Godfrey v. Comm'r of Corr.

Citation202 Conn.App. 684,246 A.3d 1032
Decision Date23 February 2021
Docket NumberAC 42890
CourtAppellate Court of Connecticut
Parties Robert C. GODFREY v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

Vishal K. Garg, West Hartford, assigned counsel, for the appellant (petitioner).

Tamara Grosso, assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Laurie N. Feldman, deputy assistant state's attorney, and Gail P. Hardy, former state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Suarez, Js

Opinion

PRESCOTT, J.

This appeal presents the important question of whether, under the common-law contractual "frustration of purpose" doctrine, a habeas petitioner who had been charged with a capital felony and pleaded guilty to murder in order to avoid the imposition of the death penalty is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea sixteen years later because the death penalty has since been abolished. We conclude that, even if the frustration of purpose doctrine applies to criminal plea agreements, the petitioner, Robert C. Godfrey, is not entitled to relief under that doctrine because by entering into the plea agreement, he assumed the risk that the death penalty might be abolished at some point while he was serving his sentence of sixty years of incarceration.

The petitioner appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1 On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he was not entitled to habeas relief with respect to a collateral attack on his guilty plea because (1) he failed to prove that his principal purpose for entering into a guilty plea with an agreed upon sixty year sentence was substantially frustrated by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty and (2) he had assumed the risk that the law might change in his favor.2 We conclude that the habeas court properly determined that the petitioner had assumed the risk that the death penalty might be abolished at some point while he was serving his sixty year sentence, and, therefore, we do not reach his first claim. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our disposition of the petitioner's claims.3 On November 9, 2001, the East Hartford police responded to apartment 209 of an apartment complex on a report that a woman was found dead. Upon arrival, the police observed the woman's nude body, with a large open wound to the back of her head, lying face down next to the bed. There were large amounts of blood on the walls, the bed, and the floors of the apartment. In the kitchen, there were what appeared to be bloody footprints. The footprints led from apartment 209, up the outer staircase, to the door of apartment 309, which is where the petitioner lived. When the petitioner first was interviewed by the police, he indicated that he knew the victim, and that they may have had a few beers together, but he did not know how the bloody footprints could have ended up outside of his doorway. The petitioner consented to the taking of a DNA sample, which later was determined by the medical examiner to match the semen found in the victim. The cause of the victim's death was cranial cerebral trauma

, caused by ten to fifteen blows from a sharp instrument. A search warrant was executed at the petitioner's apartment, where the police found bloody footprints inside, which later were determined to match the petitioner's own footprints, and clothes stained with the victim's blood.

On November 27, 2001, the petitioner was charged with capital felony in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2001) § 53a-54b (7), murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, two counts of burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (1) (2), and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70 (a) (1). Thereafter, the petitioner entered into a plea agreement with the state. Pursuant to the agreement, the state filed a substitute information charging the petitioner with one count of murder in violation of § 53a-54a (a), to which he agreed to plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of sixty years of incarceration. On March 11, 2004, the court canvassed the petitioner regarding his guilty plea. Through that canvass, the court determined, inter alia, that the petitioner understood that (1) the guilty plea was "for keeps," meaning that he would not be permitted to "change his mind later and take it back," (2) he could not withdraw his guilty plea "unless the court doesn't impose a sentence agreed upon," (3) he was "giving up any rights to an appeal," and (4) the sentencing statute required that he serve the sixty years "day for day." The court found that there was a factual basis for the petitioner's guilty plea and that it was knowingly and voluntarily made. The court then accepted the plea and later sentenced the petitioner, consistent with the plea agreement, to a term of sixty years of imprisonment.

On April 25, 2012, No. 12-5 of the 2012 Public Acts (P.A. 12-5) was signed into law, prospectively repealing the death penalty for all crimes committed on or after that date, and retaining the death penalty for capital felonies committed prior to that date. Three years later, our Supreme Court, in State v. Santiago , 318 Conn. 1, 119, 122 A.3d 1 (2015), held that the imposition of the death penalty on offenders who committed capital crimes prior to the enactment of P.A. 12-5 would violate article first, §§ 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution, thus effectively abolishing the death penalty in Connecticut.

Following the release of the Santiago decision, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On April 17, 2018, the petitioner filed an amended petition that alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in count one and, in count two, that his guilty plea should be vacated pursuant to the doctrine of frustration of purpose because the abolishment of the death penalty in Connecticut frustrated his principal purpose in accepting the plea agreement, namely, to avoid the death penalty. The relief sought in the petition is a judgment vacating the original plea agreement and the remand of his case for resentencing "in accordance with the plea that would have been negotiated had the death penalty been unavailable." The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, filed a return on May 21, 2018, in which he asserted that the petitioner failed to state a ground on which relief can be granted, and raised the defense of procedural default. Thereafter, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss count two of the petition on the same grounds alleged in the return.

At the habeas trial, on September 4, 2018, the petitioner withdrew count one of the petition and three witnesses testified, including the petitioner and both of his trial counsel, as to count two.

Specifically, both trial counsel testified, inter alia, that they recommended to the petitioner that he plead guilty because there was a significant likelihood that he would receive the death penalty if the case went to trial because of the "horrific" nature of the crime and the weakness of evidence regarding any mitigating factors that might persuade the jury to decline to vote in favor of the death penalty.4 One of the petitioner's trial counsel, Attorney Barry Butler, stated that he advised the petitioner that a sixty year sentence, which he would be required to serve in full, thereby rendering him ineligible for release until he is approximately ninety years old, was more favorable than a life sentence without the possibility of parole because of the potential for future changes to the law that would make someone with a finite sentence eligible for early release.5 Attorney Butler also stated that he had discussed with the petitioner the possibility that one day the state might abolish the death penalty, although he did not have a specific expectation at that time that it would be abolished. The petitioner testified, inter alia, that avoiding the death penalty was "somewhat important" to him, that he was scared of the death penalty, and that he would not have pleaded guilty and agreed to a sixty year sentence if the death penalty had been unavailable. In addition, he stated that he did not want to plead guilty to a sexual assault, which was consistent with Attorney Butler's testimony that pleading guilty to sexual assault was a "deal breaker" for the petitioner. The habeas court rendered judgment on March 8, 2019, denying the amended habeas petition.6 Specifically, the court concluded that, as a matter of first impression, the frustration of purpose doctrine, which is typically applied in civil cases alleging breach of contract, also applies to criminal plea agreements. The court then applied that doctrine and found that the petitioner failed to prove that (1) his principal purpose for agreeing to enter a guilty plea was substantially frustrated by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty,7 and (2) he did not assume the risk that the death penalty subsequently might be abolished.8 On March 18, 2019, the habeas court granted the petitioner certification to appeal the habeas court's judgment. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as needed.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court properly determined that the frustration of purpose doctrine applies to plea agreements, but improperly concluded that he was not entitled to habeas relief because (1) he failed to prove that his principal purpose for entering into a guilty plea was substantially frustrated by the subsequent abolition of the death penalty and (2) he had assumed the risk that the law might change in his favor. In response, the respondent argues that this court need not decide whether the frustration of purpose doctrine applies to plea agreements in general or in...

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    ...so as to preserve the certainty of contracts ...." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Godfrey v. Commissioner of Correction , 202 Conn. App. 684, 693, 246 A.3d 1032, cert. denied, 336 Conn. 931, 248 A.3d 2 (2021), quoting 17A Am. Jur. 2d 618, Contracts § 640 (2016), and 1......
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    ...and fact, which is subject to plenary review." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Godfrey v. Commissioner of Correction , 202 Conn. App. 684, 693, 246 A.3d 1032 (2021). Moreover, "[w]hether the petitioner was deprived of his due process rights due to a Brady violation is ......
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