm name of C.A. Godcharles & Company, to recover wages for labor as a puddler. Pleas, non assumpsit, payment, set-off with leave.

The following facts appeared on the trial before ROCKEFELLER P.J.:

The plaintiff was employed as a puddler by the defendants in their nail mill at Milton, Pa. The defendants posted in their mill a set of rules to govern their works, inter alia Puddling, $4 per ton of 2240 pounds; scrap, $2.50 per ton of 2240 pounds. They claimed on the trial that it was the custom in all mills of like character to post rules for the government of the work, and that these rules became part of the contract between the employer and employe.

During the time of his employment the plaintiff asked for and received from the defendants orders on different parties for the purchase of coal and other articles, which orders were honored by the parties on whom they were drawn, and Godcharles & Co. afterwards paid them; these orders were similar to the following: "William P. Stout -- Let Frank Wigeman have coal to the amount of $4.25. C.A. Godcharles & Co."

These orders the plaintiff maintained could not, under the Act of June 29th, 1881, P.L., 147, be applied as a set-off to his claim for wages for labor as a puddler.

On the trial defendants' counsel offered to prove that it is the universal custom in mills in Pennsylvania, of the character of that owned by defendants, to fix the rate of wages for puddling at so much for 2240 pounds; the evidence that plaintiff recognized this custom and acted upon it, by settling with defendants on their several pay-days upon this basis, being already in.

This for the purpose of showing the contract between the parties, as to the amount of wages the plaintiff was to receive.

To this the plaintiff's counsel objected:

1. That the plaintiff cannot be bound by rules fixed in defendants' mill unless he had notice of them; merely because it is the universal custom in Pennsylvania in mills of this character would not bind the plaintiff unless he had knowledge of that universal custom, and there is no evidence that he had.

2. Because it has not been shown that plaintiff ever made a settlement with these defendants for anything, or in any way, much less upon a basis of 2240 pounds to the ton, and it is not shown that plaintiff ever knew he was going to be paid at that rate.

3. The evidence is immaterial and irrelevant for the purpose offered.

THE COURT: The evidence of a custom to pay for puddling at a rate different from what the law of the State declares shall be a ton, we think is inadmissible to bind the plaintiff. But if this mill had rules stating the price to be paid for puddling a ton of 2240 pounds, and the plaintiff knew of these rules, I think he would be bound. (First assignment of error.)

Defendants' counsel offered to prove that it is the universal custom in Pennsylvania for all mills of the character of defendants' to have a set of rules governing the terms upon which the work of puddling is done, taken in connection with the evidence already in as to what the rules of defendants' mill in relation thereto were, and that the same were posted in conspicuous places in said mill during the plaintiff's employment therein.

This for the purpose of showing the contract between the parties as to the terms of plaintiff's employment by defendants.

To this the plaintiff's counsel objected:

1. Because this custom would not prevail unless the plaintiff knew of the existence of it, and it is not offered to show that he knew of the existence of such a custom.

2. Because the rules of this mill would only be binding upon the plaintiff if he knew them.

3. Because the evidence is immaterial and irrelevant.

THE COURT: The objections are sustained, the evidence rejected. (Second assignment of error.)

Defendants' counsel offered to prove that it is the universal custom in Pennsylvania for mills of the character of defendants' to have a set of rules governing the terms upon which the work of puddling is done; taken in connection with the evidence already in as to what the rules of defendants' mill were in relation thereto, and that the same were posted in a conspicuous part of the mill at the time of and during the plaintiff's employment therein.

This for the purpose of showing that inquiry was the duty of the plaintiff as to what the rules of this mill were, and to affect him with constructive notice of said rules.

To this the plaintiff's counsel objected:

1. Because it is not offered to be shown that plaintiff knew of this universal custom.

2. Because this universal custom will not govern the making of the law of this case.

3. The plaintiff could not have been put upon inquiry unless he knew of this universal custom.

4. Because the evidence is immaterial and irrelevant.

THE COURT: I am of opinion that the offer of evidence to show a custom, without offering to show that plaintiff had knowledge of such custom is inadmissible.

The objections are sustained, the evidence rejected. (Third assignment of error.)

The defendants presented the following points:

1. If the jury believe that it is the universal custom in mills of the character of defendants' to have rules fixing the terms upon which puddling is done, and if the jury believe that the rules of defendants' mill were conspicuously posted in the mill and office, it was the duty of the plaintiff seeking employment at the mill to inquire what the rules of the mill were, and the fact that the rules were so posted would affect him with notice as to what they were, and he would be bound by them.

Answer. This perhaps would be so if there was any evidence that the plaintiff knew of the existence of such a custom, but in the absence of such evidence, I cannot say that as a matter of law that the mere posting of the rules in conspicuous places in the mill and office would affect the plaintiff with notice as to what they were, and that he would be bound by them. (Fourth assignment of error.)

2d. If the jury believe that one of the rules of defendants' mill was that 2240 pounds of iron should be puddled for a ton, and that plaintiff at the time of hiring with defendants had either actual or constructive notice of such rules, this rule then became a part of the contract, and plaintiff must make 2240 pounds for a ton.

Answer. This is so if the plaintiff had actual notice of such rule. You have the evidence as to the posting of the rules in conspicuous places in and about the defendants' mill, and you are to determine from all the evidence in the case whether the plaintiff had notice of the rule. (Fifth assignment of error.)

In the general charge the Court instructed the jury, inter alia, as follows: The defendants contend that this Act of Assembly (Act of June 29th, 1886), is unconstitutional and void, and that it ought not to be applied in this or any other case; that it is not binding upon the citizens of this Commonwealth because it applies to a class, and that the legislature is forbidden by the Constitution to pass any laws which are not general, and that do not apply to all citizens of the Commonwealth. The question has not as yet been raised before the Supreme Court of this State, so far as I know. If it had been decided by that Court, of course that decision would be binding upon this Court. It has, however, been raised before other courts, and it has been decided to be constitutional, and this Court does not now propose to say that it is unconstitutional. Therefore, so far as its provisions apply to the case now before the Court and jury, we will endeavor to apply them.

* * *

It is these orders that were given to William P. Stout and Dr Follmer that the plaintiff especially objects to, and contends that they were illegal and void on account of the...