Godfrey v. Meridian Light & Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 22 April 1912
• Docket Number: 15443
• Parties: MISS SUSIE RUSSELL GODFREY v. MERIDIAN LIGHT & RAILWAY CO
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

58 So. 534

101 Miss. 565

MISS SUSIE RUSSELL GODFREY v. MERIDIAN LIGHT & RAILWAY CO

No. 15443

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 22, 1912

APPEAL from the circuit court of Lauderdale county, HON. JOHN L BUCKLEY, Judge.

Suit by Miss Susie Russell Godfrey against the Meridian Railway &amp Light Company. From a judgment for defendant plaintiff appeals.

The appellant brought suit against the appellee for the sum of five thousand dollars damages for the alleged failure of the defendant to stop its car and admit her as a passenger at a street crossing in the city of Meridian.

The declaration alleges that plaintiff went to a corner in the business section of the city for the purpose of taking a car and signaled for it to stop; that the signal was seen and understood by the motorman, but that he made no effort to stop the car until it had passed by plaintiff, finally stopping about fifty yards beyond her; that his failure to stop was willful and grossly negligent; that, when the car stopped, the conductor on the rear of the car looked back and saw that plaintiff wished to board the car; that without giving her time to reach it, or offer to back the car to the crossing where she stood with her baby, eighteen months old the conductor willfully, negligently, and insultingly, knowing that plaintiff desired to become a passenger, signaled the motorman to go ahead, and left the plaintiff standing at the corner; that, by reason of the gross negligence and willful wrong done plaintiff by defendant, she was compelled to walk a great distance, carrying her child, suffering physical pain and mental anguish, to her damage, etc., and further, that because of the insults and humiliations heaped upon her by the servant of the defendant she is entitled to damages.

The case was submitted to a jury under instructions of the court, and resulted in a verdict for defendant, from which comes this appeal.

Reversed and remanded.

C. D. Christian and Green & Green, for appellant, filed an elaborate brief covering all points decided in the case but too long for publication.

Baskin & Wilbourn, for appellee, filed an extended brief fully covering the case but too long for publication.

OPINION

WHITFIELD, C.

The sixth instruction given for the defendant is fatally erroneous, for two reasons: First, it assumes what was certainly in controversy that Freeman and Chatham were the motorman and conductor on this particular street car; and, secondly, it took entirely from the consideration of the jury the question of whether the defendant was guilty of gross negligence. Punitive damages are recoverable, not only for willful and intentional wrong, but for such gross and reckless negligence as is the equivalent of willful wrong in the eye of the law. This is not the law. If this charge were correct, then it would follow that, although the jury might have believed that Mrs. Godfrey was in the place for embarkation on the car at the time stated by her, they would, nevertheless, find for the defendant, if only they further believed that the motorman and conductor did not see Mrs. Godfrey. They might not have seen her, and yet been guilty of gross negligence in not seeing her.

The sixth instruction is as follows: "Unless the plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the testimony that Freeman and Chatham willfully refused to stop at a time and place when plaintiff was entitled to board the car then plaintiff is not entitled to recover punitive or exemplary damages against defendant; that punitive or exemplary damages are what is called in law smart money or vindictive damages to be given in cases when those against whom they are inflicted have been guilty of willfully and knowingly wronging the party or parties claiming said damages."

The fourth instruction given for the defendant is as follows "The court instructs the jury that the burden of proof is on plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant's servants negligently omitted to stop the car and take her on as a passenger before plaintiff is entitled to recover at all; and, further, that, in the event the jury should believe from the evidence that defendant's servants did negligently omit to stop the car and accept plaintiff as a passenger, the burden is also on plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the testimony that she sustained actual damages and the amount thereof with reasonable certainty before she can recover any actual damages, and, if the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff did not sustain any actual damages, and that the conduct of defendant's servants was not insulting, and intentionally willful even though negligent, then the jury should only award plaintiff nominal damages." The last clause of this instruction, which tells the jury that if they believe from the evidence that plaintiff did not sustain any actual damages, and that the conduct of the defendant's servants was not insulting, capricious, and intentionally willful, even though negligent, then the jury should award plaintiff only nominal damages, is objectionable for two reasons: First. Because it required the jury to believe that the defendant's conduct was insulting, capricious, and intentionally willful. The three adverbs should have been used in the alternative, and not conjunctively. Second. The phrase, "even though negligent," would have warranted the jury in believing that...