Godley v. Weisman
| Decision Date | 09 June 1916 |
| Docket Number | 19,714 - (15) |
| Citation | 158 N.W. 333,133 Minn. 1 |
| Parties | ELIZABETH T. GODLEY v. I. WEISMAN |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Deed -- building restrictions in prior deed.
1. A deed to "lot 11" and other lots contained a covenant that the deed was subject to building restrictions contained in a prior deed which conveyed only lot 11. This adopted the building restrictions in the former deed and applied them to all lots conveyed by the later deed so far as the restrictions could be made applicable thereto.
Deed -- general building plan.
2. Where the owner of a lot subject to no building restrictions conveys it and in the deed inserts restrictive covenants these covenants cannot, in the absence of some general building plan, be regarded as enuring to the benefit of lots previously conveyed by him, and prior grantees cannot enforce such restrictions. Where, however, a number of lots in the same locality, and some contiguous to others, were conveyed by a single deed containing building restrictions applicable to all, and the grantee conveyed one tract to plaintiff and later a contiguous tract to defendant, and in each deed incorporated the building restrictions under which he held his title, these transactions evince a purpose to adopt a general building plan. An owner need not have a multitude of lots in order to have a building plan. He may have such plan for two lots as well as for more.
Enforcement of building restrictions.
3. Where there is a general building plan with restrictions, the restrictions are for the benefit of all of the land subject thereto, and each grantee of any part of the land may enforce the restrictions against his neighbor.
Enforcement of building restrictions -- loss of right.
4. Plaintiff has not forfeited her right to enforce a restriction against the building of duplex houses by the fact that a one-story sun room or porch of her house extends beyond the building line, the main portion of her house being within the line.
On June 9, 1916, the following opinion was filed:
Counsel for defendant appellant on motion for reargument urges that because the court stated in the opinion that "the language of the Gates deed is not free from doubt" it should have held that the conveyance was therefore unrestricted. Counsel cite numerous cases to the general proposition that, where the right of a complainant to relief by the enforcement of a restrictive covenant is doubtful, the doubt should be resolved against the restriction and relief denied.
If by this is meant, as said in Peabody Heights Co. v. Willson, 82 Md. 186, 203, 32 A. 386, 1077, 36 L.R.A. 393, that "if there be doubt as to the intention of the parties, courts will naturally lean in favor of the freedom of the property," then we concur, for it is undoubtedly the rule that, "in construing conditions of this character, they are to be most strongly construed against the party seeking to exact their performance, and if any doubt exists as to the manner of the performance, * * * the restriction shall be construed most favorable to the one against whom it is to be enforced." Melsom v. Ormsby, 169 Iowa 522, 532, 151 N.W. 817.
But, if the rule stated by counsel means that whenever the language of the restriction is such as to suggest doubt, either slight or grave, as to the meaning or extent of the alleged restriction, the court must forthwith forbear further consideration of the case and deny relief, then we do not concur. In Schoonmaker v. Heckscher, 157 N.Y.S. (App.Div.) 75, 77, the New York supreme court, appellate division, said, as did the courts in the cases cited by defendant's counsel...
To continue reading
Request your trial