Goff v. Harris, Civ. A. No. 80-82-NN.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1980
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 80-82-NN.
• Citation: 502 F. Supp. 1086
• Parties: Elizabeth S. GOFF, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

502 F. Supp. 1086

Elizabeth S. GOFF, Plaintiff, v. Patricia Roberts HARRIS, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

Civ. A. No. 80-82-NN.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Newport News Division.

November 10, 1980.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Herbert H. Bateman, Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, Newport News, Va., for plaintiff.

Michael A. Rhine, Asst. U. S. Atty., Norfolk, Va., for defendant.

ORDER

CLARKE, District Judge.

This matter comes to the Court on plaintiff Elizabeth S. Goff's Complaint and Motion for Order of Remand.

Background

On January 9, 1979, the plaintiff filed an application for disability insurance benefits with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,¹ alleging that she had been unable to work since August 19, 1978, because of various physical disabilities, including continuous breast pain due to fibrocytic disease, diabetes and high blood pressure. Tr. 43-46.² This application was denied initially on March 9, 1979, and, on reconsideration, on April 8, 1979. Tr. 47, 52.

The Administrative Law Judge later considered the plaintiff's case de novo and, after a hearing in which the plaintiff testified and was represented by counsel, denied plaintiff's claim on December 6, 1979. Tr. 7-15. On February 20, 1980, the Appeals Council reviewed and upheld the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Tr. 3-4. Accordingly, his decision stands as the final decision of the Secretary and the matter is ripe for review by the Court. Eppard v. Weinberger, 378 F.Supp. 970, 971 (W.D.Va. 1974); Thompson v. Ribicoff, 205 F.Supp. 308, 309 (S.D.W.Va.1962).

Based on a review of the record and the briefs submitted by both parties, the Court finds that the plaintiff's motion raises two issues: (1) whether the plaintiff has shown good cause pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), thus enabling the Court to remand the case for the taking of additional evidence, and (2) whether the Secretary's final decision denying plaintiff's claim for disability benefits is supported by substantial evidence.

Facts

The record discloses that the plaintiff is a forty-six year old woman with an eighth grade education, who was gainfully employed from age sixteen until August 19, 1978. Most recently, the plaintiff was employed as a transformer assembler for GTE-Sylvania, a position requiring continuous standing and heavy lifting. The plaintiff's previous employment includes positions as an assembly line worker in a shirt factory, an apartment maintenance employee, a store clerk, and an employee in an electronics firm. Tr. 26-29. At the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge, the plaintiff stated that she had stopped working in August 1978 to undergo surgery for the removal of a breast tumor. She added that she also had been suffering from high blood pressure, diabetes, a hernia, arthritis of the spine and joints, kidney and stomach problems, and depression. Tr. 26-39.³ She claimed that she continued to have severe chest pains after the operation, and that this ailment, coupled with her numerous other health problems, prevented her from working or carrying out many of her normal daily activities. Tr. 30-33, 37-40. In denying the plaintiff's claim for disability benefits, the Administrative Law Judge found that, although the medical evidence revealed multiple health problems, the plaintiff still had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work. Tr. 13.

The plaintiff contends that the Court should remand the case to the Secretary because of newly discovered medical evidence not available at the time of the hearing. In support of this argument, the plaintiff has submitted letters from Dr. William R. Gaver dated April 17, 1980, and from Dr. Margaret D. Smith dated May 6 and May 30, 1980. Plaintiff's Brief app. A, B & C. In addition, the plaintiff has submitted a medical report, dated April 12, 1980, prepared by Dr. Smith. Plaintiff's Brief app. C.

Law and Conclusions

Good Cause Shown

Under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976), the Court

may, at any time, on good cause shown, order additional evidence to be taken before the Secretary, and the Secretary shall, after the case is remanded, and after hearing such additional evidence if so ordered, modify or affirm his findings of fact or its decision, or both, and shall file with the court any such additional and modified findings of fact and decision, and a transcript of the additional record and testimony upon which his action in modifying or affirming was based.

Under these guidelines, a decision to remand a case to the Secretary for further consideration is within the discretion of the Court. See Tyler v. Weinberger, 409 F.Supp. 776, 785 (E.D.Va.1976). The courts have construed the term "good cause" liberally to achieve the remedial purposes of the Social Security Act. See Wray v. Folsom, 166 F.Supp. 390, 394-95 (W.D.Ark.1958). See also Bishop v. Weinberger, 380 F.Supp. 293, 297 (E.D.Va.1974). Where no party would be prejudiced by the acceptance of newly discovered evidence, the courts are not required to make a technical, meticulous finding of "good cause." Epperly v. Richardson, 349 F.Supp. 56, 61 (W.D.Va. 1972). Accordingly, the party seeking to have the case remanded is only required to make a general showing of the nature of the evidence he seeks to submit at the administrative proceeding. King v. Califano, 599 F.2d 597, 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Long v. Richardson, 334 F.Supp. 305, 306 (W.D.Va. 1971).

Nevertheless, when a claimant seeks to have a case remanded to the Secretary for "good cause," he bears the burden of showing that the newly discovered evidence bears directly and substantially on the issues decided, that it is not merely cumulative, and that it has a reasonable chance of altering the decision of the Secretary. See Hoss v. Gardner, 403 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1968) (per curiam); Neumerski v. Califano, 456 F.Supp. 979, 980 (E.D.Pa.1978); Justus v. Califano, 444 F.Supp. 97, 99 (W.D.Va. 1978); Morris v. Finch, 319 F.Supp. 818, 821 (S.D.W.Va.1969).

In deciding whether the plaintiff has shown "good cause" to have her case remanded to the Secretary for further proceedings, the Court is not limited to the record and will therefore consider the letters and the medical report submitted with plaintiff's brief See Flores v. Department of HEW, 465 F.Supp. 317, 326 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Sage v. Celebrezze, 246 F.Supp. 285, 288 (W.D.Va.1965). The letter submitted by Dr. William Garver is merely cumulative evidence. Dr. Garver states that Mrs. Goff is suffering from several medical problems and concludes that her employment possibilities are "limited." Plaintiff's Brief app. A. The record on which the Administrative Law Judge and the Appeals Council based their decisions contains numerous medical reports from doctors who examined the plaintiff. All of the ailments described by Dr. Garver were discussed in at least one of the medical reports in the record. Furthermore, the Administrative Law Judge, as well as those doctors who ventured an opinion on the matter, concluded that the plaintiff was suffering from multiple physical impairments that significantly limited the types of jobs that she could perform. Tr. 12-13, 90-91, 96-98, 139-142. Accordingly, this letter does not demonstrate the requisite "good cause" to remand the case to the Secretary.

The Court finds, however, that the letters and medical report submitted by Dr. Margaret Smith demonstrate "good cause" to remand the case for the taking of newly discovered evidence relevant to the petitioner's disability. Although these documents are of a fairly general nature, they state that the plaintiff has suffered additional complications since the final decision of the Secretary and, in addition, contradict the medical reports in the record. The medical report dated April 12, 1980, indicates that Mrs. Goff had to be hospitalized for several days because she required complete bed rest and intensive conservative back therapy. Plaintiff's Brief app. C. Moreover, the medical reports available during the administrative proceedings state that the plaintiff was capable of sitting and standing for long periods of time. See Tr. 85, 90, 96, 98, 141. Dr. Smith, however, concluded in her letters of May 6 and May 30, 1980, that the plaintiff was permanently disabled and that the severity of her back and leg pains made it almost impossible for her to sit or stand for any continuous period of time. Plaintiff's Brief app. B & C.

Accordingly, the documents submitted by Dr. Smith qualify as relevant, non-cumulative evidence of the plaintiff's disability that reasonably might alter the final decision of the Secretary. See Bishop v. Weinberger, 380 F.Supp. at 297; Epperly v. Richardson, 349 F.Supp. at 61-62; Urgolites v. Finch, 316 F.Supp. 1168 (W.D.Pa. 1970). Furthermore, a remand requiring the Secretary to consider this newly discovered evidence would not be prejudicial to the Secretary. The Government may order any additional independent examinations by medical experts and may make any additional inquiries it deems necessary to resolve the issue of the plaintiff's disability. See Bishop v. Weinberger, 380 F.Supp. at 297.

The Court is aware that, in addition to being viewed as additional evidence of the plaintiff's disability prior to the final decision of the Secretary, the documents submitted by Dr. Smith might be construed as evidence of a disability arising during a period subsequent to the Secretary's final decision. Nevertheless, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that the plaintiff was insured for disability purposes under the Social Security until December 31, 1982. Tr. 13. Clearly, then the plaintiff could file a new claim for benefits based on this evidence alleging that she had recently become disabled, and the previous adverse ruling of the Secretary would not be res judicata. See id. at 297; Noonan v. Richardson, 338 F.Supp. 734, 736 (E.D.Pa.1972); ...