Goebel v. SALT LAKE CITY SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 20020825.
Decision Date | 01 October 2004 |
Docket Number | No. 20020825.,20020825. |
Citation | 2004 UT 80,104 P.3d 1185 |
Parties | Edward George Goebel and Kathy Goebel, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-Appellees, v. Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Salt Lake City Corporation, Inc., Omni Products, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, Utah Transit District, Defendants, Appellees, and Cross-Appellants. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
This opinion is subject to revision before final publication in the Pacific Reporter.
Peter C. Collins, Salt Lake, for plaintiffs.
E. Scott Savage, Casey K. McGarvey, Martha S. Stonebrook, Salt Lake, for defendants.
INTRODUCTION
¶1 Plaintiffs-appellants Edward and Kathy Goebel (the Goebels) appeal a grant of directed verdict and other rulings in favor of defendant-appellee Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. (Southern), and a grant of summary judgment in favor of Salt Lake City Corporation (the City). In brief, the Goebels argue that the trial court committed reversible error by:
¶2 Southern cross-appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in ruling that Utah Code sections 10-7-26, 10-7-29, and 56-1-11, and Salt Lake City Code § 14.44.030 apply to Southern.
¶3 We affirm.
¶4 On February 19, 1998, Mr. Goebel was riding his bicycle on 1700 South Street over a railroad crossing near 200 West Street when he crashed, sustaining serious injuries. The Goebels' theory about what caused the accident focused partly on the rubber mats, called "field panels," that were a component of the crossing. The Goebels therefore brought suit against Omni Products, Inc., because its predecessor had manufactured the field panels. Additionally, the Goebels sued Union Pacific, which had installed the field panels, and Utah Transit Authority (UTA), which owned the rail line and crossing. The Goebels settled with each of these defendants before trial, and none of them are parties to this appeal. The remaining defendants who are parties to this appeal are Southern, which was using UTA's crossing for freight service pursuant to an easement, and the City, which was responsible for maintaining the street leading up to the crossing.
¶5 The tracks at the crossing had been owned by Union Pacific, but Union Pacific sold the tracks to UTA prior to Mr. Goebel's accident. Southern was formed in 1992 to continue freight service on the tracks, while UTA took on the passenger service. When Union Pacific sold the tracks to UTA, it retained a limited easement for the purpose of freight service, which it then immediately transferred to Southern. Southern then entered into an Administration and Coordination Agreement (Agreement) with UTA. The Agreement specified that Southern could run freight trains on tracks that UTA designated as "Freight Trackage." Thus, UTA owned the tracks, and Southern had an easement to use the tracks for freight purposes, subject to the terms of the Agreement. The Agreement required Southern to maintain freight trackage crossings as necessary for freight rail service.
¶6 At trial, the Goebels attempted to present evidence supporting their theory that a "protuberance"—the Goebels' term—in the road caused Mr. Goebel to steer his bicycle into a gap between field panels at the crossing. The field panels raised the level of the roadway almost to the level of the rails. The field panels were laid next to each other, but over time, the Goebels theorized, a gap running parallel to Mr. Goebel's direction of travel grew between two of the field panels. The Goebels theorized that Mr. Goebel's accident occurred because the front tire of Mr. Goebel's bicycle—a road bicycle with relatively narrow wheels and tires—entered the gap and jammed against one of the rails.
¶7 Notwithstanding the Goebels' theories, however, no witnesses actually saw, and Mr. Goebel cannot actually remember, what caused the accident. Southern presented evidence to support its competing theory of what caused Mr. Goebel's accident. According to Southern's theory, the gap was not even involved in Mr. Goebel's accident.
¶8 In an order dated July 8, 2002, the trial court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The court granted in part Southern's motion for a directed verdict in an order dated August 29, 2002. The court's factual findings and legal conclusions as related to these orders are presented as relevant below.
¶9 The Goebels' first and most significant argument is that the trial court erred in granting Southern's motion for directed verdict because: (1) there was evidence presented at trial from which a jury could conclude that Southern had constructive notice of the protuberance, that it had a duty to fix the protuberance, and that its failure to fix the protuberance proximately caused Mr. Goebel to crash; (2) the Goebels did not need to present evidence that Southern had notice, because state law imposes an affirmative duty to maintain the crossing; (3) pursuant to Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1986), Southern should be presumed to have had notice because the gap was a permanent unsafe condition in a crossing for which Southern was responsible; (4) the jury could have inferred that Southern had constructive notice of the gap from evidence that gaps often form gradually over time; and (5) notice was not required as an element of the Goebels' public nuisance claim.
¶10 We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness. For a directed verdict to be appropriate, the evidence must be such that reasonable minds could not differ on the facts based on the evidence presented at trial. Mgmt. Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1982). We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if that evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom would support a judgment in favor of the losing party, we must reverse. Id. If evidence raises a "question of material fact," it is reversible error for a trial court to grant a motion for directed verdict. See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 16, 990 P.2d 933.
¶11 The Goebels take issue with the trial court's finding that the protuberance was not a proximate cause of Mr. Goebel's damages, and further argue that Southern had both constructive notice of the existence of the protuberance and a duty to repair it. The trial court found that,
¶12 Proximate cause is an issue of fact and is, therefore, not typically resolved by the court in a jury trial. See Mackay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp., 2000 UT 15, ¶ 12, 995 P.2d 1233. It is legal error for a court to grant a directed verdict on the issue of causation unless there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury might conclude that a breach of a duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. See Mahmood, 1999 UT 104 at ¶ 21. Put another way, if there is any doubt about whether something was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the court must not decide the issue as a matter of law. See Rees v. Albertson's, Inc., 587 P.2d 130, 133 (Utah 1978).
¶13 According to the Goebels' theory of the case, it was the gap that actually caused Mr. Goebel to fall, and the trial court did find that the gap was the proximate cause of the accident. Mr. Goebel argues that he steered his front wheel into the gap because he was avoiding the protuberance, but this does not mean that the existence of the protuberance necessarily forced Mr. Goebel to steer into the gap. From the evidence presented, no reasonable jury could find that the protuberance proximately caused Mr. Goebel to steer into the gap. The protuberance was no more a cause of Mr. Goebel's accident than his decision to ride his bicycle that day, or the weather. After reviewing the evidence, we agree with the trial court and Southern that Mr. Goebel could have steered his bicycle into the gap regardless of whether the protuberance existed at all. The trial court was therefore correct in finding as a matter of law that the protuberance was not a proximate cause of the accident.
¶14 Building upon the trial court's ruling that Southern is a "railway company" that owed the Goebels a duty of care pursuant to Utah Code...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig.
...is not to be applied retroactively unless the statute expressly declares that it operates retroactively.” Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1197–98 (Utah 2004). Defendants contend that because the Utah Antitrust Act did not permit indirect purchasers to recover for antitr......
-
Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc.
...v. Burningham, 2007 UT 58, ¶ 38, 165 P.3d 1214. "We review a trial court's grant of directed verdict for correctness." Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ¶ 10, 104 P.3d 1185. "We will sustain a directed verdict if after `examining all evidence in a light most favorable to the......
-
Anderson Development Co. v. Tobias
...that the SLAPP Act cannot operate retroactively because the legislature did not expressly provide for such operation. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R., 2004 UT 80, ¶ 39, 104 P.3d 1185 (noting that a statute affecting substantive rights "is not to be applied retroactively unless the stat......
-
Kerr v. City of Salt Lake
...at issue here, must show that the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the condition before the accident. Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d 1185;Schnuphase v. Storehouse Mkts., 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). Constructive knowledge may be proven by......
-
Utah Standards of Appellate Review - Third Edition
...LC v. Watts, 2009 UT App 137, ¶ 24, 210 P.3d 977. (29) Whether a statute operates retroactively. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co., 2004 UT 80, ¶ 36, 104 P.3d 1185; Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188, ¶ 4, 186 P.3d 960. (30) Whether the trial court correctly determined that an agreeme......