Goff v. Arizona
| Citation | 526 F.Supp.3d 551 |
| Decision Date | 10 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 17-01623-PHX-JJT (DMF),CV 17-01623-PHX-JJT (DMF) |
| Parties | Angel GOFF, Plaintiff, v. State of ARIZONA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Arizona |
Bert H. Deixler, Pro Hac Vice, Patrick James Somers, Pro Hac Vice, Sarah Emily Moses, Pro Hac Vice, Kendall Brill & Kelly LLP, Los Angeles, CA, Stephen Dominic Benedetto, Peoples Law Firm PLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Plaintiff.
Brian Harrison Merdinger, Holly Marie Zoe, Scot L. Claus, Andrew Joseph Alvarado, Vail Choji Bryant Cloar, Dickinson Wright PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendant Juan Ignacio Ramirez, Jr.
Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, Roger W. Hall, Patrick J. Boyle, Michelle C. Lombino, Jeremy D. Horn, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, AZ, for Defendants State of Arizona, Ryan, McWilliams and Moody.
John J. Tuchi, United States District Judge Plaintiff Angel Goff, who is represented by counsel, brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Arizona state law. (Doc. 129.) Pending before the Court are (1) Defendants Ryan, McWilliams, Moody (hereinafter, "Prison Official Defendants") and the State of Arizona's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 141), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 152), and (2) Defendant Juan Ramirez's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 142), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. 149).
The Court will grant the Prison Official Defendants and State of Arizona's Motion and will deny Defendant Ramirez's Partial Motion.
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she is a transgender woman presently in the custody of the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC). (Doc. 129 ¶¶ 1, 21.) Plaintiff alleges that from 2014 until 2016, Defendant Ramirez, a Corrections Officer, "molested, impermissibly touched, and sexually assaulted" her. (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Ramirez's abuse, she "has experienced debilitating anxiety, severe depression, and suicidal ideations, in addition to post-traumatic stress symptomology." (Id. ¶ 67.) Plaintiff also names as Defendants the State of Arizona; then-ADC Director Charles Ryan; then-ADC Division Director of Offender Operations Carson McWilliams; and ASPC-Lewis Warden Chris Moody. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14.) Plaintiff sues the Prison Official Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief and in their individual capacities for damages.1 (Id. )
Count One asserts a claim of excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments against Defendant Ramirez; Count Two asserts a failure-to-protect claim under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments against the Prison Official Defendants; Count Three (assault and battery), Count Four (negligence), and Count Five (negligence per se) are all asserted against Defendants Ramirez and the State of Arizona. (Id. ¶¶ 68-127.) Plaintiff seeks damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys’ fees, and costs. (Id. at 22-23.)
The Prison Official Defendants and the State of Arizona move for summary judgment on the basis of exhaustion, qualified immunity, and statutory immunity. (Doc. 141.) Defendant Ramirez moves for partial summary judgment on the basis of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and statutes of limitations. (Doc. 142.)
A court must grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The movant bears the initial responsibility of presenting the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record, together with affidavits, if any, that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
If the movant fails to carry its initial burden of production, the nonmovant need not produce anything. Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Co., Inc. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 2000). But if the movant meets its initial responsibility, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate the existence of a factual dispute and that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and that the dispute is genuine, i.e., the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) ; see Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D. Co. , 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 1995). The nonmovant need not establish a material issue of fact conclusively in its favor, First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co. , 391 U.S. 253, 288-89, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968) ; however, it must "come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (internal citation omitted); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
At summary judgment, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In its analysis, the court must believe the nonmovant's evidence and draw all inferences in the nonmovant's favor. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider any other materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
Plaintiff is a male-to-female transgender woman and has been in ADC custody since 1996. (Doc. 153 (Pl.’s Statement of Facts) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff had plastic surgery to appear more feminine, underwent hormone therapy for 28 years, and is self-castrated. (Id. ¶ 3.) As of September 2019, Plaintiff is one of approximately 113 transgender prisoners in ADC custody, 19 of whom are at Arizona State Prison Complex (ASPC)-Lewis, a male prison facility in Buckeye, Arizona, which "leads the department in assaults." (Id. ¶¶ 4-5.) Plaintiff, "who in virtually all respects is a woman," has only been housed in male facilities since her incarceration began, including in dormitory housing with up to 30 male prisoners. (Id. ¶ 9.) ADC policy requires that transgender prisoners be housed and searched based on their biological sex at birth. (Id. ¶ 8.) The threat of violence and sexual violence to transgender prisoners "is an everyday occurrence" and, since 1996, Plaintiff has been harassed and abused by at least 3 prison guards, including Ramirez, and 15 prisoners; the harassment and abuse included unwanted advances, non-consensual touching, forced oral sex, beatings, and rape. (Id. ¶¶ 6, 7, 11.)
Around November 2015, ADC developed Department Order (DO) 810, which governs the management of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex prisoners. (Id. ¶ 13.) ADC formed a Transgender Committee whose objective is to ensure that transgender prisoners are housed safely and without being assaulted. (Id. ¶ 14.) The Transgender Committee is required to assess transgender prisoners within 7 days of intake and to reevaluate their housing every 180 days, taking into account the prisoners’ own views of their safety, but the Transgender Committee regularly failed to do either. (Id. ¶ 15.) Defendant McWilliams was on the Transgender/Intersex Committee while he was Division Director of Operations for ADC. (Doc. 139 (Defs.’ Statement of Facts) ¶ 32.) Between 2013 and 2015, McWilliams "was personally aware of 15-20 sexual assault complaints made by Plaintiff" but took no specific action to address them and the Transgender Committee did not address any of these complaints. (Doc. 153 ¶¶ 23-24.)
Defendant Ramirez began working as a correctional officer (CO) for ADC on July 30, 2012 and worked at the ASPC-Lewis, Buckley Unit, until he resigned on June 28, 2016. (Doc. 153 ¶¶ 33, 35; Doc. 139 ¶¶ 61-62.) Ramirez later admitted to an ADC investigator that he had "excessive sexual cravings," but nothing in ADC's hiring process was designed to uncover this. (Doc. 153 ¶¶ 33, 34.) On August 25, 2013, Ramirez's performance review stated that he "maintains a professional demeanor and demonstrates expertise in all he does" and an August 31, 2013 comment recommended that Ramirez receive permanent status. (Doc. 139 ¶¶ 68-69.)
On September 18, 2013, Ramirez was arrested and cited by the Phoenix Police Department for soliciting an undercover police officer posing as a prostitute. (Doc. 153 ¶ 36; Doc. 139 ¶ 72.) ADC conducted an Administrative Investigation into Ramirez's arrest, and Ramirez initially denied his involvement, but later reversed course and confessed. (Doc. 153 ¶¶ 37, 38.)
Deputy Warden Dorsey noted that Ramirez's actions constituted a Class 7 violation for "intentional untruthfulness" during the investigation, a Class 6 violation for violating the standards of conduct for State employees, and a Class 5 violation for committing "a less serious misdemeanor[.]" (Doc. 139 ¶ 80; Doc. 139-2 at 220.) On November 22, 2013, Ramirez was suspended for 80 hours without pay by Deputy Warden Dorsey as a result of his arrest. (Doc. 139 ¶¶ 78-79; Doc. 139-3 at 34.) "The Prison Officials never considered firing Ramirez" and did not supervise Ramirez more closely after his arrest or assess whether he might pose a risk to prisoners. (Doc. 153 ¶¶ 41, 42.) Ramirez testified that he did not have to register as a sex offender as a result of this incident. (Doc. 139 ¶ 86.) On January 31, 2014, Ramirez's performance review said, "End of the year close out meeting expectations."2 (Id. ¶ 70.) Ramirez complied with his annual training requirements from 2012 through June 2015, and he was rated as meeting all expectations for the July 2014 through 2015 rating period. (Id. )
In early 2015, Ramirez began harassing Plaintiff, first by...
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