Goeing v. Outhouse

• Decision Date: 14 June 1880
• Citation: 95 Ill. 346,1880 WL 10042
• Parties: FREDERICK GOEING et al.v.OLIVER OUTHOUSE et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

95 Ill. 346

1880 WL 10042 (Ill.)

FREDERICK GOEING et al.

v.OLIVER OUTHOUSE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Mt. Vernon Jun. 14, 1880.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton county, the Hon. GEO. W. WALL, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. CASEY & DWIGHT, for the appellants:

The landlord's lien, in such a case as this, is not even dependent upon the levy of a distress warrant, but is given by the statute,--the statutory provision being express that every landlord shall have a lien upon the crops grown or growing upon the demised premises, in any year, for the rent that shall accrue for such year. Rev. Stat. 1874, page 661, sec. 31; Mead v. Thompson, 78 Ill. 62; Prettyman v. Unland et al. 77 Id. 206.

And such lien attaches from the time of the commencement of the growth of the crops. Watt v. Scofield, 76 Ill. 261.

Knowing that Carter was a tenant, appellees knew the appellants had a lien, because it was given by the statute, and every one is presumed to know the law. Watt v. Scofield, 76 Ill. 261.

If Roper, from whom appellees claim, had acquired any rights, he merely took Carter's place, and, in so doing, was bound to satisfy any unpaid rents. Farnham v. Hohman, 90 Ill. 312. To permit appellees to claim that they purchased this corn,--it matters not from whom, whether it be Carter, Roper or any one else,--would be granting that which the law does not warrant. There being jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, this judgment against Carter must stand until reversed. It can not be attacked collaterally. The findings of the court are conclusive. Adam v. Arnold, 86 Ill. 185; Goudy et al. v. Hall, 30 Id. 109; Elston et el. v. The City of Chicago, 40 Id. 514; Arnold et al. v. Gifford, 62 Id. 249.

These decisions clearly announce the doctrine, that not only are the parties to a judgment bound by it till reversed by an appellate court, but the judgment is conclusive as against strangers. It can not be impeached nor contradicted by third parties.

The alleged declaration of Krug, to constitute an estoppel as against appellants' lien, must have been one, the injurious influence of which might, and ought to, have been foreseen. It must have been acted upon in good faith, and Roper must have changed his situation so that injury would have resulted to him if Krug were allowed to retract the declaration. Bigelow on Estoppel, page 552, et seq.; Knoebel v. Kercher, 33 Ill. 308; Smith v. Newton, 38 Id. 230.

In other words, if Roper had been induced, by the acts or declarations of Krug, to purchase Carter's interest in the corn, then neither the appellants nor Krug could be heard to say the lien had not been waived. But there is no pretence that Roper was induced by anything Krug did, or said, to buy Carter's interest in the corn, and, therefore, Roper gained no advantage, nor acquired any rights by such supposed purchase. Hefner v. Vandolah, 57 Ill. 520; The People v. Brown et al. 67 Id. 435; Ball et al. v. Hooten, Admr. 85 Id. 159; Kinnear v. Mackey, 85 Id. 96.

Messrs. MURRAY & ANDREWS, for the appellees:

The questions involved are of fact--not of law. It may be conceded that a landlord's lien is not dependent on legal proceedings; that it attaches the moment the crop begins to grow, and that all persons are bound to notice it at their peril. We do say it may be waived, released or satisfied, and the landlord may be, by his conduct, estopped to assert it. Kinnear v. Mackey, 85 Ill. 96.

We had supposed that a judgment would not be conclusive against any person who was not and could not have been a party to the proceeding in which it was rendered. It is not perceived why the principle does not apply to appellees in the case at bar. Another reason why this judgment should not be held conclusive is, that no act or admission of Carter after the sale to appellees would be admissible as evidence for any purpose, and a judgment is merely a conclusive admission. But whether the judgment against the tenant is conclusive against appellees, is unimportant, for the reason that the circuit court held that it was conclusive, and confined appellees to the proof of two points only, viz: 1. Amount of corn taken. 2. Estoppel. No exception is alleged to this ruling, which was frequently repeated by the court in the hearing of the jury.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

Volney Carter, in the spring of 1876, rented from appellants forty acres of land on which to raise corn, the rent to be one-fourth of the crop.

On the 17th day of October, 1876, Carter having departed from the State, appellants issued their distress warrant against him for the rent alleged to be due, which was levied upon the undivided three-fourths of the forty acres of corn. On the 8th of November, 1876, on trial had before a justice of the peace upon this distress proceeding, judgment was rendered for the defendant, which, on appeal to the circuit court, was reversed, and a judgment was rendered in favor of appellants against Carter for $45 rent, and that they have execution against the property distrained for that sum and costs. In the meantime the appellees herein, claiming to have bought the corn levied upon by the distress warrant, had gathered and appropriated the same to their use.

This suit was then instituted by appellants, against appellees, before a justice of the peace, to recover damages for the alleged wrongful taking of such corn.

From the judgment before...