Goff v. Kokomo Brass Works

• Citation: 43 Ind.App. 642,88 N.E. 312
• Decision Date: 13 May 1909
• Docket Number: No. 6,392.,6,392.
• Parties: GOFF v. KOKOMO BRASS WORKS.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana

43 Ind.App. 642

88 N.E. 312

GOFF

v.KOKOMO BRASS WORKS.

No. 6,392.

Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1.

May 13, 1909.

Appeal from Superior Court, Howard County; B. F. Harness, Special Judge.

Action by Joseph Goff against the Kokomo Brass Works. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

B. C. Moon, for appellant. John B. Joyce and Kirkpatrick & Morrison, for appellee.

MYERS, J.

Action by appellant to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while in the service of appellee. The issues were formed by the complaint and answer of general denial. The cause was tried by a jury and a verdict returned for appellee. From a judgment in favor of appellee, appellant has appealed to this court, assigning as error the overruling of his motion for a new trial.

The reasons assigned in support of the motion relate solely to the action of the court in sustaining the objections of appellant to certain questions propounded by appellee to the persons called to act as jurors, touching their competency and qualifications to so act. These questions called for information as to whether they were acquainted with any of the officers or agents of the Travelers' Insurance Company, whether any of them ever had any business relations with that company, whether they were then or ever had been the agent or in the employ of that company, or whether they then were acquainted with any agent of that company. Preliminary to these questions, appellant offered to introduce evidence to the court tending to show that the Travelers' Insurance Company was interested in the result of the suit, and this offer was refused. A complete examination of each of the jurors upon his voir dire is made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions. Appellee contends that, the jury being accepted by appellant without making any peremptory challenge or objection to the competency of any juror, he thereby waived any error that may have been committed in impaneling the jury.

From the objections made to the various questions propounded by appellant to each of the jurors, and from the rulings of the court as disclosed by the record, it appears that the court proceeded upon the theory that, as appellee was the only defendant of record, the latitude of appellant's inquiry did not extend to elicit the suggested information. The matter of impaneling a jury must to a great extent be left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it is only in cases where an abuse of that discretion is clearly shown will appellate tribunals disturb the judgment of that court. Courts of last resort having to do with questions not unlike in principle the one here presented, with almost one accord, have held that where parties are acting in good faith considerable latitude should be allowed along lines touching the competency of persons called as jurors to act in the matter under investigation, as also for the purpose of furnishing a basis upon which the court and parties may proceed intelligently, to the end that a fair and impartial jury may be obtained. Elliott's Gen. Prac. § 507; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 545, 1 N. E. 491;Evansville, etc., Co. v. Loge, 42 Ind. App. 461, 85 N. E. 979;Donovan v. People, 139 Ill. 412, 28 N. E. 964;Stoots v. State, 108 Ind. 415, 9 N. E. 380;Connors v. United States, 158 U. S. 408, 15 Sup. Ct. 951, 39 L. Ed. 1033; 24 Cyc. 341; Stephenson v. State, 110 Ind. 358, 362, 11 N. E. 360, 59 Am. Rep. 216.

The juror is no more than a witness, obliged to disclose upon his oath true answers to such questions as may be asked touching his competency to serve as a juror in the case about to be tried (Thornton on Juries & Ins. § 128; Burt v. Panjaud, 99 U. S. 180, 25 L. Ed. 451), and the court should exclude questions which are irrelevant and would not, however answered, affect the juror's competency in the particular case, or which would tend to mislead or confuse a juror, or would, as said in the case of Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332, 106 N. W. 833, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 357, clearly give “undue importance to the insurance company's connection with the case, since no such basis was necessary” (Howard v. Beldenville, etc., Co., 129 Wis. 98, 108 N. W. 48;Faber v. Reiss Coal Co., 124 Wis. 554, 102 N. W. 1049; Connors v. United States, supra; 24 Cyc. 341). In M. O'Connor v. Gillaspy, 170 Ind. 428, 83 N. E. 738, it is said: “Parties litigant, in cases of this class, are entitled to a trial by a thoroughly impartial jury, and have a right to make such preliminary inquiries of the jurors as may seem reasonably necessary to show their impartiality and disinterestedness. In the exercise of this right, counsel must be allowed some latitude, to be regulated in the sound discretion of the trial court, according to the nature and attendant circumstances of each particular case. The examination of jurors on their voir dire is not only for the purpose of exposing grounds of challenge for cause, if any exist, but also to elicit such facts as will enable counsel to exercise their right of peremptory challenge intelligently. Questions addressed to this end are not barred, though directed to matters not in issue, provided they are pertinent and made in good faith. It does not appear from the record that an accident or indemnity insurance company was in any manner interested in this action, but the laws of this state authorize the incorporation of companies for indemnifying employers against liability for...