Goddard by Goddard v. Weaver

• Decision Date: 20 August 1990
• Docket Number: No. 39A01-9002-CV-83,39A01-9002-CV-83
• Citation: 558 N.E.2d 853
• Parties: Tammy GODDARD, by next friend Wanda GODDARD, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Larry N. WEAVER, d/b/a Milan Terrace Mobile Home Park, Appellee (Defendant Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 853

558 N.E.2d 853

Tammy GODDARD, by next friend Wanda GODDARD, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Larry N. WEAVER, d/b/a Milan Terrace Mobile Home Park Appellee (Defendant Below).

No. 39A01-9002-CV-83.

Court of Appeals of Indiana Third District.

Aug. 20, 1990.

John P. Schuerman, Schuerman Law Offices, Batesville, for appellant.

Thomas J. Lantz, Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, Seymour, for appellee.

HOFFMAN, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Tammy Goddard, by her next friend Wanda Goddard, appeals a summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Larry Weaver in an action to recover damages for injuries she sustained as a result of multiple dog bites.

The facts most favorable to the non-moving party show that Weaver owned a trailer park in which Goddard and Harold and Katherine Maybrier resided. On June 13, 1986, Goddard, a five-year-old child, was walking across the Maybriers' yard with a sandwich in her hand when Lady, an Alaskan Malamute owned by the Maybriers, knocked her down. Upon hearing Goddard's screams, Katherine Maybrier ran out of her trailer and pulled Lady off Goddard. As a result of the attack, Goddard sustained numerous lacerations to her face, arms, and hands requiring over 100 sutures. Her complaint against Weaver proceeds upon a negligence theory.

The sole issue before this Court is whether the trial court erred in granting Weaver's motion for summary judgment. In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we apply the same standard as that employed by the trial court. A court may grant summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits and testimony, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must liberally construe all evidence in favor of the non-moving party and resolve any doubt against the moving party. Even if the court believes the non-moving party will not succeed at trial, summary judgment is inappropriate where material facts conflict or undisputed facts lead to conflicting inferences.

Ind. Trial Rule 56(C);

Travel Craft v. Wilhelm Mende GMBH (1990), Ind., 552 N.E.2d 443, 446.

Goddard first claims Weaver, as landlord, had a duty to maintain "common areas" in a safe condition for his tenants. It is well settled that, in the absence of statute, covenant, fraud, or concealment, a landlord who gives a tenant full control and possession of the leased property will not be liable for personal injuries sustained by third persons upon the leased property. Flott v. Cates (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 847, 848. However, a landlord does have a duty to maintain in a safe condition common areas over which he retains control. Id.

In the instant case, it is clear from the record that Weaver did not have control over the property where the attack occurred. Weaver had entered into an oral agreement with the Maybriers to use as yard what they chose to maintain. The Maybriers mowed and maintained a 50-foot section from the door of their trailer to a creek as well as a 20-foot section on the other side of the creek. They also kept Lady chained to a tree on their property at all times. Because Weaver did not retain control over the property, he cannot be liable to Goddard for the injuries she sustained there.

Id.;

see also Royer v. Pryor (1981), Ind.App., 427 N.E.2d 1112, 1117.

Furthermore, even assuming Weaver had control over the property, it is clear from the record that he did not have actual knowledge of Lady's vicious propensities. There was no evidence that Lady had ever bitten or attempted to bite anyone. Moreover, as Weaver stated in his deposition, he had no knowledge that the Maybriers owned Lady or that they were keeping her permanently on their property. In the absence of actual knowledge of the vicious propensities of a tenant's dog, a landlord owes no duty to third persons injured by the dog. Id. at 1117-1118. Consequently, Weaver did not owe a duty to Goddard, and he cannot be liable for her injuries.

Goddard next argues that Weaver was a "keeper" of Lady and, as such, had a duty to exercise reasonable care to guard against the animal's natural propensities. She cites a Connecticut superior court case for the proposition that a landlord who permits a dog to be kept in a common area is a keeper of the animal. Bailey v. DeSanti (1980), 36 Conn.Sup. 156, 414 A.2d 1187, 1188. However, as previously discussed, the instant attack occurred in an area over which Weaver had relinquished control and possession. Without control of the property and without...