Goff v. Barnhart

Citation421 F.3d 785
Decision Date31 August 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-3337.,04-3337.
PartiesGeneva GOFF, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Rockne Cole, argued, Iowa City, IA, for appellant.

John E. Beamer, argued, Assistant U.S. Atty., Des Moines, IA (Gary L. Hayward, Assistant U.S. Atty., and Jennifer L. Fisher, Assistant Regional Counsel, SSA, on the brief), for appellee.

Before MURPHY, BYE, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Geneva Goff appeals from the district court's1 order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits. Goff claims she is disabled because two strokes have affected her walking, motor capabilities, and speech. She also claims she suffers from depression. On appeal, Goff argues the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred by: 1) failing to give proper weight to the opinions of Goff's treating physician and psychiatrist, 2) discounting her subjective complaints of pain, and 3) finding Goff could perform the work of a companion or personal assistant. We affirm the decision of the district court.

I

In October 1995, Goff suffered a stroke. Following her stroke, she was neurologically normal and her condition was stable. In January 1997, Goff sought help for depression. In March 1997, Goff suffered a second stroke. During this time, she had been working as a Certified Nurse's Assistant (CNA). She continued work as a CNA until January 2001, when she was fired for allegedly slapping a resident. From early 2001 through the hearing, Goff worked approximately fifteen hours per week as a kitchen aide. Goff filed for disability benefits on January 29, 2001, and for supplemental security income on February 21, 2001, alleging she became disabled beginning January 19, 2001. Goff claimed she was unable to work because multiple strokes caused slurred speech and balance problems. Additionally, she claimed she suffered from depression.

The ALJ determined Goff met the disability insured status requirements of the Social Security Act on January 19, 2001, and continued to meet them through at least December 2005. The ALJ found Goff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 19, 2001. The ALJ further determined Goff suffered severe impairments in combination, consisting of degenerative changes in her knees, more severe on the left; obesity; status post strokes from 1997 with non-severe dysarthria; depression; and non-severe hearing loss amenable to improvement with a hearing aid. However, the ALJ found Goff's impairments did not meet the Social Security Income Listings.

While the ALJ concluded Goff was unable to perform past relevant work, the ALJ found Goff still retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform work which was limited to lifting 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally, and standing and/or walking no more than six hours of an eight-hour day. The ALJ determined Goff should avoid very complex and detailed work, but found she was capable of performing more than merely simple, routine, and repetitive work. In determining Goff's RFC, the ALJ found Goff was forty-nine years old, which is defined as a younger-aged individual; she had a high school education; and she had acquired work skills which were transferable to the skilled or semi-skilled work functions of other work, including feeding and transporting individuals, record keeping, and assisting with activity of daily living.

Further, in determining Goff's RFC, the ALJ concluded the hearing testimony regarding the intensity and severity of Goff's symptoms was not fully credible. At the hearing, Goff testified about the severe pain she experienced after working. The ALJ discounted Goff's subjective complaints because they were inconsistent with the record as a whole. The ALJ also found that Goff's limitations related to her speech and depression were not severe, and her seizures had been controlled with medicine. Additionally, the ALJ found no evidence Goff could not afford pain medication.

The ALJ also discounted certain opinions from two of Goff's treating sources. In early 2001, both Dr. Christopher Okiishi, Goff's treating psychiatrist, and Dr. Matthew Prihoda, Goff's long-term treating physician, submitted RFC assessments, where they backed Goff's claim of significant limitations. The ALJ did not request clarification from either doctor. Instead, the ALJ discounted both opinions, citing inconsistencies with other objective medical evidence, Goff's activity level, and her work history.

Accordingly, a Vocational Expert (VE), considering Goff's age, education, previous work experience, and RFC, determined jobs still existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Goff could perform. The VE cited personal attendant and companion as examples of such jobs. As such, the ALJ determined Goff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act.

II

This court reviews de novo a district court's decision upholding the Commissioner's denial of social security benefits. Reed v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). The court will affirm the ALJ's decision if it is "supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Tellez v. Barnhart, 403 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2005) (citation omitted). "Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion." Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1068 (8th Cir.2000). Evidence that both supports and detracts from the ALJ's decision should be considered, and an administrative decision is not subject to reversal simply because some evidence may support the opposite conclusion. Davis v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 962, 966 (8th Cir.2001). If, after reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ's findings, the court must affirm the ALJ's decision. Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1217 (8th Cir.2001).

The Commissioner's regulations governing determinations of disability set forth a five-step sequential evaluation process which the Commissioner must use in assessing disability claims. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir.2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(f)).

During the five-step process, the ALJ considers (1) whether the claimant is gainfully employed, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment, (3) whether the impairment meets the criteria of any Social Security Income listings, (4) whether the impairment prevents the claimant from performing past relevant work, and (5) whether the impairment necessarily prevents the claimant from doing any other work.

Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled. The fourth step in this analysis requires the ALJ to determine a claimant's RFC." Id. at 590-91. "A disability claimant has the burden to establish her RFC." Id. at 591 (citing Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 737 (8th Cir.2004)). If the claimant establishes her inability to do past relevant work, then the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner. Id. "The Commissioner must then prove, first that the claimant retains the RFC to do other kinds of work, and, second that other work exists in substantial numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able to perform." Id. (citing Nevland v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir.2000)). Moreover, "[t]he burden of persuasion to prove disability and to demonstrate RFC remains on the claimant, even when the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner at step five." Stormo, 377 F.3d at 806.

A

Goff contends the ALJ, in determining her RFC, erred by not giving proper weight to the opinions of her long-term treating physician and her treating psychiatrist. "[A] treating physician's opinion is given `controlling weight' if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence." Reed, 399 F.3d at 920 (quotations and citations omitted). "A treating physician's opinion `do[es] not automatically control, since the record must be evaluated as a whole.'" Bentley v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 784, 786 (8th Cir.1995). An ALJ may " discount or even disregard the opinion of a treating physician where other medical assessments are supported by better or more thorough medical evidence, or where a treating physician renders inconsistent opinions that undermine the credibility of such opinions." Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir.2000).

In August 2002, Dr. Prihoda, Goff's long-term treating physician, submitted an RFC assessment, where he found, among other things, that Goff could only stand or walk for two to three minutes at one time, could seldom reach with her upper extremities, and could handle objects for less than two hours of an eight-hour work day. The ALJ, finding the opinion inconsistent with other substantial evidence, discounted it. The ALJ pointed out Goff testified she worked five-hour shifts for fifteen to twenty-three hours a week as a kitchen helper, where she was on her feet for about two hours at a time, stacked dishes, lifted sacks of potatoes, and lifted ice buckets. We find this testimony to be substantial, indeed compelling, evidence inconsistent with Dr. Prihoda's assessment. As such, the ALJ is not required to give the assessment controlling weight. While the ALJ also found Dr. Prihoda's opinion to be internally inconsistent, we need not comment on that, as an appropriate finding of inconsistency with other evidence alone is sufficient...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3116 cases
  • Englerth v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 29 Septiembre 2016
    ...at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.'" Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first ca......
  • Johnston v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 30 Septiembre 2016
    ...at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.'" Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first ca......
  • Frieden v. Colvin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 11 Septiembre 2015
    ...at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.'" Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first ca......
  • Stephens v. Astrue
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • 14 Mayo 2012
    ...at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled.'" Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2004)). In this sequential analysis, the claimant first ca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume II
    • 4 Mayo 2015
    ...Supp.2d 1178, 1189-90 (D. Kan. 1999), §§ 105.5, 1105.8 Goerg v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 582, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1981), § 606.1 Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005), 8th-11, 8th-09, 8th-07, 8th-05 Goins v. Colvin , 764 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2014), 7 th -14 Gold v. Secretar......
  • Case Index
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Bohr's Social Security Issues Annotated - Volume I
    • 4 Mayo 2015
    ..., 397 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. Feb. 15, 2005), 8th-05 Ghanim v. Colvin , 763 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2014), 9th-14 Goff v. Barnhart , 421 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005), 8th-05 Goins v. Colvin , 764 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. Aug. 19, 2014), 7th-14 Guilliams v. Barnhart , 393 F.3d 798 (8th Cir. ......
  • Case index
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. I - 2014 Preliminary Sections
    • 2 Agosto 2014
    ...741 F.3d 758 (7 th Cir. Dec. 20, 2013), 7 th -13 Garza v. Barnhart, 397 F.3d 1087 (8 th Cir. Feb. 15, 2005), 8 th -05 Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785 (8 th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005), 8 th -05 Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798 (8 th Cir. Jan. 4, 2005), 8 th -05 Hilkemeyer v. Barnhart , 380 F.3d 4......
  • Table of cases
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Archive Social Security Issues Annotated. Vol. II - 2014 Contents
    • 3 Agosto 2014
    ...Supp.2d 1178, 1189-90 (D. Kan. 1999), §§ 105.5, 1105.8 Goerg v. Schweiker, 643 F.2d 582, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1981), § 606.1 Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785 (8th Cir. Aug. 31, 2005), 8th-11, 8th-09, 8th-07, 8th-05 Gold v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare , 463 F.2d 38, 41 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT