Godinez v. City of Chi., Case No. 16-cv-07344
| Decision Date | 30 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-07344 |
| Parties | JANET GODINEZ, on behalf of herself and as administrator of the estate of her brother, HERIBERTO GODINEZ, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Janet Godinez filed this action against Defendant City of Chicago ("the City") and individually named Defendant Police Officers for conduct, she alleges, resulted in the death of her 26-year-old brother Heriberto Godinez on July 20, 2015. Plaintiff asserts excessive force, failure to intervene, supervisory liability and conspiracy claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as a Monell policy claim and Illinois state law claims for wrongful death, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The City moves for summary judgment on Plaintiff's Illinois wrongful death claim and the Monell policy claim (Counts V and VI). For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the City's motion for summary judgment [279] as to these claims.
Summary judgment is proper where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive law controls which facts are material. Id.
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (1986). After a "properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted). Construing the evidence and facts supported by the record in favor of the non-moving party, the Court gives the non-moving party "the benefit of reasonable inferences from the evidence, but not speculative inferences in [its] favor." White v. City of Chi., 829 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted). "The controlling question is whether a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party on the evidence submitted in support of and opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Id. (citation omitted).
Under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/1, a decedent's estate may bring a suit against a party "whose alleged 'wrongful act, neglect or default' caused the death." Paredes v. Cook Cty., No. 15 C 3644, 2018 WL 4955865, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2018) (quoting 740 ILCS 180/1). A plaintiff must prove causation in order to prevail on a wrongful death claim. Id. "Proximate cause is a question of fact for the jury unless there is no material issue regarding the matter or only one conclusion is clearly evident." Williams v. Univ. of Chicago Hosps., 179 Ill. 2d 80, 88-89, 688 N.E.2d 130, 134 (1997).
The City moves for summary judgment against Plaintiff on the wrongful death claim because "Plaintiff cannot produce admissible evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that Godinez's death was caused by the actions of police officers." (Dkt. 280 at 4). Defendants argue that because Plaintiff's retained cause of death experts, forensic pathologist Michael Baden, M.D., and neuropathologist, Jan Leestma, M.D., should be barred, Plaintiff cannot meet the essential element of causation.
Concurrently with the instant motion, the City filed motions to exclude the testimony of Drs. Leestma and Baden. For the reasons described in separate rulings, (Dkts. 400 & 401), the Court will allow both Drs. Leestma and Baden to testify as to cause of death. The Court found those experts qualified to opine as to the cause of death, that their methodology is sound, and that their testimony will be helpful tothe jury. The weight to be given to the doctors' conclusions are questions for the jury to decide and can be tested on cross-examination at trial. Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 2010) (); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993) ().
Because the Court will allow the testimony of Drs. Leestma and Baden as qualified and reliable experts, this case presents the classic "battle of the experts" on the cause of death issue. Defendants will present expert testimony from forensic pathologists that the cause of Mr. Godinez's death was alcohol and cocaine intoxication, (dkt. 280 at 4) (citing Def. SOF ¶¶44, 57); whereas, Plaintiffs' experts will testify that the cause of death was positional asphyxia and spinal cord injury caused by Defendant Officers' use of force. (Dkt. 344 at 4-6) (citing Pl. SOAF ¶¶8, 11, 13-14). It is not for this Court to make credibility determinations on the expert opinions on summary judgment. Manjarrez v. Georgia-Pac. LLC, No. 12 C 1257, 2013 WL 3754861, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 16, 2013). This "battle of the experts" creates a genuine issue of material fact. Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Lear Corp., 756 F.Supp.2d 938, 951 (N.D.Ill.2010) (). Given the conflicting expert testimony, and drawing allreasonable inferences against the moving party, the Court finds the issue of causation to be appropriately left to the trier of fact and denies summary judgment as to the wrongful death claim.1
A municipality can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). Liability arises "only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989) (emphasis in original). Therefore under Monell, the "critical question" is whether a municipal policy or custom "gave rise to the harm (that is, caused it), or if instead the harm resulted from the acts of the entity's agents." Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017).
To establish § 1983 municipal liability, a plaintiff must show "(1) he suffered a deprivation of a federal right; (2) as a result of either an express municipal policy, widespread custom, or deliberate act of a decision-maker with final policy-making authority for the City; which (3) was the proximate cause of his injury." Ovadal v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 416 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 2005). The second element may take one of three forms: "(1) an express policy that would cause a constitutionaldeprivation if enforced; (2) a common practice that is so widespread and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the force of law even though it is not authorized by written law or express policy; or (3) an allegation that a person with final policy-making authority caused a constitutional injury." Rossi v. City of Chi., 790 F.3d 729, 737 (7th Cir. 2015). There are "no bright-line rules defining a widespread custom or practice." Thomas v. Cook Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). An unconstitutional policy can include implicit policies or a gap in expressed policies. Daniel v. Cook Cty., 833 F.3d 728, 734 (7th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). A plaintiff must prove "a true municipal policy at issue, not a random event." See Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 380 (7th Cir. 2005).
In its motion, the City argues that it should prevail as a matter of law on the Monell claim because Plaintiff cannot show that her brother's death was the result of any widespread unconstitutional custom or practice by the City. (Dkt. 280). The City contends that all of Plaintiff's Monell evidence relates to solely the in-custody death of Godinez, and a single incident does not establish a widespread practice or policy. The City further argues that the investigative files it produced do not show any de facto unconstitutional policy.
Plaintiff responds that a jury should decide the Monell claim. She argues that the City is liable under Monell because it was deliberately indifferent to the Chicago Police Department's (CPD) widespread pattern and practice of (1) using excessiveforce; (2) failing to adequately train officers on restraint techniques; (3) failing to maintain video and audio recording equipment and recordings; (4) permitting a code of silence to exist within CPD; and (5) failing to hold police officers accountable for misconduct. (Dkt. 344 at 12); see also Second Amended Complaint (SAC), (Dkt. 159 ¶¶34-48).
To show a genuine issue of material fact exists, Plaintiff relies on the following evidence: (1) the 2017 Department of Justice Report (DOJ Report); (2) April 2016 Police Accountability Task Force Report (PATF Report); (3) statements by former Mayor Rahm Emanuel and Superintendent Eddie Johnson; (4) Charles Drago's expert report; (5) other cases involving death by positional asphyxia; and (6) the officers' testimony in this case.
As an initial matter, the City did not object to the admissibility of the DOJ Report as hearsay in its motion for summary judgment, only in its reply brief. The City only argued that the DOJ and PATF Reports were not related to this case. (Dkt. 280 at...
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