Goddard v. South Bay Union High School Dist.

• Citation: 79 Cal.App.3d 98,144 Cal.Rptr. 701
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 27 March 1978
• Parties: Jerold GODDARD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. SOUTH BAY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Governing Board of the South Bay Union High School District, James M. Riewer, as Superintendent of the South Bay Union High School District, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 49754.

Page 701

144 Cal.Rptr. 701

79 Cal.App.3d 98

Jerold GODDARD, Petitioner and Appellant, v. SOUTH BAY UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, the Governing Board of the South Bay Union High School District, James M. Riewer, as Superintendent of the South Bay Union High School District, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 49754.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

March 27, 1978.

Rehearing Denied April 24, 1978.

Hearing Denied May 25, 1978.

Trygstad & Odell, Inc., and Lawrence B. Trygstad, Los Angeles, for petitioner and appellant

John H. Larson, County Counsel, and Audrey Oliver, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for defendants and respondents.

STEPHENS, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Jerold Goddard (hereinafter "Petitioner") appeals from a judgment by the superior court denying his petition for a writ of mandate. Petitioner sought a writ directing respondents South Bay Union High School District (hereinafter "District") and the Governing Board of the South Bay Union High School District (hereinafter "Board") to compensate him for all salary lost as a result of the District's refusal to grant salary credit for courses taken at Southwestern University School of Law.

FACTS

At the time this appeal was filed, Petitioner was a social studies teacher in the District, and had been so employed since 1967. He taught courses in Government, American History and Economics.

The Respondent Board provides that teachers who take college or university courses which improve their teaching competence may receive credit for salary advancement on the salary schedule, subject to the requirement of Board regulations. In September 1971, Petitioner undertook a course of study at Southwestern University School of Law, and in January 1972, requested salary credit for the courses he was taking. This request was approved by Petitioner's department chairman and school principal. ¹ In August 1972 after completion of 18 units of credit at Southwestern Petitioner was formally advised by letter from the Assistant Superintendent in charge of personnel that coursework taken at Southwestern would not be accepted for salary credit. Petitioner was informed that Southwestern University does not meet the requirements of Board Regulation ² 4141.4, which states in part "All units accepted for placement on the salary schedule must be from a duly accredited college or university. In California, an accredited institution would be one accredited by Western Association of Schools and Colleges. Teachers attending colleges or universities outside of California will receive credit for units taken in institutions accredited by associations equivalent to Western Association of Schools and Colleges." (Italics added.)

It was stated that Southwestern was not accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges (hereinafter "W.A.S.C."); ³ therefore, units taken from Southwestern were considered unacceptable for salary purposes.

On November 1, 1972, Petitioner met directly with the Board to request salary credit for courses he had taken. He contended that although Southwestern was not accredited by W.A.S.C., it was nevertheless a duly accredited college of law. Furthermore, he noted that the Board had recently granted another teacher (Michael Gianinni) salary credit for attending law school courses; therefore, he urged that to deny petitioner salary credit would be discriminatory. ⁴ The Board rejected Petitioner's arguments and denied him salary credit because Southwestern University was not accredited by W.A.S.C. ⁵

Petitioner sought a writ of mandate in the Los Angeles Superior Court, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1085. The matter was heard on March 16, 1976, before Judge Norman R. Douds. At trial, respondents moved to introduce as evidence several declarations by Board members who had voted to enact 4141.4. These Board members unanimously stated that their intent in voting for Regulation 4141.4 was to prohibit salary credit for courses taken at professional institutions such as law schools. Petitioner objected that the testimony of individual lawmakers was not admissible to prove what was intended at the time of enactment. The evidence, however, was admitted upon the parties' stipulations that only relevant and competent evidence within the declarations would be considered.

Also admitted into evidence was the declaration of Richard Mileham, Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Personnel. Mileham recounted the origins of 4141.4. He stated that the district's faculty association had been opposed to the continued granting of salary credit to Michael Gianinni, who was attending law school. Mileham stated that the association thought it improper to Petitioner introduced evidence which dealt with the reasonableness of requiring W.A.S.C. accreditation as a means of preventing salary credit for law school courses. This included portions of the deposition of District Superintendent Riewer wherein he described W.A.S.C. accreditation of the entire institution rather than a reflection of its components: "It is my understanding that there is an umbrella nature of the W.A.S.C. accrediting process covering the entity of the university." Riewer said "(i)t is our contention that a law school at UCLA or USC is not accredited by W.A.S.C." Nevertheless, he subsequently did agree that under the current board policy "if Mr. Goddard had gone to UCLA (a W.A.C.S. accredited university) and had gone to their law school and had submitted the units, he would have as a matter of course gotten credit at the beginning of the next school year . . . ."

grant credit for courses taken in a school of law which would prepare the employee for a profession as a lawyer and not as a teacher. Mileham further stated that on August 6, 1969, he expressed the faculty association's views to the Board, and that after discussing the matter, the Board enacted Board Regulation 4141.4.

The trial court having concluded that Regulation 4141.4 was validly enacted and applied denied the writ of mandate.

CONTENTIONS

On appeal, Petitioner asserts that the writ of mandate to compel board action should have been granted below for the following reasons: (1) The Board's denial of Petitioner's salary credit was founded upon an erroneous construction of Board Regulation 4141.4; hence, denial of salary credit constituted a breach of Petitioner's contract of employment, as well as a violation of the requirement that placement of teachers on salary schedules be uniform for those of like experience and training. (Ed. Code § 45028 formerly § 13506); (2) If, as respondents' assert, 4141.4 does exclude credit from any school not accredited by W.A.S.C., that regulation would be arbitrary and unreasonable as applied to Petitioner; it would therefore violate the above mentioned principle of uniformity and the equal protection requirements of the United States Constitution and California Constitution; (3) If 4141.4 is based upon the premise that teachers who go to professional schools such as law schools thereby intend to leave the teaching profession, the regulation would constitute an invalid conclusive presumption violative of procedural due process.

We have concluded that the respondents improperly construed Board Regulation 4141.4 so as to deny salary credit for courses taken from a duly accredited law school. We have therefore not addressed the constitutional issues raised by Petitioner.

DISCUSSION

At the outset, we recognize that one may appeal the judgment of the superior court denying a writ of mandate. (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 1110, 1064, 904.1; Lompoc Federation of Teachers v. Lompoc Unified School District (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 701, 710, 130 Cal.Rptr. 70; Ross v. Municipal Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 575, 576, 122 Cal.Rptr. 807.) ⁶

In the present case, the trial court concluded that the Board had validly applied Regulation 4141.4 so as to disallow salary credit for law courses taken at a fully accredited law school. The construction of an administrative regulation and its application to a given set of facts are matters of law, and as the California Supreme Court has recently stated, "while an administrative agency's interpretation of its own regulation obviously deserves great weight (citations), the ultimate resolution of such legal questions rests with the courts." (Carmona v. Division of Industrial Safety (1975) 13 Cal.3d 303, 310, 118 Cal.Rptr. 473, 477, 530 P.2d 161, 165; see also Culligan Water Conditioning v. State Board of Equalization (1976) 17 Cal.3d 86, 93, 130 Cal.Rptr. 321, 550 P.2d 593.) Where the facts essential to the determination of such a legal issue are not in conflict, the reviewing court is not bound by the trial court's resolution. (Shoban v. Board of Trustees (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 534, 541, 81 Cal.Rptr. 112; Western Contracting Corp. v. State Board of Equalization (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 568, 575, 71 Cal.Rptr. 472.) In the present case, the facts which are material to this court's construction of Regulation 4141.4 are not in dispute. We are therefore not bound by the trial court's determination regarding the proper interpretation of the regulation.

It has been held that the rules and regulations promulgated by a board of education are integral parts of a teacher's contract of employment. (Frates v. Burnett (1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 63, 69, 87 Cal.Rptr. 731; Fry v. Board of Education (1941) 17 Cal.2d 753, 760, 112 P.2d 229.) In Frates the court held that (9 Cal.App.3d pp. 69-70, 87 Cal.Rptr. p. 734.): " An employment contract between a school district and an employee is in essence a contract of adhesion and therefore will be construed against the school district." Applying this principle, the court construed an ambiguous board regulation against the board. An adhesion contract is a contract in which the party with superior bargaining power permits the other party to adhere to the contract or reject it, but does not permit an opportunity to bargain over its...