Goff v. Dailey
| Decision Date | 27 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-87-CV-10821.,4-87-CV-10821. |
| Citation | 789 F. Supp. 978 |
| Parties | George GOFF, Plaintiff, v. Steve DAILEY, Deputy Superintendent, and Richard Huckins, Correctional Officer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Philip B. Mears, Mears Law Office, Iowa City, Iowa, for plaintiff.
Layne M. Lindebak, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for defendants.
Plaintiff instituted the present lawsuit alleging violations of his constitutional rights on October 27, 1987. The parties consented to proceed before a U.S. Magistrate on June 19, 1991. By the time for trial the undersigned had been appointed a U.S. District Court judge. Trial in this matter was held on November 13, 1991.
5. On August 3, 1987, George Goff and other inmates were watching television in the recreational room at the Clarinda Facility. Another inmate asked Correctional Officer Huckins if the inmates would be allowed to watch television longer than normal that evening. Officer Huckins told them they would not be able to have that extension of time.
6. At that point, Goff, seated at a table, said to another inmate that Officer Huckins "must not have gotten any pussy before work."
7. Officer Huckins heard the comment and asked Goff to repeat it, which Goff did. Officer Huckins then told Goff that he was on report for that statement.
8. Goff then told Officer Huckins that he (Goff) could say anything he wanted to another inmate, as long as it was not directed at the officer.
9. After asking if the officer still intended to write the report, Goff indicated that he would take the officer to court.
10. A short time later, Goff returned and told Huckins that he was the wrong person to be "fucking with." Goff reiterated his statement: "You don't think I'm the wrong person to be fucking with, I'll go back to Fort Madison right now."
11. Goff was charged by Huckins and found guilty by the disciplinary committee of violating three different rules: # 14 (Threats/Intimidation); # 26 (Verbal Abuse); and # 27 (Obstructive/Disruptive Conduct).
12. On appeal, Deputy Superintendent Dailey affirmed the disciplinary committee's findings and found that Goff's reference to going back to Fort Madison supported a Rule 14 violation. Dailey interpreted that statement to mean that Goff might involve himself in dangerous conduct without regard to the likelihood of being transferred to Fort Madison as a result.
13. As a result of being found guilty of the rule violations, Goff received 3 days of disciplinary detention and 16 days loss of good time. However, the disposition was suspended and never imposed.
14. After this disciplinary report, Goff's security classification score was increased by two points. This score is one factor used in determining an inmate's eligibility for the "outs" program at Clarinda.
The plaintiff offers three arguments in support of his complaint against defendants. First, plaintiff asserts that his right of access to the court has been denied because he was punished for telling a correctional officer that he would take the officer to court if he received a disciplinary report. Secondly, plaintiff argues that his first amendment rights were violated when he was disciplined for making comments to other inmates. Finally, plaintiff claims his due process rights were violated because the disciplinary committee which found him guilty employed the "some evidence" test as a standard of proof in making their factual determinations.
With regard to plaintiffs' right of access to the court, the defendants do not dispute that an inmate cannot be punished for filing legal actions. Defendants concede that under certain circumstances, disciplining an inmate for threatening legal action may impermissibly burden an inmate's right of access to the courts. However, the facts in this case show plaintiff was placed on report for verbal abuse because he stated that Officer Huckins "must not have gotten any pussy before work." Goff then threatened Huckins twice. Goff initially tried to intimidate Huckins by threatening him with court action. Goff's second threat came later when he told Huckins that he was the wrong person to be fucking with and indicated he was ready to return to Fort Madison. A decision to place him on report had been made prior to Goff's threat of court action. Goff's subsequent comments provided the basis for additional charges.
Superintendent Dailey was troubled by Goff's comment that he was unconcerned about a potential transfer to Fort Madison, a far more restrictive institution than Clarinda. The court agrees that this could be construed as a threat and violation of Rule 14 in that it evidences a lack of concern for the consequences of actions that may be taken.
After reviewing the record, including Officer Huckins' report, the disciplinary committee's decision and Superintendent Dailey's decision, the court finds that there was ample evidence to support a charge of threats/intimidation, verbal abuse and disruptive conduct. The charges against Goff were not filed to punish him for threatening legal claims.
Plaintiff's second claim is that his first amendment rights were violated when he was punished for saying to another inmate that a correctional officer "did not get any pussy before work." Goff was charged with violating a correctional institution rule for making this statement. Rule 26 specifically states:
Verbal Abuse: An inmate commits verbal abuse when the inmate subjects another person to abusive or defamatory language, remarks, or gestures, in writing or orally, and includes insolence or disrespect to another person.
It is not disputed that Goff made the remark, though he denies making it to Officer Huckins. However, Officer Huckins heard the remark when Goff first made it in the recreational room.
In a prison setting, "an inmate's constitutional freedoms are inhibited to the extent that the exercise of such freedoms is inconsistent with necessities of implementing penal objectives in enforcing prison security." Guy v. State, 396 N.W.2d 197, 203 (Iowa App.1986). The Supreme Court has held that a "lesser standard of scrutiny is appropriate in determining the constitutionality of the prison rules." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 81, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2257, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Additionally, "when an applicant asserts a deprivation of a constitutional freedom, he has the burden of proof to show such a constitutional violation by a preponderance of the evidence." Williams v. State, 378 N.W.2d 894, 896 (Iowa 1985).
The prison disciplinary committee decided that Goff's comment violated Rule 26. The inmate's right to free speech in the prison context with its emphasis on discipline and control is curtailed, and disrespectful comments which contribute to lack of discipline are not permitted. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. at 2261 (). Balancing the respective interests presented, the court concludes that Goff's first amendment rights were not abridged when he was charged with and found to have violated this rule.
Plaintiff's third and final allegation is that his due process rights were violated because the disciplinary committee which found him guilty employed the "some evidence" test as a standard of proof in making its factual determinations. Plaintiff is correct to note the distinction between a standard of review, used by a reviewing court to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, and a standard of proof, which establishes the quantum of evidence a hearing officer or initial hearing body must rely on to find guilt. Determinations of fact made by initial hearing bodies are usually made utilizing a preponderance of the evidence standard. See e.g., Charlton v. F.T.C., 543 F.2d 903, 907-08 (D.C.Cir. 1976). The standard of review used by courts to evaluate prison disciplinary committee findings is the "some evidence"1 test.
The defendants admit in their answer to plaintiff's amended complaint that, "The disciplinary committee which found Mr. Goff guilty of violating the rules employed the `some evidence' test as a standard of proof in making their factual determinations." The disciplinary committee's use of the "some evidence" rather than the "preponderance of evidence" standard of proof violated Goff's due process rights.
The court finds, however, that Goff experienced no harm or actual damages as a result of this violation and is not entitled to compensatory damages.2 See Graham v. Baughman, 772 F.2d 441, 446 (8th Cir. 1985) (). An award of nominal damages of $1.00 is appropriate compensation. Graham, 772 F.2d at 447 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1050, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)) ("the denial of procedural due process should be actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual injury").
Based on the foregoing,
1. IT IS ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff for nominal damages of...
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...not address the prison's initial standard of proof. See, e.g., Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399 n. 4 (3d Cir.1987); Goff v. Dailey, 789 F.Supp. 978 (S.D.Iowa 1992); Young v. Coughlin, No. Civ-87-877E, 1989 W.L. 132012, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.1989). Other courts, however, have relied upon Hill to ......
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