Goersen v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 20 March 1882
• Citation: 99 Pa. 388
• Parties: Goersen <I>versus</I> Commonwealth.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 388

99 Pa. 388

Goersen versus Commonwealth.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 19 and 20, 1882.

March 20, 1882.

January 19th and 20th 1882.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, and GREEN, JJ.

ERROR to the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1881, No. 123.

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Edmund Randall and William H. Ruddiman, for the plaintiff in error.—The purpose of an indictment is to inform a defendant of the offence charged against him, that, if innocent, he may prepare to defend himself upon the trial.

The indictment in this case gave the prisoner no intelligence of the facts charged as a crime against him, and afforded him no opportunity for preparation to meet the allegations of the Commonwealth subsequently made on the trial.

The indictment must contain a specific description of the offence. Wharton's Crim. Prac. & Pl. 154-166. This indictment is apparently drawn up under the provisions of the act of March 31st 1860, § 20: . . . . "It shall be sufficient, in every indictment for murder, to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased." This section must, however, be read in connection with the rest of the act, including section 11: "Every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law, which charges the crime substantially in the language of the act prohibiting the crime." Now this indictment charges the offence set out in section 74, same act:- "All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison . . . . shall be deemed murder in the first degree."

This indictment does not charge that the defendant did kill and murder by poison, and is not therefore drawn in conformity with the act prohibiting the crime.

The indictment is in direct violation of section 9 of the Declaration of Rights, giving the accused the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him."

The evidence as to Mrs. Souder's death was clearly improperly admitted: Regina v. Oddy, 5 Cox C. C. 210. There was lacking any evidence of motive on the prisoner's part to murder Mrs. Souder in connection with murdering his wife. This was essential to justify the admission of the evidence: Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 22 P.F. Smith 60; State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245; Wharton's Crim. Ev. 8 ed. 50.

It is true that no specific exceptions were taken to the charge, but the court will overlook this.

"It is the duty of a judge, trying a man for his life, to charge fully upon the law, without regard to points presented by counsel. The rule that a judge is not to be convicted of error for what he omits to say, ought not to be applied in a capital case. The prisoner has a right to have the jury properly instructed upon every question of law legitimately raised by the evidence, and this right he cannot waive, nor can his counsel do so for him:" Meyers v. Commonwealth, 2 Norris 131. The charge of the judge palpably violated this rule. It was directly against the prisoner, giving undue prominence to the theory of the prosecution and wholly disregarding that of the defence and the facts on which it was based.

George S. Graham, district attorney, and Henry S. Hagert, for the Commonwealth.—The indictment is in the form commonly used in this county since the Act of March 31st 1860. Prior to that Act it was not necessary to specify the degree in the indictment: Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 S. & R. 424; White v. Commonwealth, 6 Binn. 183; or to allege that the murder was committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any one of the offences named in the Act of 1794. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 7 W. & S. 418; Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 12 Wr. 396. And since the Criminal Procedure Act of 1860, the means used need not be set out: Lane v. Commonwealth, 9 P. F. S. 374.

It is alleged that the indictment is bad because in violation of the 9th section of the Declaration of Rights, which gives the accused the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him." But in Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 1 Wr. 115, the Act of 1860 was expressly held not to be in conflict with the Declaration of Rights, and in Commonwealth v. Twitchell, THOMPSON, C. J., in refusing an allocatur, held that the provisions of the Act were not in conflict with a similar provision of the Constitution of the United States. To the same effect is the later case of Campbell v. Commonwealth, 3 Norris 199, decided on the authority of Cathcart v. Commonwealth.

It is not to be doubted that evidence of collateral independent crimes cannot be received when offered simply to prove the prisoner's connection with the crime charged; or in other words, a man cannot be convicted of one offence by proving him to have been guilty at some other time of another and independent offence; but neither is it to be doubted that evidence may be given of extraneous crimes where they form part of the res gestæ, or tend to exhibit a chain of circumstantial evidence of guilt in respect to the act charged, or where it is alleged that the crime in question was one of a system of mutually dependent crimes, or where such evidence tends to establish the identity of the person by whom, or the instrument with which, the crime was committed, or to prove guilty knowledge, intent or motive; and in cases of alleged murder by poison, other cases of death by the administration of poison at the hands of the party charged may be given in evidence, to rebut the defence of suicide or accident; or in chief, to exclude the possibility of death by either of these latter causes: King v. Wylie, 1 New Rep. 92; Queen v. Ellis, 6 B. & C. 145; Queen v. Cobden, 3 F. & F. 833; Queen v. Dossett, 2 Carr. & K. 306; Queen v. Harris, 4 F. & F. 342; Kramer v. Commonwealth, 6 Norris 299; Queen v. Taylor, 5 Cox C. C. 138; Queen v. Richardson, 2 F. & F. 343; Queen v. Salt, 3 F. & F. 834: Queen v. Foster, 24 L.J. (M. C.) 134; Kilrow v. Commonwealth, 8 Norris 480; Queen v. Reardon, 4 F. & F. 76; Queen v. Voke, Russ. & Ryan C. C. 531; Queen v. Clewes, 4 Carr. & P. 221; Walter v. People, 6 Park. 15; Johnson v. State, 17 Ala. 618; Ferrigan v. Commonwealth, 8 Wright 386; Turner v. Commonwealth, 5 Norris 54; Carroll v. Commonwealth, 3 Norris 107; Campbell v. Commonwealth, 3 Norris 187; Queen v. Roden, 12 Cox C.C. 630; Heath v. Commonwealth, 1 Rob. (Va.) 735; Brown v. Commonwealth, 26 P.F. Smith 319; People v. Doyle, 21 Mich. 221; Queen v. Geering, 8 L. J. N.S. (M.C.) 215; Queen v. Garner, 3 F. & F. 681; S. C., 4 Ib. 347; Queen v. Cotton, 12 Cox C. C. 400; Queen v. Heeson, 14 Cox C. C. 40; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 22 P. F. Smith 61.

It is submitted that the charge was free from objection and omitted no material point.

Mr. Justice MERCUR delivered the opinion of the Court, March 20th 1882.

The first assignment of error is the refusal of the court to quash the indictment. The complaint is that it does not aver in what way or manner the murder was committed. Such objection is without force, since the Act of 31st March 1860. Section 20 thereof declares: "it shall be sufficient in every indictment for murder, to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased." Section 11 provides that "every indictment shall be deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law, which charges the crime substantially in the language of the Act prohibiting the crime."

This indictment charges the murder in the language of the Act, to have been committed feloniously, willfully and with malice aforethought. Conceding this to be so, it is contended the Act is in conflict with section 9 of the Declaration of Rights, which declares that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The argument is based on the assumption that "nature and cause" are equivalent to "mode or manner." They are clearly distinct. The nature and cause of a criminal prosecution is sufficiently averred by charging the crime alleged to have been committed. This must be done. The mode or manner refers to the instrument with which it was committed, or the specific agency used to accomplish the result. It is not necessary to aver either of these in the indictment. The 20th section of the Act is, therefore, not in conflict with the organic law. Cathcart v. Commonwealth, 1 Wright 108; Campbell v. Same, 3 Norris 187. Whenever one before trial needs more specific information than is contained in the indictment, to enable him to make just defence, it may be obtained on proper application to the court.

The second specification is to permitting the Commonwealth to give evidence of a separate and distinct offence, from that for which the accused was being tried. If that other offence, in fact, was separate and distinct from the one charged in the indictment, it is important to consider the purpose for which the evidence was offered. It is true, a defendant cannot be convicted of the offence charged, merely because he has committed another offence, either of a similar or a dissimilar kind. Hence, as a general rule, evidence of his participation in another independent and distinct crime, cannot be received simply for the purpose of proving his commission of the offence for which he is on trial: Whar. Crim. Ev. § 30; Coleman v. People, 55 N. Y. 90; State v. Renton, 15 N. H. 174; Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen 542...