Goddard v. Lexington Motor Co.
| Decision Date | 28 February 1924 |
| Docket Number | 3841 |
| Citation | 223 P. 340,63 Utah 161 |
| Court | Utah Supreme Court |
| Parties | GODDARD v. LEXINGTON MOTOR CO |
Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County; George S Barker, Judge.
Action by Howard E. Goddard against the Lexington Motor Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.
REVERSED, and new trial granted.
Halverson & Pratt, of Ogden, for appellant.
Bagley Fabian, Clendenin & Judd, of Salt Lake City, for respondent.
This case was formerly argued and submitted to this court and a decision rendered affirming the judgment. Later, upon the petition of appellant, a rehearing was granted, and oral arguments were again made, in which the questions in dispute were presented in a somewhat different aspect from that in which they were first presented and considered. Upon the rehearing we have reached the conclusion that the judgment appealed from ought to be reversed.
The action is to recover the purchase price paid by appellant for an automobile, alleged to have been delivered to him on approval by respondent upon the terms that, if it was not satisfactory, he could return it and have the purchase price repaid to him. It is alleged that the automobile was not as represented; that appellant refused to accept it, and returned it to respondent and remanded the return of the purchase price paid, which was refused by respondent. Meredith Matthews was joined as a defendant, but at the trial the action was voluntarily dismissed as to him. A jury was impaneled, and the appellant offered his evidence, at the conclusion of which the court granted respondent's motion for nonsuit against him. From the judgment for respondent, entered thereon appellant has appealed to this court.
The main facts disclosed by the appellant's evidence, necessary to illustrate the question to be considered, may be summarized as follows:
The Lindell Auto Company was a dealer in automobiles at Ogden, Utah, engaged in selling Lexington automobiles at retail. The respondent, the Lexington Motor Company, is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of Lexington automobiles at Connersville, Ind. Meredith Matthews was the intermountain representative of respondent, with his office at Salt Lake City, Utah.
On March 18, 1921, the appellant entered into a written agreement with Lindell Auto Company for the purchase of a "Lexington model T sedan" automobile to be delivered to him for the total sum of $ 4,500.50, of which sum $ 1,100 was paid by the delivery of a used car to the Lindell Auto Company. Other terms and conditions of this contract are not material here. In making the agreement for the sale to appellant, the Lindell Auto Company was assisted by one Hendricks, described as being "from the factory." Hendricks communicated an order for the car to the respondent. The amount for which the used car was accepted ($ 1,100) was the amount of dealer's profit or commissions on the transaction, and the remainder ($ 3,400.50) was the manufacturer's price.
Before the shipment of the car from the factory, for some reason not clearly shown, the Lindell Auto Company retired from the transaction, and the car, with others, was shipped by respondent from the factory to Ogden, consigned to itself. A draft was drawn on Meredith Matthews for the price of all the cars shipped, which included the $ 3,400.50, the price of the car in question, with bill of lading for the shipment attached to the draft. Matthews was interested in the matter, knew the situation, and was anxious to consummate the sale to the satisfaction of the purchaser. When the shipment was made, respondent telegraphed Matthews as follows:
Upon the arrival of the car at Ogden, Matthews notified appellant of the fact, and that it was necessary to pay the draft before the car could be obtained. Appellant refused to advance the money before inspecting the car. Efforts were made for permission from the bank and railroad company to allow examination and inspection of the car before paying the draft, which failed. Thereupon Matthews stated to appellant that if he would advance the price of the car the bill of lading would be released, and he could examine the car, and if it was not satisfactory he could return it, and his money would be refunded. Appellant agreed to the proposal, advanced $ 3,400.50, which was applied by Matthews on the draft, and the car was unloaded. It was defective and unsatisfactory in numerous particulars. Appellant refused to accept it, and after some negotiations and efforts at compromise delivered the car to respondent and demanded the return of the purchase price paid.
The main question in the case is whether the evidence of the authority of Matthews to bind the respondent by his agreement with appellant was sufficient to be submitted to the jury. The trial court evidently sustained the motion for nonsuit upon the theory that the evidence was insufficient in that respect. The record discloses the following facts relative to the agency and authority of Matthews in the transaction:
The amended answer, while denying that he was a general sales agent, admits that he was a factory representative for the sole purpose of carrying on any necessary negotiations between the company and dealers in and about Utah. It was shown by the evidence of Matthews himself and others that the president of the company employed him to go to Salt Lake City to be the intermountain representative of the company; that he went there on April 1, 1921, and opened up an office as such; that on his door was painted the sign, "Lexington Motor Company, Connersville, Indiana," under which was his name, followed by "Intermountain Representative"; that he was the intermountain representative of the company until the 1st of August following; that he was furnished printed stationary by the company, on which he was so described; that he had instructions from the company relative to the installation of engines, making exhibitions, and giving lectures on the motor used in Lexington cars; that he looked after and handled a show motor and moving picture machine and banners in connection with general advertising; that he conducted negotiations with banks for banking arrangements in behalf of and at the request of the company; that he conducted negotiations for sales of Lexington cars with prospective individual purchasers; that he was on the lookout for business, and "getting a line on the situation in his territory."
With respect to the particular transaction in question, he knew the details of the situation with appellant. He received the telegram from the company, advising him of the shipment, and stating "trust you will handle satisfactorily." He stated that he had not ordered the car and had no personal interest in the matter, except as a representative of the company. There were no resident dealers in business at the time who could or would handle the transaction. He said he went to Ogden to assist in the delivery of the cars and to get the money from Goddard. Lindell, formerly of the Lindell Auto Company, told him that he was unable to take the cars. Matthews then made a new agreement with Lindell to...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Adamson v. United Mine Workers, 8161
...the occurrences which the plaintiff alleges occurred on April 6, 1952.' Plaintiff cites the familiar rule from Goddard v. Lexington Motor Co., 63 Utah 161, 223 P. 340, 342, as "When any evidence is adduced tending to prove the existence of a disputed agency, its existence or nonexistence is......