Godwin v. United States, Monica P. Brown, Omni Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 04 August 2015 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14cv391-DPJ-FKB |
Parties | TAYLOR B. GODWIN, by and through her guardian, TAMI GODWIN PLAINTIFF v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MONICA P. BROWN, OMNI INSURANCE COMPANY, MISSISSIPPI FARM BUREAU CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, AND JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 5 DEFENDANTS |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This case is before the Court on Defendant United States of America's Motion to Dismiss or, alternatively, for Summary Judgment [36]. Because the jurisdictional question is intertwined with the merits of Plaintiff's federal claim, and because the Court finds genuine issues of material fact on the merits of the claim, the motion is denied.
Plaintiff Tami Godwin filed this suit on May 13, 2014, alleging that Defendant Monica P. Brown, while in the course and scope of her duties as an employee of the United States Postal Service, caused an automobile accident that injured Taylor Godwin. Federal jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C. § 1346, which grants the district courts subject-matter jurisdiction over tort claims against the United States. The United States moved [14] to dismiss, contending that Brown was off-duty at the time of the accident, and Plaintiff moved [21] for jurisdictional discovery. The Court granted the motion for discovery and denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice to the United States' right to re-file its motion following the period of jurisdictional discovery. Order [27].
After the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery, the United States filed the instant motion seeking dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) or summary judgment under Rule 56. The evidence submitted by the parties establishes the following undisputed facts: At the time of the accident, Brown was employed as a Rural Carrier Associate of the United States Postal Service based out of Stonewall, Mississippi. As a Rural Carrier Associate, Brown drove her personal vehicle to deliver mail. On the day of the accident, Brown completed her usual postal route and returned to the post office at approximately 2:35 p.m. She completed her work at the post office, signed out from work, and left the office in her personal vehicle at 2:40 p.m. But while at the post office, Brown discovered a piece of mail that she had inadvertently failed to deliver on her route that day. So when she left the post office at 2:40, she did not head toward her home in Meridian but instead drove back in the direction of the mail recipient's home to deliver the omitted piece of mail. The accident occurred at 2:55 p.m.
The evidence also reveals disputed questions of fact as to whether, on the date of the accident or on any previous occasion, the Officer in Charge of the Stonewall Post Office, Anita Wright, gave Brown permission to return to her route after signing out for the day. Specifically, Brown testifies in her deposition that Wright gave her permission to return to her route to deliver the piece of mail in question, but Wright testifies that she would not have given Brown permission to deliver the mail after her working hours. Another rural carrier based out of the Stonewall Post Office, Danny Jones, testifies that he knew of no one who had been given permission to deliver mail after working hours. He and Wright also testify that the type of mail recovered from Brown's vehicle that she was en route to deliver was not the kind of mail that would need to be delivered after hours.
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 1981). "[W]here factual issues determinative of jurisdiction are intertwined with or identical to factual issues determinative of the merits[,] . . . the rule of Bell v. Hood[, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946),] requires the district court to assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits." Wordwide Parking, Inc. v. New Orleans City, 123 F. App'x 606, 608 09 (5th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
In the Federal Tort Claims Act context, dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on a finding that the tortfeasor was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the incident would be improper. Montez v. Dep't of the Navy, 392 F.3d 147, 150 (5th Cir. 2004). Instead, the "jurisdictional attack intertwined with the merits of [the] FTCA claim should be treated like any other intertwined attack" and considered under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule56. Id. Because the United States has alternatively moved under Rule 56 and the parties have presented evidence in support of their positions, the Court will address the motion under Rule 56.
Summary judgment is warranted under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when evidence reveals no genuine dispute regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The rule "mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 323. The nonmoving party must then "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324. Conclusory allegations, speculation, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic arguments are not an adequate substitute for specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. TIG Ins. Co. v. Sedgwick James of Wash., 276 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2002); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (per curiam); SEC v. Recile, 10 F.3d 1093, 1097 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
Finally, E.E.O.C. v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 397 98 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The parties agree that the question of whether Brown was "acting within the scope of h[er] office or employment" is determined under Mississippi law because the accident occurred in Mississippi. See Bodin v. Vagshenian, 462 F.3d 481, 484 (5th Cir. 2006).
"Under Mississippi law, to be within the scope of employment, the acts must have been 'committed in the course of and as a means to accomplishing the purposes of the employment and therefore in furtherance of the master's business . . . [or] incidental to the authorized conduct.'" Wright ex rel. Wright v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 606, 611 (S.D. Miss. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Adams v. Cinemark U.S.A., Inc., 831 So. 2d 1156, 1159 (Miss. 2002) (en banc)). "That an employee's acts are unauthorized does not necessarily place them outside the scope of employment if they are of the same general nature as the...
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