Godoy v. Maplehurst Bakeries Inc.

Decision Date13 October 2010
Docket NumberCivil No. 09–1696 (MEL).
Citation747 F.Supp.2d 298
PartiesMayra Mejía GODOY, Plaintiff,v.MAPLEHURST BAKERIES, INC., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Juan R. Gonzalez–Munoz, Gonzalez Munoz Law Office, Maria Elena Margarida–Franco, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.Luis R. Perez–Giusti, Patricia R. Limeres–Vargas, Adsuar Muniz Goyco Seda & Perez Ochoa PSC, San Juan, PR, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

MARCOS E. LÓPEZ, United States Magistrate Judge.I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 23, 2009, plaintiff Mayra Mejía Godoy (plaintiff or “Mejía”) filed a complaint in the instant case against her former employer, Maplehurst Bakeries, Inc. (Maplehurst), its unidentified insurance companies, Maplehurst employee Angel Ortiz (“Ortiz”), and his wife Jane Doe and their conjugal partnership.1 (Docket No. 3.) Claiming, inter alia, that Ortiz's sexual harassment of Mejía created a hostile work environment and that Mejía was unjustly discharged in retaliation for her request that the company take disciplinary action against Ortiz, plaintiff asserts causes of action for hostile work environment and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., as well as under supplemental state law, to wit: Puerto Rico's Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 146– 151 (“Law 100”); Law No. 69 of July 6, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 1321– 1341 (“Law 69”); Law No. 17 of April 22, 1988, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 155– 155m (“Law 17”); Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 194, et seq. (“Law 115”); and Law No. 80 of May 30, 1976, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, § 185, et seq. (“Law 80”).

Pending before the court is Maplehurst's motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's opposition, and Maplehurst's reply. (Docket Nos. 53, 61, 74.) Also pending before the court is plaintiff's motion to strike the majority of exhibits proffered as evidence in support of defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts (Docket No. 53–1), filed in conjunction with defendant's summary judgment motion, as well as defendant's opposition to said motion. (Docket Nos. 62; 75.)

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Plaintiff requests that the court strike exhibits 6–22, 24–27, and 29 to defendant's Statement of Uncontested Facts (Docket Nos. 53–2, pp. 14–50; 53–3; 53–4; 53–5; 53–6, pp. 5–27; 53–7, pp. 1–13), and generally raises three objections: i) deposition transcripts do not comply with Fed R. Civ. P. 30(f)(1); ii) documents are not properly authenticated under Fed. R. Civ. 901; and iii) documents constitute inadmissible hearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 802, 803 and 807. (Docket No. 62, ¶¶ 4–5.) In addition, plaintiff's Opposition Statement to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts (Docket No. 61–1) identifies plaintiff's specific objections to certain exhibits. (Docket No. 62, ¶ 5.)

As an initial matter, plaintiff does not articulate with specificity objections to the following exhibits: 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 29. (Docket Nos. 53–2, pp. 14–21, 30–42, 45–50; 53–3; 53–4, pp. 7–12; 53–6, pp. 7–10; 53–7, pp. 1–13); ( See Docket Nos. 62; 61–1.) The court will not consider blanket objections. Therefore, the motion to strike is DENIED as to exhibits 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 25, 29.

Regarding plaintiff's certification argument concerning deposition transcripts, the court finds that exhibits 26 and 27 (Docket No. 53–6, pp. 11–27) are properly certified under Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(f)(1), as the record contains a certification from a notary or officer that the witness for the depositions in question was duly sworn and that the deposition accurately recorded the witness's testimony. (Docket Nos. 74–6, p. 5; 61–3, pp. 4–5, 19.) Therefore, plaintiff's motion regarding exhibits 26 and 27 is DENIED.

Plaintiff objects to exhibits 7, 8, 13, 22 and 24 (Docket Nos. 53–2, pp. 22–29, 43–44; 53–5; 53–6, pp. 5–6) on the ground that they are hearsay statements that fail to qualify under the business records exception because defendant did not include testimony by a custodian demonstrating that it was the regular practice to keep such records. See Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). Regarding exhibits 7 (Docket No. 53–2, pp. 7–27) and 8 (Docket No. 53–2, pp. 28–29), plaintiff's hearsay objection fails. Exhibit 7 consists of Mejía's internal complaint, which is a party admission and therefore not hearsay, and a cover letter from María Wicks (“Wicks”), Maplehurst's Account Manager and Supervisor, to Bruce Roach (“Roach”), Maplehurst's Human Resource Manager, detailing a conversation Wicks had with Mejía. This document does not constitute hearsay because the author is relying on her personal recollection of events. Likewise, exhibit 8 is a letter from Wicks to Roach memorializing her personal impressions of the episode in question, and does not rely on another declarant's statements. Plaintiff also objects to both exhibits on the grounds that they have not been properly authenticated under Fed.R.Evid. 901. As to exhibit 7, the court finds that the document was not properly authenticated as its referenced citation was not included in defendant's submissions. As to exhibit 8, the court finds that the document was not properly authenticated since the citation provided—defendant's answers to plaintiff's interrogatories—is not sufficiently specific for the court to determine whether the document in question was actually produced. (Docket Nos. 75, p. 6; 74–1.) Therefore, plaintiff's motion to strike exhibits 7 and 8 is GRANTED.

Regarding exhibits 13 (Docket No. 53–2, pp. 44–45) and 22 (Docket No. 53–5), plaintiff's hearsay objection fails because the documents in question are not being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Exhibit 13 is a letter from Roach to Ortiz informing him that he is being formally disciplined, and is submitted to prove that fact, not to prove the truth of the underlying claims. Exhibit 22 is a copy of Maplehurst's employee handbook, and is submitted only as proof that she had received a copy of said policy, not for the truth of the assertions within. Therefore, plaintiff's motion regarding exhibits 13 and 22 is DENIED.

Regarding exhibit 24 (Docket No. 53–6, pp. 5–6), the document in question, an official description of the technical sales representative position, is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore constitutes hearsay. The business exception rule does not apply because defendant failed to include testimony by a custodian or another employee demonstrating that it was the regular practice to keep such records. Therefore, plaintiff's motion regarding exhibit 24 is GRANTED.

Regarding exhibit 20 (Docket No. 53–4, pp. 1–6), plaintiff objects to the document due to a lack of authentication. The court finds that the document was not properly authenticated since the citation provided—defendant's answers to plaintiff's interrogatories—is not sufficiently specific for the court to determine whether the document in question was actually produced. (Docket Nos. 75, p. 7; 74–1.) Therefore, plaintiff's motion regarding exhibit 20 is GRANTED.

Thus, plaintiff's motion to strike is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The same is GRANTED with respect to exhibits 7, 8, 20 and 24 and DENIED with regard to exhibits 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 29.

III. UNCONTESTED FACTS

Plaintiff Mejía began working for defendant Maplehurst in May 2001. (Docket Nos. 53–1, p. 2; 61–1, p. 2; 70–1, pp. 1–2.) As a bakery trainer serving various Pueblo and Walmart locations, Mejía essentially functioned as outside staff for those stores' bakery departments, aiding in the preparation and presentation of Maplehurst baked goods. (Docket Nos. 53–1, p. 2; 61–1, p. 3; 70–1, Ex. 29, pp. 58:2–61:13.)

During the relevant period, Maplehurst's three Puerto–Rico–based employees—Mejía, Ortiz, and Carlos Ortiz (no relation)—reported to the account manager, Wicks. (Docket Nos. 53–1, p. 3; 61–1, p. 5; 74–7, Ex. 26–a, p. 12:11–15.)

On March 12, 2007, Mejía wrote a letter to Wicks, to formally register her “total disapproval” concerning the recent conduct of Maplehurst employee Ortiz. (Docket Nos. 53–1, pp. 3–4; 61–1, p. 6; 53–2, pp. 14–17.) Specifically, Mejía stated that on March 7, 2007, in the presence of Wicks and Carlos Ortiz, Ortiz told Mejía that the next time she visited one of their worksites—the Walmart at Escorial Plaza—she should give the bakery manager a “big hug and a kiss ..., so she keeps her tranquility.” Id. ( See Docket Nos. 74–6, Ex. 26–a, pp. 44:3–5, Ex. 28–a, p. 11:18–22.) 2 Further, on March 9, 2007, alluding to the fact that Mejía had spent the entire previous day at the Escorial location after only being scheduled to work there during the morning, Ortiz stated that the bakery manager must have “ma[de] it good for [her.] (Docket Nos. 53–1, pp. 3–4; 61–1, p. 6; 53–2, pp. 14–17.) Mejía went on to state that the episode “offend[ed],” “defame[d],” and made her “angry” to have to tolerate a “hostil [sic] environment.” Id. Wicks thereafter contacted Ortiz and instructed him to cease making vulgar or potentially offensive speech in the workplace. (Docket Nos. 53–1, p. 5; 61–1, pp. 9–10; 74–6, Ex. 27–a, pp. 29:21–30:12.)

On May 2, 2007, Mejía wrote a letter to Wicks expressing her “disappointment” at Wicks' reaction to Mejía's March 12th letter. (Docket Nos. 53–1, p. 5; 61–1, p. 10; 53–2, pp. 30–31.) In addition to general complaints about an “environment in which [she] feel[s] harassed and retaliated [against],” Mejía specifically questioned a new requirement that she report to Ortiz on a daily basis, leading her to feel she was being “monitored in an unfair and discriminatory way.” Id.

On June 28, 2007, Mejía filed a charge before the Antidiscrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor and Human Resources (“ADU”), a copy of which Maplehurst received on July 9th. (Docket Nos. 53–1, ...

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