Godfrey v. City of Flint

• Decision Date: 04 May 1938
• Docket Number: No. 117.,117.
• Citation: 284 Mich. 291,279 N.W. 516
• Parties: GODFREY v. CITY OF FLINT.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

284 Mich. 291

279 N.W. 516

GODFREY

v.CITY OF FLINT.

No. 117.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

May 4, 1938.

Action by Clarence Godfrey against the City of Flint to recover damages for the loss of an airplane stored in a hangar at the City Airport. From a judgment non obstante veredicto, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Genesee County; Paul V. Gadola, judge.

Argued before the Entire Bench.

Michelson & Pearlstine, of Flint, for appellant.

Hymen Hoffman, of Flint, for appellee.

SHARPE, Justice.

This is an action instituted by plaintiff to recover damages for the loss of an airplane stored in a hangar at the City of Flint Airport. Plaintiff had verdict, but defendant's motion non obstante veredicto was granted. Plaintiff appeals.

In April, 1933, plaintiff was the owner of a three passenger commercial airplane which he leased to Gordon Helm, who stored the same in the airport at Flint. In October, 1933, Helm was engaged by the City of Flint to operate the airport. He was paid $50 per month, had the use of the field for commercial flying, and was permitted to store his airplane in the hangar. His duties were to take care of the airport, look after the beacon light, keep a log of incoming and outgoing airplanes, telephone weather reports to other airports, and collect rentals and remit the same to the city treasurer.

In December, 1933, the City of Flint received aid from the federal government for the improvement of the airport. Helm was transferred to the CWA pay roll and worked 24 hours per week. He continued to store his airplane in the city hangar, to keep the beacon lighted at night, to make a log of incoming and outgoing planes, to telephone weather reports, and to collect rentals. He was never instructed by the City of Flint to discontinue these services nor was he authorized to continue the same.

On January 30, 1934, while the CWA project was still in progress, Helm had the airplane stored in one of the city hangars at the airport. The City of Flint owned a tractor and stored the same in the hangar directly under the left wing of the airplane. On the morning in question, a mechanic employed by the City of Flint was instructed to go to the airport for the purpose of starting the tractor. The principal trouble was that the tractor had sticking valves. In attempting to start the motor, the oil was drained from the motor into an open bucket 12 or 14 inches in diameter which was placed under the motor and gasoline was poured into the priming cups. The motor was primed several times by two different employees of the city and in this process gasoline leaked upon the wooden floor. In the process of starting the motor, it backfired through the carburetor, igniting the gasoline. The fire spread to the gasoline and oil on the floor, then to the airplane, which was destroyed. Upon two other occasions the motor had been found difficult to start and had backfired, but no fire had resulted.

Before the cause was submitted to the jury, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict which was reserved. The court instructed the jury that there was no bailment for hire in this case; and submitted the case to them on the second count in plaintiff's declaration, namely, that of a gratuitous bailment. He instructed them that plaintiff must prove defendant's employees were grossly negligent in the attempt to start the tractor and that this gross negligence was the cause of the loss of the airplane. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but the court granted defendant's motion non obstante veredicto.

Plaintiff appeals and contends that the trial court was in error in his refusal to submit the cause to the jury upon the first count in the declaration, namely, that a mutual benefit bailment existed between plaintiff's lessee and the defendant, and defendant was liable for the destruction of plaintiff's property through ordinary negligence of defendants' employees; and that there was ample evidence to sustain the jury's verdict that the defendant's employees were guilty of gross negligence.

It is conceded that a bailment relation exists between the parties in this case.

In 6 Amer.Juris. p. 145, § 14, it is said that:

‘* * * bailments are now generally classified under three heads: (1) Those for the sole benefit of the bailor; (2) those for the sole benefit of the bailee; and (3) those for the benefit of both parties.’

‘Bailment for the benefit of both parties thereto has been defined as one wherein a person gives to another the temporary use and possession of property, other than money, for a reward, the latter agreeing to return the same to the former at a future time.’ 8 C.J.S. Bailments, p. 243, § 8.

‘To ascertain the rights, duties, and liabilities of the parties, it is usually necessary to determine whether a bailment is lucrative, for the mutual benefit of both parties, or whether it is for the sole benefit of one party, the other remaining uncompensated.’ 6 Amer.Juris. p. 147, § 18.

‘In determining whether or not there is a lucrative bailment, the nature and amount of the compensation are immaterial, as the law will not inquire into its...